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It is indeed a privilege to participate in this tribute to Charles O'Neill Gal-
vin on the occasion of his return to full time teaching after fifteen years as
Dean of Southern Methodist University School of Law. Thirty years ago
Dean Galvin began his distinguished career as a teacher and scholar.
Throughout his time as dean andprofessor he has been a leader in tax reform
and tax simplication efforts. My hope is that this Article, which considers
elements of reform, simplification, and tax justice at both the state andfederal
levels, will contribute to these efforts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On August 8, 1977, the Tax Court of the United States in Estate of Cas-
tleberry v. Commissioner,' reached a decision affecting all Texans, and
which, if consistently applied, will affect taxpayers in other states as well.
The court, in effect, held that Texas domiciliaries can never make gifts2 to
their spouses without having one-half of the gift3 subsequently included in
the donor spouse's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes under section
1. 68 T.C. 682 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978), nonacq.
1979-1 I.R.B. 7.
2. It has even been suggested that "[i]f the logic... [of Castleberry] withstands attack,
marriage in Texas results in an instantaneous gift to each spouse of a one-half life estate in
the other spouse's separate property, a gift that is subject to the gift tax." Note, Gift Tax
Liability Resulting From Marriage In Texas, 55 TEXAS L. REV. 1427, 1427 (1977).
3. See text accompanying notes 378-93 infra.
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2036 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,4 which provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE-The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer. . . under which
he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does not
in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property ....
In a subsequent decision, Estate of McKee v. Commissioner,5 the Tax
Court said that this principle applies to all transfers between husband and
wife of both income and nonincome producing property, including, in that
case, birthday and anniversary presents. Moreover, in a slightly different
context, in Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner6 the Tax Court held that a
transfer of community property to an irrevocable trust by one Texas
spouse for the benefit of the other spouse would require the inclusion of
one-half of the trust property in the donor's gross estate.
In Texas,7 Louisiana,8 and Idaho,9 unlike the other community property
4. I.R.C. § 2036. Henceforth textual references to "§ -" or "section --" will be to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, unless the context otherwise declares.
5. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) Dec. 35,049 (1978).
6. 69 T.C. 227 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
7. The Texas Family Code defines community property as "property, other than sepa-
rate property, acquired by either spouse during marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b)
(Vernon 1975). While the Texas Constitution does not define community property, it de-
fines separate property as "[all property, both real and personal, of the wife, owned or
claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by gift, devise or descent."
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; accord, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975). From
this constitutional definition of separate property, the Texas Supreme Court has determined
that income from separate property is community and that the legislature is powerless to.
expand the definition of separate property. Moss v. Gibbs, 370 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1963);
Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925). See also 3 L. SIMPKINS, TEXAS
FAMILY LAW § 15:39 (Speer's 5th ed. 1976). The Texas Supreme Court has also held that
the legislature is powerless to transform one type of constitutionally defined property into
another type of property, Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1966) (legislature
powerless to authorize spouses to create joint tenancy with right to survivorship in commu-
nity property without first partitioning such community property), and that the courts are
powerless in a divorce proceeding to divest one spouse of his or her separate real property
and transfer title to the other spouse. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1977).
So too, to maintain the integrity of separate property, the Texas Supreme Court has held
that gains in the nature of a change in the form of, or appreciation in, capital constituting
separate property, including mineral rights and stock dividends, are not deemed revenue or
income for marital property purposes and thus remain separate property. See, e.g., Scofield
v. Weiss, 131 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1942); Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676
(1953). See note 281 infra and accompanying text.
Despite the reaffirmation of the rule of implied exclusion in the Eggemeyer decision in
1977 and in Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), discussed at notes 449-51
infra, the 1972 decision in Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972), suggests that the
Texas Supreme Court may recognize an additional test for classifying property as commu-
nity or separate. The test of Graham would appear to constitute an indirect expansion of the
constitutional definition of separate property in some cases. In Graham the supreme court
was confronted by a constitutional challenge to § 5.0 1(a) of the Texas Family Code, which
provides that "recovery for personal injuries sustained by the spouse during marriage" shall
be separate property. In upholding the validity of § 5.01(a)'s classification of personal inju-
ries recoveries as separate property, the court reasoned that such receipts must be separate
property since community property, to be such, must be acquired by the joint efforts of the
1094 [Vol. 32
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jurisdictions, income from separate property is community property. In
Castleberry and its progeny, McKee and Wyly, the Commissioner seized
upon this principle to reason that the income from the transferred property
will be community income, and, therefore, that the donor spouse has made
a transfer of property and retained a life estate in the transferred property
requiring inclusion of a portion of the transferred property in the trans-
feror's gross estate pursuant to section 2036(a)." °
The fundamental issue in Castleberry and McKee, seemingly never ad-
dressed by the Tax Court, is whether the nexus or connection between the
transfer and the income interest of the donor spouse is broken since, after
the transfer, the donee spouse has an absolutely unfettered right to cut off
the income interest of the donor by (1) merely dissipating or otherwise
disposing of the transferred property, (2) moving to a separate property
jurisdiction, (3) divorcing the donor, or (4) dying." Alternatively, the
spouses. Chief Justice Greenhill said that a definition of community property existed in
Spanish law, and "in adopting the provisions of Section 15 of Article 16 of our constitution,
the people did not intend to change the common law or the Spanish law under which Texas
operated." He concluded, therefore, that it was appropriate to use the Spanish definition of
community property:
A much later case of this Court reverted to a test more akin to that prevail-
ing under the Spanish and Mexican law, and several early opinions of this
Court, dealing with community property. It applied an affirmative test; i.e.,
that property is community which is acquired by the work, efforts or labor of
the spouses or their agents, as income from their property, or as a gift to the
community. Such property acquired by the joint efforts of the spouses, was
regarded as acquired by "onerous title" and belonged to the community. Nor-
ris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953); DeBlane v. Lynch, 23
Tex. 25 (1859); Smith v. Strahan, 16 Tex. 314 (1856); Epperson v. Jones, 65
Tex. 425 (1886); De Funiak, Principles of Community Property (1971) § 62;
Moynihan, Community Property, 2 American Law of Property (1952) § 7.16
In light of the foregoing, it is our conclusion that, in adopting the provisions
of Section 15 of Article 16 of our constitution, the people did not intend to
change the common law or the Spanish law under which Texas operated
Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d at 392, 393 & 395.
Continued use of the test of Graham would likely result in an increase in the number of
items of property that are classified as separate, whereas under Arnolds rule of implied
exclusion, the balance would be weighted in favor of community classification.
8. LA CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2334 (West 1971). But see text accompanying notes 85-86
infra.
9. IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (income can be declared separate property of donee if such
designation appears in the instrument of transfer).
10. Texas law prevents Texas spouses from frustrating this analysis by agreeing between
themselves that all income to be realized from the transferred property will be the separate
property of the donee spouse. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), dis-
cussed at notes 449-51 infra;, Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933,
judgmt adopted), discussed at note 451 infra. See generally 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7,
§ 16:3. Only after such income comes into existence can the spouses convert it into separate
property by interspousal gift, written partition agreement, or dissolution of the community.
See id §§ 22:5, :13. Nonetheless, it appears that the settlor of a trust can earmark the trust
income as the separate property of the donee beneficiary. See notes 309-15 infra and accom-
panying text.
11. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975) provides that: "Each spouse has the
sole management, control, and disposition of his or her separate property." The right of a
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question is whether the transferor can be deemed to have retained an inter-
est in the transferred property within the meaning of section 2036(a) if the
transferor has no means by which to compel the production of income or
otherwise control the enjoyment of the transferred property.12 This is not
to say, however, that the income produced by the transferred property is
not taxable to the transferor as community property. It is submitted that
the correct analysis in Castleberry and McKee would cause (1) the exclu-
sion of the transferred property from the transferor's gross estate when the
transferred property becomes the donee's separate property; and (2) the
inclusion in the transferor's gross estate of his portion of the community
income produced prior to his death that is then identifiable. 3 Perhaps the
validity of this proposition can be demonstrated by noting the tax conse-
quences if the donee spouse died first. In such a case the entire value of
the transferred property would be included in her gross estate for federal
estate tax purposes, 4 and the property itself would be disposed of under
her will, or in absence of a will, 5 under the applicable intestate statutes.
1 6
In Wyly the issues are slightly different. There was, for example, no
possibility that the donor's spouse could alter the terms of the trust or con-
trol the trustee's exercise of discretion in administering the trust and
thereby deprive the donor of any rights in the trust that he had by virtue of
its terms or by virtue of applicable law. In point of fact, the irrevocable
trust made no provision whatsoever for the donor, and, accordingly, it is
clear that he expressly retained no interest whatsoever in the property
transferred to the trust. The question remains, however, whether the dece-
dent retained any interest in the property transferred to the trust by opera-
tion of state law. ' In particular, the issues are:
(1) Whether trust income is separate or community property.'
(2) If trust income is community property, does the donor spouse
who has a community interest in the income produced by the
trust have any ability to compel the production and distribution
of such income?' If he does not, can it still be said, as the court
spouse to dispose of his or her separate property is, with the exception of homestead prop-
erty, unlimited. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975); 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7,
§ 17:4. Furthermore, by statute, a married person has full power to contract and may enter
into contracts, including contracts to sell real property, mortgage such property, or lease
such property by such spouse's separate deed and act. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03
(Vernon 1975); 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 19:4; see Allen v. Monk, 505 S.W.2d 523, 526
(Tex. 1974); Broadway Drug Store of Galveston, Inc. v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
12. See notes 368-69 infra and accompanying text.
13. The Government did not expressly attempt to include in Mr. Castleberry's gross
estate any portion of the community income realized from the bonds he transferred to his
wife, probably because the taxpayer had voluntarily included this property inasmuch as it
had already been reduced to possession as community property.
14. I.R.C. § 2033; see notes 394-400 infra and accompanying text.
15. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (Vernon 1975).
16. Id § 45.
17. See text accompanying notes 151-93 infra.
18. See text accompanying notes 195-327 infra.
19. See text accompanying notes 231-33 infra, cf. Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner, 241
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), discussed at text accompanying notes 368-69 infra.
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did in Wyy, that the donor spouse retained an interest in the
transferred property within the meaning of section 2036(a) even
though he had no legally enforceable right to compel the produc-
tion of income or the distribution of such income?
(3) What significance should be attached to Mrs. Wyly's right to
withdraw $5,000 per annum from the trust corpus? To her right
to divorce Mr. Wyly or the possibility that she might remove her-
self from Texas? Does the outcome in Wyly then turn on the
same factors as the outcome in Castleberry and McKee?
20
Had the Tax Court in Castleberry and McKee recognized the basic issue
in those cases, it might have found Estate ofAllen D. Gutchess2' and Estate
of Uhi v. Commissioner22 persuasive and dismissed the Commissioner's
claim. Unfortunately, the Tax Court apparently believed that the donee
spouse did not have the unrestricted right to cut off the income interest of
the donor spouse despite the fact that it was her separate property. The
court simply and erroneously confused the income from the transferred
property, the fruit, which could not be frittered away, with the property
itself, the tree, which could be frittered away by the surviving spouse.
If the Fifth Circuit makes the same mistake, Texas will either have to
change its local law, which apparently means changing the state constitu-
21tion, or work to have Congress expressly carve out a special exception in
federal law. 24 This is because it seems clear that Congress did not intend
to deny residents of Texas the right to make interspousal gifts by causing
them to be specially taxed on those gifts when residents of other states
could make such gifts without such special tax consequences. 2
5
As outlined above, the questions in Wyly are more complex and no easy
solution seems apparent. Not to be overlooked is the point that Mr. Wyly
could have transferred the property in trust ostensibly for the benefit of his
wife, relying on the widely held belief that trust income is community
property to give him an interest in that which he appeared to have trans-
20. See text accompanying notes 190-91 infra.
21. 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2, discussed at text accompanying notes 62-63
infra.
22. 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'g 25 T.C. 22 (1955), discussed at text accompanying
notes 368-69 infra.
23. See note 7 supra.
24. See notes 371-73 infra and accompanying text.
25. But see Freedman v. United States, 382 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1967), a case involving
the application of I.R.C. § 2042. In Freedman the Fifth Circuit recognized the difference in
the tax impact of various sections of the Internal Revenue Code on community property
states versus noncommunity property states. The court stated in response to an assertion by
the taxpayer that the affirmance of the Commissioner's position would frustrate the national
policy of tax equalization, that "[w]hile this point ... seems persuasive, the simple answer is
that a different result under community-property law is compelled because Mrs. Freedman
had a property interest in Texas which she would not have had in a non-community prop-
erty state." Id at 748. Congress has recognized that an equal tax result is not possible in
every case because of differences in property rights held by citizens of community and non-
community property states, see S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1948), reprinted in
1948-1 C.B. 305, but, again in 1976, it made an effort "to provide substantial parity between
common law states and community property law states." JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,




ferred. While the facts seem to suggest no such connivance on Mr. Wyly's
part, it is possible that in another case the donor may have established such
a trust with a tax avoidance purpose in mind.
Two other significant issues in Castleberry, Wyy, and McKee are:
(1) Whether section 2036 contemplates retention by operation of
law.26
(2) Whether the Texas concept of sole management community
property27 so limits the transferor's community interest in the in-
come from the transferred property that such income is not
deemed "possessed or enjoyed" or does not constitute a "right to
income" as contemplated by section 2036, even though that com-
munity income is in his gross estate for federal estate tax pur-poses. Y
This Article considers the validity of the respective positions asserted in
Cast/eberry, Wyy, and McKee. While it also suggests means of making
interspousal transfers without Casteberry-like results, 29 it attempts to
demonstrate that there is little federal tax law or state property law incen-
tive for such transfers.3"
II. THE CASTLEBERRY, WYLY, AND MCKEE DECISIONS
A. Background
The principle at issue in Castleberry has been the subject matter of liti-
gation and controversy for almost thirty years. Just when taxpayers be-
lieve they have again put the issue to rest, the Government resurrects it.
Whenever lawyers first become aware of Castleberry and its progeny, they
uniformly react with expressions of disbelief followed by various analyses
26. See text accompanying notes 151-94 infra.
27. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (Vernon 1975) provides as follows:
(a) During marriage, each spouse has the sole management, control, and dis-
position of the community property that he or she would have owned if
single, including but not limited to:
(I) personal earnings;
(2) revenue from separate property;
(3) recoveries for personal injuries; and
(4) the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all property
subject to his or her sole management, control and disposition.
(b) If community property subject to the sole management, control, and dis-
position of one spouse is mixed or combined with community property
subject to the sole management, control, and disposition of the other
spouse, then the mixed or combined community property is subject to the
joint management, control, and disposition of the spouses, unless the
spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agree-
ment.
(c) Except as provided in Subsection (a) of this section, the community prop-
erty is subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the
husband and wife, unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of at-
torney in writing or other agreement.
28. Of course, if the Fifth Circuit accepts either the "right of termination" argument or
the "inability to compel" argument, it need never address this question.
29. See text accompanying notes 401-14 infra.
30. See notes 394-400 infra and accompanying text.
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suggesting the incorrectness of the decision and offers of citations to earlier
cases that if brought to the attention of the Fifth Circuit will clearly cause
it to reverse the Tax Court. For that reason it is appropriate to examine
the relevant precedent and to note the manner in which it was analyzed by
the Tax Court.
Estate of Hinds. The issue presented in Castleberry was initially consid-
ered in 1949 in Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds.31 In Hinds, the decedent,
H, 32 and his spouse, W, had transferred certain community property to an
irrevocable trust with income from the trust to be paid to W for life and
then to their children. The Tax Court found that under Texas law the
income of the trust was the community property of the spouses as long as
the community existed.33 From this finding, the Tax Court concluded
that, under the predecessor of section 2036, one-half of the value of the
property that the decedent transferred to the trust--one-quarter of the
whole-was includable in his gross estate because under Texas law he had
retained the right to one-half of the income from the transferred property.
In reaching the question of includability, the Tax Court specifically noted
that it made no difference, because of the community property law in
Texas, whether the decedent, H, affirmatively retained the income right or
whether it arose under operation of law.34
The Internal Revenue Service nonacquiesced35 in the Tax Court's deter-
mination and appealed on the grounds that the Tax Court had erred in
determining the amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate. The
Service contended that the entire value of the one-half community prop-
erty interest transferred rather than one-half of that value-one-quarter of
the whole-was includable in the gross estate.
The taxpayer in Estate of Hinds did not appeal because of monetary
31. 11 T.C. 314 (1948), aI#'don other grounds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), nonacq.
1949-1 C.B. 5.
32. In the cases discussed in this Article the donor spouse was the male, and for conven-
ience of reference, the letter "H" will often be employed to refer to the donor spouse. The
principles discussed, however, will be equally applicable when the donor spouse is the fe-
male partner.
33. The Tax Court decision in Hinds is particularly easy to criticize. The court clearly
set forth the basis of its decision. It reasoned that since the taxpayer owned one-half the
value of the community income generated by the transferred property, he must have re-
tained such right to income.
As we have already pointed out, the decedent did not specifically retain or
reserve any income from his part of the community property which was trans-
ferred to the trust; yet, under the law of Texas, he was clearly the owner of
one-half of the income from the property which he conveyed to the trust so
long as he should live. This being the case, we think decedent "retained" the
right to one-half of the income from the property which he conveyed to the
trust within the meaning of the language used in Section 81 l(c) above quoted.
II T.C. at 324; see text accompanying notes 154-64 infra. In later cases, the courts have
taken pains to point out that I.R.C. § 2036 contemplates retention at the time of transfer and
that possession at death is not equivalent to retention at the time of transfer. See, e.g.,
Terriberry v. United States, 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed at text accompanying
note 90 infra; In re Estate of Lumpkin, 474 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1973).
34. 11 T.C. at 324.
35. 1949-1 C.B. 5.
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reasons, but, upon appeal by the Internal Revenue Service, the taxpayer
urged that the Tax Court's decision be affirmed, not because it was right,
but because it gave the Service more than it was entitled to, and therefore
it should not complain.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the taxpayer and
affirmed the Tax Court's decision without approving it and denied the pe-
tition for review stating:
We do this upon the authority of the settled law of Texas, that
whether the income be regarded as separate property of the wife or as
community income from the wife's separate property, the taxpayer re-
tained neither "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the in-
come from," the property so as to make applicable [section
2036(a)(1)], invoked by the commissioner and in part applied by the
Tax Court.36
Largely as a result of the language used by the Fifth Circuit in Estate of
Hinds, the Internal Revenue Service was unsuccessful in sporadic efforts
to include in the gross estate of a deceased transferor under section
2036(a)(1) or its predecessor any part of the value of property transferred
by one spouse to the other during lifetime on the grounds of retained life
estate by operation of law.3 7
Nonetheless, in 1975, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 75-504,38
wherein the Commissioner stated he would not follow the dictum of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hinds. The Commissioner probably
based this decision upon the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the Tax Court with
respect to the amount includable in the decedent's gross estate in Estate of
Bomash v. Commissioner.39
Estate of Bomash. In Estate of Bomash v. Commissioner4' the decedent's
husband had set up a testamentary trust consisting entirely of community
property. By the terms of I's will, fifty percent of the trust income was
payable to W for life with the other fifty percent of the income going to
children and grandchildren. Approximately one-half of the trust corpus
consisted of Ws share of the community property and the other half of the
corpus consisted of I's share of the community. Ws share was placed in
the trust by means of an endorsement to -'s will in which she acquiesced
in his disposition of all of the community property.
The Tax Court found that Ws election to take under ifs will, rather
than her statutory share, constituted a "transfer" of property within the
meaning of section 2036(a) and held that one-half of the value of her one-
half community property--one-quarter of the whole property-was in-
cludable in her gross estate. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax
36. Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds, 180 F.2d 930, 932 (5th Cir. 1950) (footnote omit-
ted).
37. See notes 356-63 infra and accompanying text.
38. 1975-2 C.B. 363, discussed at text accompanying note 42 infra.
39. 432 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 50 T.C. 667 (1968).
40. 432 F.2d at 308.
1100 [Vol. 32
INTERSPO USAL TRANSFERS
Court and held that fifty percent of the trust corpus was includable in Ws
estate.
The Tax Court had followed the reasoning of the Tax Court in Estate of
Hinds that W, by her transfer, had completely intermingled her property
with the property passing under -'s will and, since she retained only fifty
percent of the income interest in the whole trust, she retained only fifty
percent of the income from the property she transferred to the trust, that is,
one-half of her one-half community property interest. The Ninth Circuit
disagreed and reasoned:
The retention of 50% income from the entire trust corpus (which in-
cludes Fannie Bomash's half contribution) is identical in substance to
a retained 100% income life estate in her own one-half of the commu-
nity property. The objective economic reality of this case is the fact
that Mrs. Bomash did not alter her position by placing her community
property share in trust. We are guided by the Supreme Court's cau-
tion in United States v. Grace's Estate, 395 U.S. 316 . . . (1968) that
"the law searches out the reality and is not concerned with the form".
Most importantly, we heed the Grace Court's clear rule that "the taxa-
bility of a trust corpus * * * does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but
depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer".41
Revenue Ruling 75-504. In Revenue Ruling 75-50442 H gave W $15,000
in cash from his separate property, which W deposited in a savings ac-
count as her separate property. On Y's death, one-half of the cash plus
one-half of the accrued interest on the account to date of death was held to
be includable in H/s gross estate. The Internal Revenue Service reasoned
that under section 2036 H had "retained," by operation of Texas commu-
nity property law, an income interest for his life with respect to one-half of
the property transferred. It based its conclusions on the principle of Texas
law that income from separate property is community property. The rul-
ing further reasoned that although such income may be placed under the
donee spouse's exclusive control and may be exempted from liabilities cre-
ated by the donor spouse, the ownership interest of the donor spouse in
that income cannot be eliminated, even by statute, since such income is
community property and cannot be separate property under the Texas
Constitution. This latter phrase relies upon Texas precedents that hold
that a husband and wife cannot by agreement alter the characterization of
community property income and characterize it as separate property until
it is earned.43 Although the Texas Constitution permits partition of ex-
isting community property," income to be realized in the future is consid-
ered after-acquired property and requires further partition after it is
realized.4"
Revenue Ruling 75-504 is the authority upon which the Service litigated
41. Id at 311 (footnote omitted; citation omitted; emphasis in original).
42. 1975-2 C.B. 363.
43. See note 10 supra and note 449 infra.
44. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.42 (Vernon 1975).
45. See note 451 supra and accompanying text.
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Castleberry and its progeny, and a number of other cases currently work-
ing their way through the administrative process.
B. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner46
The Tax Court's Opinion. Mr. Castleberry, H, transferred to his wife, W,
his community one-half share of income producing municipal bonds,
which became Mrs. Castleberry's separate property. Relying on the princi-
ple of Texas law that income from separate property is community prop-
erty, the Government sought to include one-half the transferred property
in I's gross estate on the authority of section 2036.
The taxpayer made three arguments in support of its contention that the
Tax Court decision in Estate of Hinds47 is incorrect and that section
2036(a)(1) is inapplicable to transfers of a Texas community property in-
terest by one spouse to the other, where the donor spouse continues to hold
a community property right to the income by operation of state law. Those
arguments were:
(1) The decedent "retained" no interest in the income from the
bonds within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1) since there was
no agreement, prearrangement, or understanding, either express
or implied, between the donor and donee providing for such re-
tention;
(2) Even if the decedent "retained" an interest, it was not retained
"under" the transfer as required by section 2036(a)(1); and
(3) Decedent did not retain "possession or enjoyment of, or the right
to the income from, the [transferred] property," since under
Texas law his wife had the sole management, control, and dispo-
sition of the transferred property4 8 and was free to deal with the
community income from the transferred property without the
participation, interference, or consent of the decedent,49 and
since the community income was not subject to any debts con-
tracted by decedent."
The Tax Court disagreed with the taxpayer and offered these reasons:
(1) Relying upon the reason given by the Tax Court in Estate of
Hinds, the court distinguished decisions cited by the taxpayer"
and emphasized that those decisions did not hold that a finding
of an implicit or an explicit agreement was a precondition to the
legal conclusion that a decedent had retained an interest in the
transferred property under section 2036(a). The court reasoned
that such an agreement was unnecessary as, by operation of state
law, decedent held an income interest in the transferred property
after the transfer. The court, therefore, held that section 2036(a)
applies when the donor holds an income interest in transferred
46. 68 T.C. 682 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
47. Note 31 supra.
48. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (1975); see discussion at notes 105-37 infra and ac-
companying text.
49. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.22 (1975), quoted at note 27 supra.
50. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (1975); see text accompanying notes 105-37 infra.
51. See discussion at note 161 infra and accompanying text.
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property by operation of state law as well as when he expressly
or impliedly retains the interest under the transfer instrument.
(2) The court concluded that the petitioner's second argument was
substantively identical to the first argument and that the peti-
tioner was placing "too constricted an interpretation" on section
2036(a), and that the statutory language "means only that the life
interest must be retained in connection with or as an incident to
the transfer."52
(3) In rejecting the petitioner's third argument, the Tax Court ex-
pressed its perception of applicable Texas community property
law in these terms: Ws control and right to disposition of the
transferred property was not absolute with respect to the commu-
nity income therefrom; her right of disposition over the trans-
ferred property was considered to be held in trust for the benefit
of the community, and her control and use of the community
income was subject to Yfs right to an accounting if such income
were used to benefit Ws separate property. Moreover, while
under Texas law community income from Ws separate property
was not directly subject to the debts the decedent incurred before
marriage, that community income would be subject to the pay-
ment of Fs debts upon dissolution of the community at his
death or divorce. Furthermore, one-half of the community in-
come would be includable in the decedent's gross income for fed-
eral income tax purposes if Mr. Castleberry and his wife filed
separate income tax returns.
Based upon this analysis, the Tax Court concluded that while
the decedent had no direct control over the management of the
income, W did not have ownership of more than one-half. W
"controlled" ifs one-half "only in a fiduciary capacity for his
benefit."53 The decedent's right to income, therefore, was not il-
lusory, but an enforceable right sufficient to require inclusion of
a portion of the transferred property in his gross estate under
section 2036(a)(1).
Analysis of the Opinion. In rejecting the taxpayer's third argument, the
Tax Court was confused about Texas law and that confusion may have
caused its failure to address the critical issue. The court, for example,
stated: "We . . .are of the opinion that decedent's wife's control over the
transferred property and community income was not absolute and adverse
to decedent's interest and was not equivalent to ownership of the commu-
nity income."54 This statement is only partially true. While the wife's con-
trol over the "community income was not absolute," she had total
dominion and control over the transferred property, including the right to
dissipate it on any frolic of her own without any accountability to her
spouse.55 Unfortunately, this misstatement by the Tax Court was not an
52. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682, 687 (1977) (quoting from Estate
of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959)).
53. 68 T.C. at 690.
54. Id at 688.
55. See note 11 supra.
19791 1103
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
isolated example, but is representative of the court's expressed perception
of Texas law and characterizes its opinion. For example, despite over-
whelming and unanimous authority to the contrary, the court stated: "We
note initially that her right of disposition over the transferred property was
not an arbitrary one but one held in trust for the benefit of the commu-
nity.""
In the following portion of the opinion, the court was technically correct,
but it is obvious from the context that the court incorrectly assumed that
the donor spouse had enforceable rights in the transferred property and
not merely a claim to income once it was produced.
Her control and use of the community income was subject to limita-
tions. For example, decedent or his heir could have brought an action
for an accounting, were the community income used to benefit dece-
dent's wife's separate property. . . .In addition, her control over the
community income could not be exercised in fraud of decedent's
rights as by making a gift to a third person .... 57
In view of these factors, we conclude that decedent's right to the
income was not illusory, but an enforceable right sufficient to require
inclusion of a portion of the transferred property in his gross estate
under section 2036(a)( 1).58
In defense of the Tax Court's analysis, it could be explained that
notwithstanding the Tax Court's obvious confusion about Texas law as
applied to the facts in Castleberry, Texas law clearly would characterize
any income produced by the transferred property as community prop-
erty. 59 Moreover, the fact that no income was produced from the trans-
ferred property is irrelevant in determining whether the decedent retained
a life estate in transferred property for federal tax purposes.6 °
Unfortunately, this analysis is deceptively simple, and ignores, as did the
Tax Court, the fundamental issue in Castleberry. That issue is whether the
connection between Castleberry's transfer to his wife and the fact that any
income produced by that property would be community property was sev-
ered by the fact that his wife had the absolute and unfettered right to cut
off or divest him of any and all future income or future enjoyment of the
transferred property by simply divorcing him, moving to a separate prop-
erty state, dying with a will in favor of the milkman, or dissipating it all on
the ponies.61 The income that was produced before one or more of these
56. 68 T.C. at 688.
57. Id
58. Id at 690 (footnote omitted).
59. See note 7 supra.
60. Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670-71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 829 (1959); Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227, 231-32 (1977), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978), discussed at text accompanying note 80 infra;
Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) Dec. 35,049, at 490 (1978), discussed at
text accompanying note 95 infra.
61. Prior to the decision in Castleberry, three courts applying Texas law reached results
different from those reached in Castleberry on essentially the facts presented in Castleberry.
See note 31 supra and notes 356-65 infra. These cases did not expressly consider the issue
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events occurred, of course, would be community property and properly
included in Mr. Castleberry's gross estate since he had the right to dispose
of his one-half of this community income in his will if not otherwise.
The Tax Court had before it Estate of Allen D. Gutchess,62 the case that
would seem to control Castleberry. In Gutchess the decedent had trans-
ferred his residence to his spouse, but continued to occupy the premises
until his death. The Tax Court found the decedent had not retained a life
estate in the premises, apparently because it believed at that time that re-
tention of an interest by operation of law was not within the contemplation
of section 2036(a). However, the Tax Court in Castleberry chose to focus
on the following paragraph from Gutchess as the basis for distinguishing
the holding in that case:
Respondent also makes some argument that under Ohio law (Ohio
Rev. Code sec. 3103.04) one spouse cannot be excluded from resi-
dence in the other's dwelling except by decree of court, and no such
decree was obtained here. It is difficult to see how that would have
any bearing here. If decedent had some residence rights granted by
Ohio law that would not mean retention of use and enjoyment
"under" a transfer as required by the statute that is here involved.63
Not only did the Castleberry court reject this reasoning, but it dis-
tinguished Gutchess on the ground that Gutchess's wife could exclude him
from the premises, but Castleberry's wife could not cut off his enjoyment
of the income.
We do not think that Estate of Gutchess is applicable. In that case, the
decedent lived in the residence only at the sufferance of his wife. He
would not have been able lawfully to continue to reside in the resi-
dence if his wife withdrew her consent. She could, had she chosen to
do so, have had him ejected by court order. In this case, however,
decedent's right to the community income was not defeasible. His
right was not dependent upon the actions or inactions of his spouse. The
dictum regarding rights under Ohio law referred, in context, to the
mere requirement that an action be brought and a court decree ob-
tained in order to remove the husband. The "requirement" referred
to a mere procedural difficulty in the enforcement of the transferee's
right to exclude the transferor, not a substantive diminution of the
right itself.64
At this point it is obvious the Tax Court did not appreciate that under
Texas law Castleberry's wife could more easily cut off his enjoyment of the
transferred property than could Mrs. Gutchess exclude her husband from
the premises. All Mrs. Castleberry would have to do would be to dissipate
the transferred property, which she could do at her pleasure without any
accountability to anyone. This does not necessarily mean Castleberry is
wrong. What it does mean is that the Fifth Circuit should address the
framed in the text above and perhaps that may help explain the Tax Court's refusal in
Castleberry to defer to these precedents.
62. 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2.
63. 68 T.C. at 687 (quoting Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554, 557 (1966)).
64. 68 T.C. at 687 (emphasis added).
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fundamental issue in Castleberry and recognize that the grounds chosen
by the Tax Court to distinguish Gutchess were invalid.
By way of explanation, it is suggested that perhaps the court was con-
fused because neither the Commissioner65 nor the taxpayer66 seemed to
focus on the determinative issues in their briefs. The taxpayer seemed to
combine into one argument two principles of Texas law that when taken
together may have appeared to assert a position the Tax Court found un-
tenable. The taxpayer argued that Mr. Castleberry did not have a retained
life estate because Texas law gave Mrs. Castleberry the sole management,
control, and disposition "over her separate property and the community
income produced by her separate property. '67 The taxpayer should have
65. Either the Commissioner did not understand this to be the issue or chose to ignore
it. His trial brief in Castleberry simply slipped over the question of retention of an interest
in the transferred property, choosing instead to state the problem, variously, in these terms:
With the above analysis of Texas law in mind, it is apparent, that in the
instant case the decedent, Winston C. Castleberry, retained by operation of
Texas State law a right to one-half of any income generated by the bonds
which subsequent to the gift belonged to the decedent's wife as her separate
property.
Brief for Respondent at 11. At another point, the Commissioner said:
It is abundantly clear in the instant case that the decedent prior to the trans-
fer was entitled to one-half of any income generated from the community
property which he gave to his wife. It is also clear that under Texas commu-
nity property law the decedent was equally entitled to one-half of any income
generated by the property after its transfer. Accordingly, the decedent had
both before and after the transfer the same right to any income generated by
the gifts of community property to his wife.
Id at 12.
The Commissioner's reply brief to the Tax Court contained a misapplication of the law to
the facts, which the court adopted as part of its decision. In discussing the interest of the
donor spouse in the transferred property, the Commissioner made the following statement
which is correctly applied only to the income produced by the transferred property and not
to the transferred property itself:
[R]espondent submits that although one spouse may have sole management,
control and disposition rights over separate property and community property,
those disposition rights are not as all encompassing as petitioner alleges. As
stated in I E Oakes, Speer's Marital Rights in Texas, § 365 at 529 "The right
of disposition is not an arbitrary one. It is one of trust, for the benefit of the
community."
Reply Brief for Respondent at 8.
66. The taxpayer cited Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acq. 1967-1
C.B. 2, in his brief, but it appears this reference was largely for purposes of arguing that a
§ 2036 retention had to be consensual, that is, the result of an understanding, express or
implied. Brief for Petitioner at 7-9. In its reply brief the taxpayer did cite Estate of Uhl v.
Commissioner, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), discussed at text accompanying notes 368-69
infra, but in drawing this parallel to Castleberry, went off on the ground that Mrs. Castle-
berry had sole management of "the income from the transferred property" and therefore he
"could not compel her to pay him any portion of the income from the transferred property."
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 11. In fact, Mr. Castleberry had ownership of any income
produced from the transferred property. What he did not have was the right to prevent his
wife from dissipating the transferred property, thereby cutting off any future income he
might enjoy.
67. The Commissioner's appeal brief made only the following reference to Gutchess. "a
case which the Tax Court in this case (R. 44-45) distinguished." Brief for the Appellee-
Cross-Appellant at 2 1, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 78-1612
(5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978). See also Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 14-18, Estate of Castle-
berry v. Commissioner, appealdocketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
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made manifest the stark reality that since the transferred property was the
wife's separate property, under Texas law she could manage that property
so as to deprive her spouse of any income interest in the property, and
forced the court to address this issue. The taxpayer should have then pro-
ceeded to concede that any income produced by the transferred property
was community income and therefore one-half of that community income
was included in the transferor's gross estate. By failing to concede the in-
clusion of the community income, it could have appeared to the Tax Court
that the taxpayer was indirectly urging a new rule of law on the court, to
wit, that section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code giving each spouse "the
sole management, control and disposition of the community property that
he or she would have owned if single ' ' 68 constitutes grounds for excluding
sole management community property from the estate of the nonmanager
spouse.6 9 While there may be merit in this position, it is contrary to estab-
lished principles.70
68. See text accompanying notes 105-37 infra.
69. While the taxpayer's brief does not expressly reach this conclusion, it advances the
argument that the nonmanager spouse's interest in sole management community property is
"of such a limited nature that it did not constitute a 'right to income' within the meaning" of
§ 2036(a). In order for a court to agree, it would seem it would have to reason that the
nonmanager spouse's interest in sole management community property was so limited that it
should not be in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. Alternatively, the court
would have to conclude that the standards for including property in the gross estate as pro-
bate property under § 2033 were different from the meaning Congress intended in § 2036
when it used the words "right to income." This was in part the view of the district court in
Estate of Deobald v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1977), discussed at note 85
infra. In that case, the court said that "retention" within the meaning of § 2036 meant "in-
tentional retention." Either of these analyses, of course, would still permit the inclusion of
that portion of the community income from the transferred property earned prior to the
death of the transferor in the transferor's gross estate, while the property producing that
income is excluded. This result is not anomalous. The community income is included be-
cause it is subject to disposition by the transferor at his death whereas the transferred prop-
erty is the donee spouse's to dissipate. See also text accompanying notes 138-50 infra.
The analysis undertaken by the taxpayer in Castleberry is somewhat confusing and detri-
mental to its case inasmuch as the nonmanager spouse clearly does have an enforceable
right or claim to any income produced by the other spouse's separate property. Recognizing
this point, a court can easily reason erroneously that if the nonmanager has a "right to
income" he must have some enforceable claim or interest in the transferred property that he
retained at the time of the transfer. The correct reasoning, of course, is that the nonmanager
spouse only has a right to income once it is produced; he has no enforceable right to compel
the production of income or to restrict the management of the underlying property in any
way. See text accompanying notes 231-33 infra. In other words, he cannot prevent his
spouse's dissipation of the transferred property. For that reason the real issue becomes one
of ascertaining the significance of the donee spouse's right to dissipate freely the transferred
property.
70. Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959). The other cases offered are all income tax cases, but they would
clearly seem to support the proposition in the text. For example, in Broday v. United States,
455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972), the court was confronted with the question of whether, under
Texas property law, a community property bank account of which the husband had sole
management and control and that held dividend income from the husband's separate prop-
erty, was subject to levy for a tax debt of the wife incurred prior to marriage. In answering
this question in the affirmative, the court stated:
The question of whether and to what extent the wife has property and rights to
property is determined under the applicable state law . . . .However, once it
has been determined under state law that the taxpayer owns property or rights
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The court, therefore, did not distinguish between the property trans-
ferred to Mrs. Castleberry, which was her separate property, and the in-
come from that property, which was community. The court found ample
precedent providing that sole management community property is not ex-
cluded from the estate of the nonmanager, and, since the taxpayer did not
do more to distinguish the transferred separate property from the commu-
nity income it generated, the point simply escaped the Tax Court.
C. Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner7l
The Tax Court's Opinion. Three months after Castleberry, the Tax Court
relied on it in deciding Wyy in favor of the Commissioner. Wyly is differ-
ent from Castleberry in that both Mr. and Mrs. Wyly joined in transferring
their community property interests in certain corporate stocks to an irrevo-
cable trust for Mrs. Wyly's benefit, whereas in Castleberry the donor
spouse transferred his community interest in bonds directly to his wife in
fee simple. The Wy/y trust specifically provided that all of the trust in-
come was to be paid to or for the benefit of W for life, with the remainder
to continue in trust for grandchildren. In addition, "[d]uring the wife's
lifetime the trustees have the discretionary right to invade the trust corpus
for her benefit, and the wife has the right to withdraw up to $5,000 of trust
corpus annually."' 72 In this latter respect Wyly and Castleberry are the
same in that in both cases the donee spouse can terminate any income
interest given the donor by state law by either dissipating the transferred
property, as in Castleberry, or, as in Wyly, by exercising her right to with-
draw annually $5,000 from the trust corpus and then dissipating the with-
drawn amount.
The taxpayer made three arguments against includability of one-half of
the trust corpus:
(1) The trust income distributions were not community property, but
were the separate property of the wife as the decedent did not
make a gift of the stocks to his wife, but rather made a gift of the
income derived from the stocks.73 Thus, since the income was
to property, federal law is controlling for the purpose of determining whether
a lien will attach to such property or rights to property.
Id at 1099. The court further found that since the income from separate property is com-
munity property, a wife had a present vested interest in the bank account equal and
equivalent to that of her husband. Id at 1100-01. United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190
(1971), held that under the community property laws of Louisiana, a spouse has a present
vested interest in community property equal to that of the other spouse and, therefore, is
personally liable for federal income taxes on the spouse's one-half share of the community
income even though she may not have received her share of the community income. A
similar case in the Fifth Circuit involving Texas community property law, which was de-
cided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Mitchell, and which held contrary to the
decision in Mitchell, was Ramos v. Commissioner, 429 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1970). After the
Mitchell decision, the Fifth Circuit specifically overruled Ramos in Broday v. United States,
455 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1972).
71. 69 T.C. 227 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
72. d at 228.
73. For analysis, see text accompanying notes 195-327 infra.
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the property given to the wife, the income was her separate prop-
erty under Texas law.
(2) The trust income, after distribution to W, became her separate
property by reason of the action of the spouses, and therefore
decedent did not hold a community share therein.
(3) If the distributions of trust income were community property, de-
cedent's right to the trust income was so limited"4 that it did not
constitute a retained right to income within the meaning of sec-
tion 2036.
In response to petitioner's arguments, the Tax Court concluded that pe-
titioner's first two arguments were contrary to well settled Texas law and
the third argument was subject to the court's prior holding in Estate of
Castleberry. Citing Irwin v. Gavitt75 and Commissioner v. Wilson,76 the
court stated that ifs gift of trust income created an equitable interest in
the trust corpus and it was that equitable interest, and not the right to the
trust income, that was the subject matter of decedent's gift. While the eq-
uitable interest in the trust corpus constitutes Ws separate property, under
Texas law the income distributions from that corpus during the decedent's
lifetime were the community property of decedent and his wife."
In response to petitioner's second argument, the court concluded that
Texas community property law prevents spouses from contracting or
otherwise agreeing prospectively to change the character of their property
so as to convert what would otherwise be community property to separate
property or vice versa.7" If such change cannot be accomplished prospec-
tively, the decedent is then in the position of having the right to income
even if he gives the income to his spouse upon its realization. Although
the trustees could invest the trust corpus in non-income-producing prop-
erty and had the right to make discretionary distributions of principal to
Wfor her maintenance and support7 9 without benefiting the decedent, the
court concluded that retention of the right to income is the factor that trig-
gers inclusion of the transferred property in a decedent's gross estate.
Whether the decedent actually receives such distributions or whether the
investment is made in income-producing property is immaterial as long as
a right to income exists."0 The court further concluded that distribution of
income to W would not only benefit W, but also would benefit the com-
munity estate.
Analysis of the Opinion. As in Castleberry, the issue unaddressed by the
Tax Court in Wyy was what significance should be attached to the right of
the donee spouse to dissipate the transferred property and thereby deprive
74. For analysis, see text accompanying notes 105-37 infra.
75. 268 U.S. 161 (1925), discussed at text accompanying notes 300-02 infra.
76. 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935), discussed at text accompanying notes 279-81 infra.
77. For analysis, see text accompanying notes 195-327 infra.
78. For analysis, see notes 450-51 supra and accompanying text.
79. But see text accompanying notes 191-92 infra.




the decedent of his alleged community interest in the income produced by
the transferred property. In Wyy, the donee spouse had the right to with-
draw $5,000 per annum from the trust. The corpus, once withdrawn,
would be separate property and the donee spouse could dispose of it as she
saw fit."' In addition, she could divorce the transferor or move from
Texas, in which case the income produced by the transferred property
would be her separate property. Moreover, the transferor had no right
under Texas law to compel his wife to seek enforcement of the terms of the
trust by, for example, insisting that the trustee make the trust property
productive.8 2 Given these possibilities, it is arguable that both Gutchess"3
and Uh/8 4 control Wyly, as well as Castleberry.
D. Estate of Deobald v. United States 5
In Deobald, a case decided after Castleberry and Wyly, the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana reached a result contrary to the
Tax Court's holdings in Castleberry, apparently without knowing of its
existence. Deobald transferred separate property stock to his wife, which
became her separate property. Mrs. Deobald also could have designated
the income from her separate property as separate property under Louisi-
ana law, but at the time of Deobald's death she had not taken this step. 6
The court, however, held that the wife's failure to make the declaration
was not controlling. In holding section 2036 inapplicable and excluding
the transferred property from Deobald's estate, the court held that section
2036 only applies when the transferor intended to retain an interest for life
and not when that interest was conferred by operation of law.
Thus the courts have taken the position that the transferor himself
must initiate the action by which he maintains a right in the income
after transferring the property, before there is a retention under Sec-
tion 2036(a). Where he intends to make a complete and absolute gift
of his property, though, unbeknownst to him, community property
laws may reserve to him a right to income, the courts have consist-
ently held that he retained no life interest.8 7
The district court concluded that the subjective intent of the transferor at
the time of the transfer, rather than on the completeness of the transfer, is
the controlling factor.88
81. See note I I supra and accompanying text.
82. See text accompanying notes 231-33 infra.
83. Estate of Allen D. Gutchess, 46 T.C. 554 (1966), acq. 1967-1 C.B. 2, discussedat text
accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
84. In re Estate of Uhl, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'g 25 T.C. 22 (1955), discussed at
text accompanying notes 368-69 infra.
85. 444 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1977). The Government's appeal on Deobald was
dismissed because the United States filed its notice of appeal out of turn. Brief for Appellee-
Cross-Appellant at 18 n.7, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 78-
1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
86. 444 F. Supp. at 380.
87. Id at 381-82.
88. The Government offers a rather ingenious argument in response to those who sug-
gest that "retention" under § 2036 must be express or by implication.
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Based on the combination of factors such as (1) the nature of the
contingency right to income [with the continued possession of that
right solely in the power of his spouse], and (2) an absence of any
implied or explicit agreement at the time of the transfer to retain an
interest, this Court concludes that Mr. Deobald did not retain an in-
terest in the stock, in a manner as anticipated by Section 2036(a).8 9
To emphasize the importance of the retention requirement, the Deobald
court looked to the Fifth Circuit decision in Terriberry v. United States.9
In that case the insured was trustee of a trust that owned policies on his
life. While the insured's wife had the right to revoke the trust or remove
the trustee, she never exercised the power and the proceeds of the insur-
ance were included in the insured's gross estate. The Deobald court dis-
tinguished Terriberry on the ground that inclusion of life insurance in the
insured's gross estate under section 2042 requires only that he possess inci-
dents of ownership at death. Section 2036, on the other hand, requires that
the transferor retain an interest in the transferred property at the time of
the transfer. The court quoted from an earlier Fifth Circuit case to explain
the distinction: " 'Thus, under Section 2036 and Section 2038 the decedent
must have retained some control over property he initially transferred
while under Section 2042 it is enough if at death the decedent merely pos-
sessed an incident of ownership, the means by which he came into posses-
sion being irrelevant.' ,91
Finally, in a dictum, the court indicated that the Government should not
have prosecuted this tax case on such a hypertechnical basis. The court
stated that if the Government's contentions were carried to their logical
conclusion, spouses domiciled in Louisiana
in effect . . .could never make a bona fide transfer to each other
where the grantor absolutely, unequivocably, and irrevocably parts
with all of his title, possession, and enjoyment of income-bearing
community or separate property. . . .As in the present case, even
where the husband has done everything unilaterally possible to make
a complete gift to his wife, the Internal Revenue Service, by its pro-
posed taxing scheme, would still have the right to tax the transferred
Respondent submits that under community property laws, the petitioner's
argument would require a transferor-spouse in Texas to perform a useless act.
Under Texas community property law the earnings from separate property of
a spouse are community property. See Arnold v. Leonard, 273 S.W. 799 (Tex.
1925). Since the transferor spouse retains by law a community property inter-
est in the income from the separate property of his spouse, why should he be
required as petitioner alleges to specifically state he is retaining an income
interest in the property? In addition, as pointed out in respondent's original
brief, Code § 2036 is equally applicable where the retained interest is created
by state law rather than by the positive act of reservation or retention by the
decedent. See United States v. Gordon, 406 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1969); Estate of
Robert Manning McKeon, 25 T.C. 697 (1956), acq. 1958-2 C.B. 6.
Reply Brief for Respondent at 5-6, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682
(1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
89. 444 F. Supp. at 383.
90. 517 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
91. 444 F. Supp. at 382 (inexactly quoting Estate of Lumpkin v. Commissioner, 474
F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th Cir. 1973)).
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property as part of the husband's estate. This Court must find such
taxing rationality anomalous, and rejects the government's position.92
E. Estate of McKee v. Commissioner93
The final case in this recent series is McKee, decided by the Tax Court
on March 29, 1978, in which the court distinguished Deobald as it held to
the views it announced in Castleberry.
In McKee the decedent had given his wife a life insurance policy and
$5,000 in cash from a community bank account as a combined wedding
and birthday gift. The Government abandoned its effort to include the life
insurance in the decedent's gross estate on section 2036 grounds, but pre-
vailed in having the Tax Court include one-fourth of the $5,000 cash gift
as a transfer subject to a retained life estate.
The taxpayer argued that since cash does not automatically generate in-
come, W would have to take affirmative steps to invest the cash in a man-
ner to yield income that would then be community property. Since Texas
law did not require W to invest the cash gift, the donor would have no
right to income. The Tax Court rejected this argument, relying on
Castleberry and Wyly, and erroneously stated that Ws power to invest in
non-income-producing property and her right to dispose of the property
were not absolute and were held in trust for the benefit of the commu-
nity.94
In explaining its holding, the court repeated, as in Wyy, that the mere
right to income triggers inclusion. Whether the decedent actually received
income or whether the gift is invested in income-producing property is im-
material. The court also noted that the 1932 amendment to the predeces-
sor statute of section 2036 substituted the phrase "right to the income" for
"income." The legislative history of the 1932 amendment stated that this
change was "designed to reach a case where decedent had the right to the
income, though he did not actually receive it."9 The court then expanded
the holding in Castleberry and Wyy as follows:
Finally, we do not believe Estate of Castleberry or Estate of Wyly
may be distinguished on the basis of the types of property involved.
Estate of Castleberry, Estate of Wyly, and this case involve bonds,
stocks, and cash, respectively. Section 2036(a)(1) focuses on the right
to income, not the character of the underlying property or the actual
receipt of income. We would open the door to tax avoidance schemes
if we held that a decedent could retain for his life the right to income
from a transfer of cash, either by operation of law or by agreement,
prearrangment or understanding, and nevertheless escape section
2036(a)(1). We would soon be faced with numerous transfers where
property was converted to cash prior to transfer and then later rein-
92. 444 F. Supp. at 383.
93. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) Dec. 35,049 (1978).
94. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
95. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2)
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vested in other income-producing property.96
The McKee court distinguished Estate of Deobald,97 stating that under
Louisiana law the wife has the power to declare income from a gift of
separate property as her separate property, and therefore her husband's
community interest in the future income is defeasible. The court further
noted that in Castleberry it relied on the "indefeasible" characteristic of
income from the wife's separate property. A close reading of the Deobald
opinion, however, indicates that the court placed almost no weight on the
donee's right to declare the income from the transferred property her sepa-
rate property. Moreover, as the donee in Deobald could have declared the
income as her separate property, but did not, so too the donee in McKee
could have given away the $5,000 cash gift without the consent of the do-
nor, but did not.
III. THE SOLE MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY PROPERTY ARGUMENT
Another issue in the Castleberry line of cases is whether the Texas con-
cept of sole management community property so limits the transferor's
community interest in the income from the transferred property that such
interest is, in effect, no more than an expectancy 98 and, as such, not
deemed to be the kind of interest to which section 2036 is addressed. On
the one hand, there is the uncontroverted rule that since income from sepa-
rate property is community,99 one-half of that income is included in the
gross estate of the first spouse to die. "° On the other hand, there is the
argument that while any income realized is community property, and
therefore includable in the gross estate of each spouse at death to the ex-
tent of fifty percent, the standards for including property in a decedent's
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes are not necessarily the appropri-
ate standards for determining whether the decedent has retained, within
the contemplation of section 2036, the possession or enjoyment of, or the
96. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 491. It has been suggested that the last sentence means that the
Tax Court would include gifts, such as diamond rings, in the donor's gross estate to insure
the integrity of the Castleberry principle since "Texas law gives a spouse a technical right to
the income from all of the other spouse's separate property." Comment, Section 2036 Inclu-
sions in Community Property States." Complete Interspousal Gifts Could be Impossible, 15
Hous. L. REV. 632, 672 (1978); see text accompanying notes 347-48 infra.
97. Estate of Deobald v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1977).
98. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 28-29, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner,
appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978). Mr. Castleberry's executor has urged
that the nonmanager's interest in sole management community property is so limited or
attenuated as to make his interest akin to that of an expectancy. Id Apparently, the Com-
missioner believed the taxpayer was asserting that the interest of the nonmanager was a
mere expectancy and not that the nonmanager's interest was so limited as to verge on being
only a mere expectancy. While the taxpayer did not go on to make the distinction asserted
in the text, the Commissioner dismissed the point on the ground that the United States
Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 125-27 (1930), specifically held that the
interest of the nonmanaging spouse in Texas community property amounted to more than a
mere expectancy. Brief for the Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 10.
99. See note 7 supra.
100. Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 239 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
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right to income from, property that he transferred during his lifetime.,'0
A. The Purpose of Section 2036
The purpose of section 2036 has long been expressed in terms of includ-
ing in a decedent's gross estate those transfers he made during his lifetime
that were incomplete until his death. 10 2 Whether a transfer is incomplete
is not controlled by the decedent's intention, but by the effect of the trans-
fer. 0 3 The issue to be determined is whether the effect of a particular
transfer is to allow the transferor to have such possession or enjoyment of
101. For discussion, see text accompanying notes 135-50 infra. The dissent in
Castleberry articulated this standard of inclusion. Judge Featherstone, joined by three other
Tax Court judges, stated:
[PIroperty given to a wife by her husband becomes her separate property. The
income from such property is community property, but, consistent with the
language of art. 4614, supra, the wife has an exclusive right to its management,
control, and disposition. Such income cannot be seized by her husband's cred-
itors and, without her consent, cannot be conveyed by him to his creditors.
The wife has the sole right to create contractual obligations with respect to
such income. She has the right to exclusive possession of the property and the
right to dispose of it. In her discretion, she can give it away or invest it in non-
income-producing or income-producing property. She is free to deal with the
community income from her separate property without the participation, con-
sent, or interference of her husband.
These extensive attributes of ownership led the Court of Appeals in the
Hinds case to conclude, correctly I believe, that under Texas law a husband
who transfers property to his wife does not retain the right to the income
therefrom within the meaning of section 2036.
68 T.C. at 695. This "something less than literal" application of the statute has found ex-
pression in estate tax cases involving life insurance and retained powers cases. I.R.C. § 2042
provides that life insurance proceeds will be included in an insured's gross estate if the pro-
ceeds are receivable by his estate or if he has any one of the incidents of ownership. In
Margrave v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. No. 2 (Oct. 10, 1978) (No. 2210-76), discussed at notes
328-44 infra and accompanying text, the Tax Court in effect refused to apply literally the
statutory standard to proceeds of life insurance payable to a revocable trust the insured had
established simply because the owner of the policy could have changed the beneficiary. In
Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner, 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), and Estate of Skiftor v.
Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), the respective courts have said that more is
required than mere ownership of one or more of the incidents of ownership by the insured in
order for the proceeds of the insurance to be included in his estate. As owner he must have
the capacity to exercise the incidents to benefit himself.
Similarly, the courts have said that a retained power under I.R.C. §§ 2036(a)(2) and 2038
must be a substantial or significant power. The mere possession of the power alone is not
enough to invoke the statute. Illustrative are United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972),
discussed at note 142 infra (retention of voting control insufficient power to warrant applica-
tion of § 2036(a)(2) to shares transferred in trust), and Old Colony Trust Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970) ("no aggregation of purely administrative powers" by a
transferor as trustee will warrant including the transferred property in the transferor's gross
estate under § 2036(a)(2)). There are also cases holding that when the transferor's retained
power is subject to an ascertainable standard nothing is included in his gross estate under
§ 2036(a)(2). See, e.g., Estate of Pardee v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 140 (1967), acq. 1973-2
C.B. 3.
Thus, there are limits to the literal application of the estate tax statutes. The dissenters in
Castleberry may have a point.
102. United States v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627, 630-31 (1966); Commissioner v. Estate of
Church, 335 U.S. 632, 646 (1949).
103. See Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949), discussed at text
accompanying notes 352-55 infra ("[Tihe taxability of a trust corpus ... does not hinge on a
settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer.").
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transferred property or the right to income therefrom that failure to in-
clude the property in the decedent's estate would defeat the purpose of the
federal estate tax, which is to tax at death that property in which the dece-
dent has the economic equivalent of ownership at the time of his death."0
B. The Nature of Sole Management Community Property
Texas classifies property owned by married persons as either separate or
community. Separate property is defined in the state constitution,' 0 5 and
"[e]ach spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of his or
her separate property." 0 6 All other property owned by married persons is
deemed community.' 07 Texas, however, classifies community property ac-
cording to source for purposes of each spouse's management rights over
particular kinds of property. Thus, "[d]uring marriage, each spouse has
the sole management, control, and disposition of the community property
that he or she would have owned if single, including but not limited
to . . . revenue from separate property."'0 s All other community prop-
erty is subject to "the joint management, control, and disposition of the
husband and wife, unless the spouses provide otherwise by power of attor-
ney in writing or other agreement."' 0 9
As a practical matter, the rights and responsibilities of the manager of
sole management community property are almost unlimited. Simpkins
says: "It seems clear . . . that when one spouse has the sole management
and control over certain community property, that control is absolute and
binding on the other spouse for all purposes, including disposition, in the
absence of fraud.""'  What constitutes "fraud"? Again, Simpkins offers
the following: "As a practical matter, the variety of ways or combinations
through which a spouse could be defrauded is probably infinite. . .. It"
104. The reciprocal trust doctrine, for example, "was formulated in response to attempts
to draft instruments which seemingly avoid the literal terms of § 81 l(c)(l)(B) [the predeces-
sor of I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1)], while still leaving the decedent the lifetime enjoyment of his
property." United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 320 (1969), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 154-57 infra.
105. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
106. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975). See generally Hudspeth, The Matri-
monial Property Act of 1967- Six Areas of Change, 31 TEX. B.J. 477 (1968); Huie, Dipided
Management of Community Property in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 623 (1974); McKnight,
Recodfication of Matrimonial Property Law, 29 TEX. B.J. 1000 (1966).
107. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
108. Id. § 5.22(a)(2).
109. Id § 5.22(c).
110. 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 21:23, at 394.
111. Id. § 21:1, at 366; see I E. OAKES, SPEER'S MARITAL RIGHTS IN TEXAS § 365, at 529
(4th ed. 1961).
To illustrate the point, Mr. Castleberry's executor chose an unfortunate example. Empha-
sizing the donee's right to dissipate her sole management community property, the taxpayer
noted that the donee could have spent the bond income on her own living expenses. The
Commissioner responded that such an expenditure would cause the transferred property to
be included in the donor's gross estate inasmuch as such expenditure would discharge the
donor's legal obligation of support. Brief for the Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 13-14, Estate
of Castleberry v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978); see
Richards v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (10th Cir. 1967); Helvering v. Mercan-
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Fraud on the community may be "actual" or "constructive." "Actual"
fraud requires a fraudulent intention, that is, an intent to deprive the other
spouse of her community interest." 2 Constructive fraud, on the other
hand, does not require intent. 113 In a recent case, for example, construc-
tive fraud was equated with unfairness." 4
Nonetheless, the cases are legion in holding that acts complained of as
fraudulent were not fraudulent." 5 In fact, prior to the development of the
constructive fraud doctrine, many complaints of fraud failed because the
complainant failed to discharge his or her burden of proof.'
1 6
The 1975 court of civil appeals decision in Horlock v. Horlock"t ' is illus-
trative. In an action for divorce, Dorothy Horlock claimed her husband,
Ray Horlock, defrauded the community by making gifts to his three
daughters from a prior marriage. The gifts were made from community
property and totaled $131,517. Roy Horlock did not tell his wife that he
was making the gifts, and he admitted that she would have "strenuously
protested had she known of the gifts.""' 8 Moreover, Roy filed federal gift
tax returns reflecting the gifts and managed to have Dorothy's name
forged in the returns without her knowledge and consent. The court held
tile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 11 F.2d 224, 226 (8th Cir.) cert denied, 310 U.S. 654
(1940); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.02 (Vernon 1975) (establishing a duty to support). Treas.
Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1958) provides:
The "use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property" is considered as having been retained by or reserved to the
decedent to the extent that the use, possession, right to the income, or other
enjoyment is to be applied toward the discharge of a legal obligation of the
decedent, or otherwise for his pecuniary benefit. The term "legal obligation"
includes a legal obligation to support a dependent during the decedent's life-
time.
112. Marshall v. Land, 413 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967), afl'd, 426 S.W.2d
841 (Tex. 1968) (revocable trust established by spouse with community property without
knowledge of other spouse); 3 L. SIMPK[NS, supra note 7, § 21:10, at 372.
113. Marshall v. Land, 413 S.W.2d 820, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967), af d, 426
S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968).
114. Murphy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (purchase of life insurance for benefit of unrelated person
is constructive fraud absent special circumstances); accord, Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d
365, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ refd n.r.e.).
115. 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, §§ 21:2-:27; Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Community
Property.- The Substantive Problems, 47 TEXAS L. REV. 537, 564-73 (1969). Nonetheless, it is
clear that a defrauded spouse has a remedy in the form of a right to reimbursement. United
States v. Rompel, 326 U.S. 367, 370 (1945); Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122, 126 (1930); 3 L.
SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 22:38. Such right of reimbursement, however, arises only upon
dissolution of the community. 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 22:38, at 501; see Gonzales v.
Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 300 S.W. 20 (1927); Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 254 S.W.2d
777 (1952).
116. 3 L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 21:23, at 394-95. Illustrative cases include: Locke v.
Locke, 143 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1940, no writ) (failure of proof of fraud
when spouses separated and one spouse consumed community property in excess of his liv-
ing expenses); Irwin v. Irwin, 110 S.W.- 1011 (Tex. Civ. App.-1908, no writ) (no fraud
where husband abandoned wife and consumed all his earnings during period of abandon-
ment).
117. 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).
118. Id at 54.
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that Roy's transfers did not constitute either actual or constructive fraud
on the community.
The court said actual fraud "involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to
deceive" and that the complainant "has the burden of showing that the
gifts were made with the primary purpose of depriving her from having the
use and enjoyment of the assets comprising the gifts." 9 The court held
that Dorothy did not sustain her burden of showing actual fraud inasmuch
as there was ample evidence to support the trial court's finding that Roy's
"intention in making the gifts was to benefit both the community estate
and the parties' individual estates upon the death of each or both of
them." 20 The court stated that "[tjhe single fact that the appellee inten-
tionally prevented the appellant from finding out about the gifts which he
made to his daughters does not constitute actual fraud."'' The court also
stated that "important in considering the rights of disposition" possessed
by Roy Horlock was the fact that the subject matter of the gift was Roy's
sole management community property. It commented that "[i]t is not nec-
essary that one spouse approve or agree with the dispositions made by the
other spouse of that other spouse's special community property."'
' 22
Having found no actual fraud, the court considered whether construc-
tive fraud had occurred and noted that the test was unfairness and that
Roy Horlock had the burden of proving fairness. Applying the unfairness
test requires consideration of three factors. Those three factors are "[t]he
size of the gift in relation to the total size of the community estate, the
adequacy of the estate remaining to support the wife in spite of the gift,
and the relationship of the donor to the donee."' 23 The court found that
the gift constituted only 13.1517% of Roy Horlock's $ 1 million estate, was
made to his daughters who were minors at the death of their mother, and
took nothing from his wife's estate.
In the most recent case involving managerial control over sole manage-
ment community property, Valdez v. Ramirez, 24 decided on July 26, 1978,
the Texas Supreme Court did not ever mention fraud as a limitation on the
right of the spouse having the management right. It was clear, however,
from the court's statements that it found no intent to deceive or unfairness
in the managing spouse's disposition of her sole management community
property. The case, nonetheless, is important because it reflects the limited
rights of the nonmanager spouse in sole management community property.
Mrs. Valdez, who survived her husband, had elected to have her govern-
ment pension paid to her and her husband under a joint and survivor pay-
ment option. Mrs. Valdez had been receiving benefits under the plan for
two years at the time of her husband's death. Mr. Valdez's children by a
former marriage claimed their father's community interest in the govern-





124. 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978).
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ment pension under the applicable intestate statute, section 45 of the Texas
Probate Code. 25 The Texas Supreme Court refused the children's claim
on the ground that the employee spouse's selection of the pay out option
was a valid exercise of her right to manage her sole management commu-
nity property. Implicit in the court's opinion was its finding that the settle-
ment option selected by Mrs. Valdez was fair inasmuch as the option
selected would have given Mr. Valdez an annuity for life had he been the
survivor. Also important to the court was the underlying purpose of retire-
ment benefit plans, namely, "to provide financial support and security to
aged employees"' 26 rather than, as in this case, the adult children of a
deceased nonemployee spouse. The court, however, did note that the in-
testate statute would have applied if Mrs. Valdez had not elected a pay-
ment option.
Perhaps the qourt, having found no such fraud, inadvertently omitted
any suggestion that it might have reached a different result upon a showing
of fraud.' 27 Alternatively, perhaps Mr. Valdez's children did not assert
fraud. A final possibility is that the court might have been saying that even
with a showing that the employee spouse's election of the payment option
was a fraud on the community, it would not have reached a different re-
sult. If the latter, Valdez v. Ramirez would represent new law, and the
question would be whether the holding is limited to the employee benefits
area.
Prior to Valdez it would have seemed that the nonmanager spouse
would have the right to make a disposition at death of his one-half of his
spouse's sole management community property. Has that right now been
abrograted, or does Valdez merely confirm present law and stand for the
proposition that the managing spouse is free to make a lifetime disposition
of her sole management community property and that such a disposition
can be overturned by the other spouse upon a showing of fraud? One
cannot but believe that this latter proposition is the one for which Valdez
should be cited, but it would have been easier to make out such a case had
the Texas Supreme Court at least mentioned the absence of any fraud on
125. TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 45 (Vernon 1956).
126. 574 S.W.2d at 750.
127. On December 13, 1978, after this Article was prepared, the Texas Supreme Court
denied respondent's motion for rehearing and filed an opinion that noted the absence of any
suggestion of fraud on the part of Mrs. Valdez in electing the joint and survivor annuity
option. 574 S.W.2d 748, 751 (Tex. 1978). In its opinion, the court placed great emphasis on
its determination that a joint survivorship annuity was "clearly authorized by federal law to
serve a federal purpose." Id at 140 (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962)). The court
said that, in such a case, state law would be preempted "in the absence of its use to perpetu-
ate a fraud by one spouse on the other." 574 S.W.2d at 752.
It would seem that rather than announce this perception of federal preemption in the
pension and profit sharing area, the court would have been better advised simply to base its
decision on the absence of fraud. The federal government would have no greater interest in
the beneficiary designations made by one of its employees than would a private employer.
In other words, no federal purpose is being accomplished by creating a special class of pen-
sion beneficiary designations. This argument will surely be made in other cases where
spouses dispute the beneficiary designations made by one of them. The "absence of fraud"
finding would have been a better precedent.
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the community. As it stands, Valdez arguably is authority for the proposi-
tion that the beneficiaries of the estate of the nonmanager spouse can never
frustrate the managing spouse's disposition of sole management commu-
nity property even if fraud is alleged.' 28 If that is true, Valdez is, as previ-
ously stated, important new law.
These questions aside, it is clear that the nonmanager spouse has strictly
limited rights in sole management community property. The sum total of
those rights is as follows:
(1) If the manager spouse has not made a lifetime disposition of her
sole management community property, the nonmanager, at his
death, can either dispose of fifty percent of his spouse's sole man-
agement community property by will,' 29 or this fifty percent will
pass by the intestacy statutes of Texas.
130
(2) Creditors of the nonmanager spouse may not proceed against his
spouse's sole management community property, except in the
following two situations: 3t
(a) During the lifetime of the nonmanager, claims arising out
of his tortious conduct may be satisfied out of the other
spouse's sole management community property. 132 The
courts, however, are authorized to consider the facts sur-
rounding the tort and determine the order in which separate
and community property will be subject to execution and
sale to satisfy the claim.
(b) In addition, creditors furnishing necessaries to the
nonmanager spouse may proceed afainst his spouse's sole
management community property.
Even if the fraud on the spouse doctrine applies after Valdez, the Valdez
128. See Kirkland v. Kirkland, 359 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1962, writ
ref d n.r.e.); Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). In Buehler the decedent died intestate, survived by his second wife, whom he desig-
nated as beneficiary, and by a son of his first wife. The son asserted that the designation was
testamentary and void since it had not been executed with the required formalities of a will.
The court rejected the son's contention and recognized the designation as a valid third-party
beneficiary contract.
In the later case of Kirkland the decedent was a school teacher and member of the Texas
Teachers Retirement System. The decedent had designated his sister as beneficiary of the
death benefits, overlooking his wife of twenty years and his son. Following Buehler, the
Kirklandcourt rejected the widow's contention that the designation was void since the card
had not been executed with the formalities of a will. The widow also argued that she was
defrauded of her community property interest since she failed to join in the designation.
While the court seemed to assume that the wife would have had rights had she been de-
frauded, it held that since all the considerable separate and community property of the dece-
dent went to his wife and son, except for the death benefits, there had been no fraud upon
the wife. The point of the case is that a designation without the knowledge of the nonem-
ployee spouse may be valid when that spouse is otherwise provided for.
129. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 58 (Vernon 1956).
130. Id § 45.
131. See Huie, Divided Management of Community Property in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 623 (1974); see generaly Comment, Section 5.22 of the Texas Family Code.- Control and
Management of the Marital Estate, 27 Sw. L.J. 837 (1973).
132. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 5.61(b)(2), (d) (Vernon 1975).
133. Id § 5.62.
134. See id § 4.02.
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result suggests some interesting federal estate and gift tax questions. Inas-
much as Congress has not expressly included sole management community
property in the estate of the nonmanager spouse, could it be argued that
sole management community property is included in the nonmanager
spouse's gross estate only if he has the right to dispose of it at death?
Moreover, could it be argued that the managing spouse's control over her
sole management community property is so pervasive that her lifetime
transfers of that property will not result in the nonmanager spouse having
made a taxable gift?
With respect to employee benefits, Congress has expressly recognized
the limited nature of the interest of the nonmanager in sole management
community property. Section 2039(d) provides that if the nonemployee
spouse dies first, his community interest in his spouse's employee benefit
plan shall be excluded from his estate for federal estate tax purposes. A
corresponding provision, section 2517(c), provides that for federal gift tax
purposes, a lifetime transfer of her spouse's employee benefits shall not be
treated as a taxable gift by the nonemployee spouse.
Thus, the limited nature of the nonmanager's rights in sole management
community property is a strong argument for the proposition that the do-
nor spouse did not have the use, possession, or enjoyment within the
meaning of section 2036 of the sole management community income pro-
duced by the property he transferred to his spouse as her separate prop-
erty. The taxpayer, however, must face the proposition, which the courts
have pronounced in the clearest of terms, that community property is
owned by the two spouses equally and the management rights of a spouse
over his sole management community property do not amount to complete
ownership of that property. 35
Interestingly, in Wyly, other than noting the spouses' equal ownership of
sole management community property, all the Commissioner could say
about the donor spouse's rights in the sole management community in-
come produced was to note what the managing spouse could not do,
namely:
[S]he could not have made excessive or capricious gifts of decedent's
share of the community property income . . or have used it to im-
prove her own separate property . . . . The principles of accounting
apply between the various estates of spouses in Texas. . . and where
appropriate, courts can order an accounting with respect to commu-
nity income from separate property while the marital community con-
135. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 203-05 (1971), discussed at note 70
supra; Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Bowling
v. United States, 510 F.2d 112, 113 (5th Cir. 1975); Lange v. Phinney, 507 F.2d 1000, 1005
(5th Cir. 1975); Broday v. United States, 455 F.2d 1097, 1099 (5th Cir. 1972); Commissioner
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959);
Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 500, 260 S.W.2d 676, 682 (1953); King v. Bruce, 145 Tex.
647, 654, 201 S.W.2d 803, 807 (1947); Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365, 371 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See generally W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCI-




From this the Commissioner concluded that the "[d]ecedent's right to the
community income, if any, to be generated by the trust was thus both 'as-
certainable' and 'legally enforceable' and therefore sufficient to activate
Section 2036(a)(1)."' 137
C. Conclusion
If it could be said that the nonmanager spouse has the right to dispose of
his one-half of his spouse's sole management community property at
death, 31 it would seem that this right is sufficient to bring that property
within the section 2036 concept of possession or enjoyment or right to in-
come. What greater right could a taxpayer have than the right to dispose
of property at the time of death. Such right, for example, is the basis of
section 2041, relating to powers of appointment, the one attribution section
within the federal estate tax.
The issue is complicated, however, because, first, the nonmanager
spouse may be divested of his right of disposition by actions of the man-
ager spouse, and secondly, there is disagreement as to the tests to be ap-
plied in determining whether a decedent's interest in transferred property
is that contemplated by Congress when it enacted section 2036. The
Castleberry court provided that the test is whether the transferor's interest
is illusory.' 39 The taxpayer in Wyy, however, claims the test is whether
the decedent's interest is substantial and not insignificant. 4 ° In the case
where the decedent's interest is in sole management community property,
the taxpayer argues that the nonmanager spouse's control over the income
is not substantial and is really insignificant. The Commissioner, on the
other hand, argues that "[aill that is required is that a decedent retain a
'property right' in the income,. . . or that he retains [sic] a right to have
the income applied to his 'pecuniary benefit,' Treasury Regulations Sec-
tion 20.2036. l(b)(2), or that he retains [sic] an 'economic benefit' from the
property transferred."'' The Commissioner further asserts that the sub-
136. Brief for the Appellee at 20, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No.
78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978) (citations omitted); see Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 317-
18, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627 (1935); Harris v. Royal, 446 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
137. Brief for the Appellee at 20, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No.
78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
138. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text. But see United States v. Stewart,
270 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 960 (1960); Caswell v. United States, 205
F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1962).
139. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682, 690 (1977), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
140. Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No.
78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
141. Brief for Appellee at 25, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 78-
1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978); see Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949);
First National Bank v. United States, 342 F.2d 415, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1965); Greene v. United
States, 237 F.2d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 1956). In Estate of Church the United States Supreme
Court held that the decedent had retained an interest within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2036 so
long as his interest was a property right in the income. 335 U.S. at 644-45.
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stantial control test urged upon the court by the taxpayer is not applicable
to section 2036(a)(1), when the inquiry is that of use, possession, enjoy-
ment, or right to income. The Commissioner maintains that the substan-
tial control test is properly applied only as to section 2036(a)(2), when the
inquiry is that of the decedent's retained right to designate who shall enjoy
the income from the transferred property during the decedent's lifetime.
The Commissioner appears to be in error in his statement of the applica-
ble law. The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Byrum
4 2
used a " 'substantial present economic benefits' " test' 4 3 in applying sec-
tion 2036(a)(1), and held for Byrum, the taxpayer. Byrum had established
an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his children with shares of stock in
three closely held corporations. The trustee was an independent banking
institution, but Byrum expressly retained the right to vote the shares of
stock in the trust and to disapprove any sale of those shares. The Supreme
Court found "that Byrum's retention of voting control was not the reten-
tion of the enjoyment of the transferred property within the meaning of the
statute.""' The Court noted:
The Government points to the retention of two "benefits." The first of
these, the power to liquidate or merge, is not a present benefit; rather,
it is a speculative and contingent benefit which may or may not be
realized. Nor is the probability of continued employment and com-
pensation the substantial "enjoyment of . . .[the transferred] prop-
erty" within the meaning of the statute. 1
45
At this juncture, the reader will undoubtedly point to the anti-Byrum
rule adopted by Congress in 1976 and modified by the Revenue Act of
1978. 146 The modification created new section 2036(b) to deal with the
142. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
143. Id at 149; accord, Estate of Gilman v. Commissioner, 547 F.2d 32, 35 (2d Cir.
1976); Yeazel v. Coyle, 68-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 12,524 (N.D. 111. 1968).
144. 408 U.S. at 150.
145. Id at 149-50. The substantial present economic benefit test apparently was first
articulated in Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 486 (1946). That case in-
volved a deceased transferor who, as trustee, had the power to accelerate the enjoyment by
the trust beneficiaries of the property he had placed into the trust during his lifetime. The
Court held that the decedent's power caused the trust property to be included in his gross
estate (as it would be under present law, namely I.R.C. § 2038). In reaching its decision, the
Court articulated the notion that the words "enjoy" and "enjoyment" in the estate and gift
statutes "connote substantial present economic benefit." 326 U.S. at 486. Although the
Court in Byrum would appear to be the first court to find that a retained interest was insub-
stantial under this test, Byrum was not the first case to extend the Holmes substantial benefit
test to § 2036(a)(1). In Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959), the court used this test in applying § 2036(a)(1) and held that
the decedent had retained a life estate in property that he transferred during life. McNichol
is the leading case supporting the proposition that a life estate need not be expressly retained
in order to apply § 2036(a)(1).
Justice White (joined by two others) dissented in Byrum. He correctly pointed out that
"nowhere in the statute ... do the words 'substantial' and 'present'--or suggestions to that
effect-appear." 408 U.S. at 154 n.3. Furthermore, he correctly noted that Holmes was not
,.a case in which the Court intended or attempted to narrow the meaning of § 2036(a)(1)."
1d Nonetheless, both the majority in Byrum and the court in McNichol seem clear as to the
applicable standard. Logic supports their conclusion.
146. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(i)(1), 92 Stat. 2931.
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Byrum case and redesignated subsection (b) as subsection (c). New section
2036(b) now provides:
(b) VOTING RIGHTS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.- For purposes of subsection (a)(1), the reten-
tion of the right to vote (directly or indirectly) shares of stock of a
controlled corporation shall be considered to be a retention of the en-
joyment of transferred property.
(2) CONTROLLED CORPORATION.- For purposes of paragraph
(1), a corporation shall be treated as a controlled corporation if, at any
time after the transfer of the property and during the 3-year period
ending on the date of the decedent's death, the decedent owned (with
the application of section 318), or had the right (either alone or in
conjunction with any person) to vote, stock possessing at least 20 per-
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock.
(3) COORDINATION WITH SECTION 2035.- For purposes of ap-
plying section 2035 with respect to paragraph (1), the relinquishment
or cessation of voting rights shall be treated as a transfer of property
made by the decedent.' 4 7
As a result of the congressional response to Byrum, does the Supreme
Court's decision have any vitality? The answer would seem to be an obvi-
ous yes. All that Congress did was change the result in Byrum in a very
specific way. It did not reject the "substantial present economic benefits"
test used in Byrum. If Congress had wanted to eliminate the substantiality
requirement from the Supreme Court's test, it would have modified section
2036(a)(1) in a much different fashion. Nonetheless, while it is true that
Congress did not change the substantial benefit test, there do not appear to
be any cases except Byrum in which a court has excluded transferred prop-
erty from a transferor's gross estate on the ground that the decedent's use,
possession, or enjoyment of, or right to income from, the transferred prop-
erty was not substantial or was insignificant.
All of the other cases that involve inquiries as to the substantiality or
significance of the degree of control retained by the decedent involved as-
sertions by the Commissioner that the decedent retained a section
2036(a)(2) right to designate who would enjoy the income from the trans-
ferred property during his lifetime.' 4 8 Moreover, there are two cases hold-
ing that a decedent's contingent right to income required the inclusion of
the transferred property in the transferor's gross estate.' 4 9
147. Id
148. See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); United States v. O'Malley, 383
U.S. 627 (1966); Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
149. Marks v. Higgins, 213 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Nathan's Estate,
159 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 843 (1948). See also Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1(b)(i), (ii) (1958). Other cases have found that retention of any economic benefit
will cause inclusion of the transferred property in the donor's gross estate. See First Na-
tional Bank v. United States, 342 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1965); Greene v. United States, 237 F.2d
848, 852 (7th Cir. 1956); Helvering v. Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 111 F.2d
224, 226 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 654 (1940) (upholding Treas. Reg. 80, art. 18
(1937), the predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1958), which provides that an inter-
est is retained if the income is to be applied toward the "pecuniary benefit" of the donor).
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Applying the substantial benefits test of Byrum to Mr. Castleberry's
transfer to his spouse could easily lead to the conclusion that the interest
given Mr. Castleberry by Texas law in the income from the transferred
property was not the kind of interest contemplated by section 2036 inas-
much as Mr. Castleberry's interest in the income produced is protected
only by the doctrine of fraud on the spouse. Valdez and Horlock, thus,
would seem to be important precedents to the estates of Castleberry, Wyly,
and McKee in support of their arguments.
Valdez could mean that the donor spouse has an interest at his death in
the income produced by the transferred property only if the donee spouse
does not take it away from him, and whether she relieves him of his inter-
est fraudulently or while acting in the best interest of the community is
irrelevant. At the very least, Valdez means that a nonfraudulent disposi-
tion by the donee spouse of the income produced by the transferred prop-
erty will cut off any interest of the donor spouse in that income. Thus,
Valdez would seem to say that the donor spouse's rights under Texas law
to any income produced by the trust, if it is sole management community
property as alleged, are not worth much, if anything. Certainly, it could be
argued that such rights do not constitute a section 2036(a)(1) interest.1 50
Thus, the taxpayers in Castleberry, McKee, and Wyly might prevail on
the ground that their interest in the community income generated by the
transferred property is so insubstantial that it is beyond the reach of sec-
tion 2036(a)(1). If not, they may argue that they "retained" no interest in
the transferred property even though they had a section 2036(a)(1) interest
in that property at the time of their respective deaths.
IV. THE "RETENTION BY OPERATION OF LAW" ISSUE
A taxpayer may have an interest in property that he has transferred, but
that property will not necessarily be included in his estate unless he "re-
tained" that interest within the meaning of section 2036(a)(1).
A. The Three "Old" Retention Tests- In General
Three different tests for determining whether there has been a "reten-
tion" of an interest within the meaning of section 2036(a) can be discerned
in the cases making that determination. To facilitate discussion the three
tests are labeled the express retention test, the facts and circumstances test,
and the economic effects test.
The express retention test is self-defining. The test inquires as to
whether the transferor has any legally enforceable right to the use or en-
joyment of the transferred property, or a right to the income from the
150. Taxpayers with this issue should consider avoiding the Tax Court and litigating in
the district court where it would seem a jury trial could be available on the factual issue
whether an income interest provided by Texas law in transferred property constitutes a sub-
stantial present economic benefit under the Byrum test for § 2036(a)(1). See Kokes v.




The facts and circumstances test, on the other hand, does not depend
upon finding that the transferor has legally enforceable rights to an interest
in the transferred property, but more nearly on whether the transferor, in
fact, has for life the use, possession, enjoyment of or right to income from
the transferred property. 152 In such cases, the courts have expressed a will-
ingness to imply an understanding or agreement between the parties to
allow the transferor to enjoy the property. 153
The economic effects test is hard to isolate, partly because it is still in the
formulation stage. The question is under what circumstances, if any, will
the courts imply a retention of a life estate from the mere fact that the
decedent had the economic benefits at his death from property that he had
at one time transferred. The economic effects test is rooted in United States
v. Estate of Grace,'54 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1969.
In that case the spouses had established reciprocal trusts for each other.
Because of the coordination that obviously took place in the establishment
of the respective trusts, Joseph Grace was deemed the transferor of the
trust established by his wife for his benefit and she was deemed to be the
transferor of the trust he had established for her benefit. This attribution
of transferor-like status to each spouse resulted in the Court's including in
Joseph Grace's gross estate the value of the trust in which he had a life
estate even though that trust had been established by his spouse. The
Court said that, although there had been no express retention of a life
estate nor any intent manifested in an agreement to maintain a right in the
transferred property, "the settlor in a very real and objective sense did
retain an economic interest while purporting to give away his property." 
55
The Court held that a life estate has been retained when "the arrangement
• . . leaves the settlors in approximately the same economic position as
they would have been in had they created trusts naming themselves as life
beneficiaries."' 56 Finally, the Court stated that "[it is no answer that the
transferred properties were different in character. For purposes of the es-
tate tax, we think that economic value is the only workable criterion."'' 57
Perhaps the Supreme Court did not intend in Estate of Grace to articu-
late a new broad standard for application of section 2036, and intended the
case to be limited to its facts. For whatever reasons, the courts have been
slow to develop Estate of Grace. While the language of the Court's opin-
151. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949) (holding that the
predecessor of § 2036(a)(1) applied to a retained right to income from property transferred
m trust).
152. See, e.g., Tubbs v. United States, 472 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S.
829 (1959).
153. See Tubbs v. United States, 472 F.2d 166, 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667, 670-71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 829 (1959).
154. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
155. Id at 323-24.
156. Id at 324.
157. Id at 325.
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ion was cited as authority in Bomash,'58 only one estate tax case has ex-
tended the holding to a different set of facts. In Bischoff v.
Commissioner159 a grandfather established four trusts for his grandchil-
dren and made the grandmother the trustee. The grandmother established
four identical trusts for the same grandchildren and made the grandfather
the trustee. The trustee of each trust would have section 2036 or section
2038 powers if the settlor of the trust was deemed the trustee under the
reciprocal trust doctrine. The taxpayers claimed that the reciprocal trust
doctrine is not applicable when, as there, neither settlor at his death pos-
sesses any economic interest in the property transferred to the trusts. The
Tax Court held that the Estate of Grace did not restrict the application of
the reciprocal trust doctrine to crossed economic interests such as the life
estates Mr. and Mrs. Grace enjoyed. "We simply are not convinced that
the Supreme Court intended to close a perceived loophole under section
2036(a)(1) and, at the same time, permit one to flourish under sections
2036(a)( 2) and 2038(a)(1)."' 161
In Castleberry the Tax Court seems to have held that a finding of a
retention of an interest in transferred property is unnecessary so long as
the transferor has an economic interest in the transferred property at his
death.
We find the reasoning no less valid today and are of the opinion
that petitioner has misconstrued the thrust of our decisions wherein
we did or did not find an agreement, prearrangement, or understand-
ing that decedent has retained a life interest in the transferred prop-
erty. Those decisions did not hold that a finding of an implicit or
explicit agreement was a precondition to the legal conclusion that a
decedent had retained an interest in the transferred property under
section 2036(a)(1). Petitioner is correct in noting that in each of those
cases the decedent would have had no interest in the transferred prop-
erty absent an agreement. However, in the instant case such an agree-
ment was unnecessary. By operation of State law decedent held an
interest in the transferred property after the transfer. We therefore con-
cluded that section 2036(a)(1) applies where the donor holds an income
interest in transferredproperty by operation of State law as well as where
he expressly or impliedly retains the interest under the transfer
instrument. f61
158. Estate of Bomash v. United States, 432 F.2d 308, 311 & n. 1 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'g 50
T.C. 667 (1968), discussed at text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
159. See Estate of Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 32 (1977).
160. Id at 47.
161. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682, 686 (1977), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978) (footnote omitted; emphasis added), discussed at notes
46-70 supra and accompanying text. The Commissioner states: "Before the transfer of the
bonds, decedent had a one-half community property ownership interst [sic] in the income
from the bonds. After the transfer, he had exactly the same interest. Thus, there was a
retention in substance and Section 2036(a)(1) applies." Brief for the Appellee-Cross-Appel-
lant at 16-17, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 28, 1978).
While decedent had a one-half community interest in any income produced by the trans-
ferred property both before and after, there was no guarantee that after the transfer the
donee spouse would not dissipate, die, divorce, or depart, and thereby frustrate the produc-
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The Fifth Circuit must decide whether to accept this new application of
Estate of Grace as a basis for deciding retained life estate cases.
The effect of the Tax Court's position is to emasculate the retention re-
quirement of section 2036(a) and render it much more like section 2038
than its literal language would seem to permit. Section 2038 applies to
transfers where enjoyment was subject to the transferor's power at his
death "to alter, amend, revoke or terminate"' 62 even if that power was not
retained by the decedent at the time of the transfer. It is often said that
section 2036(a)(2) and section 2038 reach the same kind of interests. In
that sense, section 2036(a)(2) is considered the lifetime branch of section
2038. A Treasury Regulation under section 2036, however, emphasizes the
distinction between the kinds of interests each section is designed to reach.
That regulation provides that "[tihe phrase 'right . . . to designate' . . .
does not include a power over the transferred property itself which does
not affect the enjoyment of the income received or earned during the dece-
dent's life. (See however, section 2038 for the inclusion of property in the
gross estate on account of such a power.)"' 16 3
The Tax Court's emasculation of the retention requirement expressly
provided for in section 2036 is far-reaching not only because it contravenes
an express statutory provision, but also because the Second Circuit has
read a retention requirement into section 2038. In 1972 the Second Circuit
claimed that section 2038 had been applied only in cases in which the
transferor retained the taxable power at the time of the transfer.164 It,
therefore, refused to apply section 2038 to a case in which there was no
express retention.
Actually, the economic effects test of Estate of Grace bears some similar-
ity to the facts and circumstances test. They are distinguishable, however,
in the sense that under the economic effects test, the courts would not have
to find any facts and circumstances from which to imply an agreement or
understanding that the transferor will have the enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property. Moreover, the economic effects test would seem to re-
quire, out of faithfulness to Estate of Grace, a showing that the transferor
has a substantial or significant interest in the transferred property at
death. 6 ' Under the facts and circumstances and express retention tests,
tion of any income. Before the transfer, the donor could prevent that result. See text
accompanying notes 173-74 infra.
Accord, Estate of Hinds v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 314 (1948), all'don other grounds, 180
F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1950), discussed at note 33 supra.
In the portion of the Castleberry opinion devoted to determining the amount included in
Mr. Castleberry's gross estate, the Tax Court seemed to see Estate of Grace as being limited
to the reciprocal trust context. See note 385 infra and accompanying text. This suggests that
the Tax Court may not have appreciated the implication that can be drawn from its analysis.
162. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a) (1958).
163. Id § 20.2036-1(b)(3).
164. See Skifter v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), nonacq., 1978-1 C.B. 3.
But cf. Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 C.B. 193 (donor to custodianship under Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act who becomes successor custodian has I.R.C. § 2038 power to terminate even
though not retained at time of transfer).
165. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
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having found a retention, the only question seems to be whether the dece-
dent has any interest, however insignificant, in the transferred property at
his death.
B. The Express Retention Test: As Applied to Castleberry and McKee
Both Messrs. Castleberry and McKee did all they could to divest them-
selves of the transferred property. Neither decedent retained, by any stan-
dard, any interest in the transferred property-the tree-subsequent to the
transfer.166 What each did have was the legally enforceable right' 67 to
one-half of any income produced by the transferred property-the
fruit-by virtue of the Texas community property principle that income
from separate property is community.' The issue then is whether the
connection between the transfer and the fact that any income produced by
the transferred property is community is broken by the fact that the donee
spouse has the unfettered right to dissipate the transferred property and
thereby deprive the decedent of any income or other enjoyment of the
transferred property.' 69 Such potential for a severance of the nexus be-
tween the transfer and the interest would appear to negate retention, ex-
press or otherwise. Furthermore, there is a weaker argument that asks how
the decedent could have retained the use, possession, or enjoyment of, or
right to the income from, the transferred property when he had no right to
compel the donee spouse to manage the transferred property in any way
for his benefit or to constrain her in her management of that property.
170
C. The Facts and Circumstances Test: As Applied to Castleberry and
McKee
The issue is whether from the facts and circumstances that existed at the
time of the transfer, the courts could imply an agreement or understanding
that the decedent would in fact retain for his life the use, possession, or
enjoyment of, or right to income from, the transferred property.' 7' In
Castleberry and McKee there is simply nothing in the record that would
suggest any agreement or understanding between the respective transferors
and transferees that the transferors would enjoy either the transferred
property or the income therefrom. While the statute is not concerned with
actual enjoyment, but the right to such enjoyment, the absence of such
enjoyment would be taken as some evidence that there was no agreement
or understanding between the respective transferors and transferees. 17
2
166. The Commissioner concedes that under his interpretation of Texas law, it is "impos-
sible for one spouse to give to another the complete right to income from property." Brief
for the Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 17, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, No. 78-1612
(5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978) (footnote omitted).
167. But cf notes 106-38 supra and accompanying text.
168. See note 7 supra.
169. See notes 59-66 supra and accompanying text.
170. See Estate of Uhl v. United States, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), ajf'g 25 T.C. 22
(1955). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 231-33 infra.
171. See note 152 and accompanying text.
172. There is nothing in the Castleberry or McKee records to indicate that the transferors
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D. The Economic Effects Test: As Applied to Castleberry and McKee
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Estate of Grace17 is the source of the economic effects test. Since
the Supreme Court found retained life estates in Estate of Grace from the
mere fact that coordination between the spouses took place in the estab-
lishment of the trusts, perhaps it is now fair to say that the retention re-
quirement of section 2036(a) is to be broadly interpreted so as to carry out
the legislative policy of tracing not only incomplete transfers, but also
schemes that have tax avoidance purposes even though they are not within
the literal language of the statute. The test of Estate of Grace appears to be
an inquiry as to whether the transferor is in substantially or approximately
the same position before and after the transfer. Thus, were Messrs. Castle-
berry and McKee in approximately the same economic position after their
respective transfers to their spouses that they would have been in had the
transfers not been made? The answer is a resounding no! Before the
transfer, Mr. Castleberry, for example, enjoyed the right to manage at least
jointly, if not solely, the community property transferred. After the trans-
fer, the transferred property was the wife's separate property, subject to her
unfettered right of disposition. Only the income produced by the trans-
ferred property was community property, and as to that, management was
now committed exclusively to her, subject only to the limitation that she
not so manage the income produced as to work a fraud on the commu-
nity. 174
Moreover, the transfers by Mr. Grace and Mrs. Bomash are distinguish-
able from the transfers by Messrs. Castleberry and McKee. Both Mr.
Grace and Mrs. Bomash were in the same economic position after the
transfer that they would have been had the respective transfers been made
to trusts that they each had established for their respective benefits.
E. The Retention by Operation of Law Test
The district court in Deobald stated that under section 2036 the subjec-
tive intent of the donor is to be emphasized and that there has been no
retention under section 2036(a) unless "the grantor had the intent mani-
fested in an agreement at the time of transfer, to maintain a contingency
interest or right in the transferred property."' 75 Nonetheless, there would
ever enjoyed the transferred property. In Wyly the trust included only non-income-produc-
ing property. Brief for Appellant at 16, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, No.78-1306 (5th
Cir. Feb. 28, 1978).
173. 395 U.S. 316 (1969).
174. See notes 105-34 supra and accompanying text.
175. 444 F. Supp. 374, 382 (E.D. La. 1977). For discussion of this case, see text accompa-
nying notes 85-92 supra. The United States Supreme Court has clearly and unequivocally
expressed a contrary view in Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1949)
(emphasis added), discussed at text accompanying notes 352-55 infra:
In Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632, 701, . . . we have discussed the
Haliock holding in relation to the scope of the "possession or enjoyment"
provision of § 811 (c) and need not elaborate what we said there. "hat we said
demonstrates that the taxability of a trust corpus under thisprovision of§ 811 (c)
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seem to be no reason why an interest in transferred property cannot be
retained by operation of law. The courts have had no difficulty including
in a decedent's gross estate interests in property that resulted from the op-
eration of state law. 176 Furthermore, despite the district court's view in
Deobald, lack of volition on the part of the decedent has not kept so-called
involuntary transfers out of the gross estate of incompetents when such
transfers are made by court order during the period of incompetency but
within three years of death. 1
7 7
Nevertheless, even the Treasury has not heretofore contemplated reten-
tion by operation of law to be within the ambit of section 2036. Its regula-
tions under section 2036 speak of the decedent who has "retained or
reserved" an interest in the transferred property, but make no mention of
retention by operation of law.' 78 On the other hand, its regulations under
section 2037 state that that section includes "an interest arising either by
the express terms of the instrument of transfer or by opera/ion of law."' 79
Also difficult to reconcile is Helvering v. Helmholz,'8 ° in which the
Supreme Court said that the retention of an interest in transferred property
by operation of law is not grounds for including the transferred property in
does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative
effect of the trust transfer. In the Church case we stated that a trust transaction
cannot be held to alienate all of a settlor's "possession or enjoyment" under
§ 811 (c) unless it effects "a bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely,
unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts with all of
his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred
property. After such a transfer has been made, the settlor must be left with no
present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title,
and no right to possess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other
words such a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaf-
fected by whether the grantor lives or dies." We add to that statement, if it
can be conceived of as an addition, that it is immaterial whether such a present
or future interest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor because he de-
liberately reserves it or because, without considering the consequences, he con-
veys away less than all of his property ownership and attributes, present or
prospective. In either event the settlor has not parted with all of his presently
existing or future contingent interests in the property transferred. He has
therefore not made that "complete" kind of trust transfer that § 811 (c) com-
mands as a prerequisite to a showing that he has certainly and irrevocably
parted with his "possession or enjoyment." Any requirement less than that
which we have outlined, such as a post-death attempt to probe the settlor's
thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effectiveness of
the "possession or enjoyment" provision as an instrument to frustrate estate
tax evasions.
In the later case of United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316, 323 (1969), the Supreme
Court noted that Spiegel established that taxability "'does not hinge on a settlor's motives,
but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer.' "
176. See Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), discussed at text accom-
panying notes 352-55 infra; Thomas v. Graham, 158 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1946).
177. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594 (1944).
178. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (1958).
179. Id § 20.2037-1(c)(2) (emphasis added); see Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335
U.S. 701 (1949), discussed at text accompanying notes 352-55 infra.
180. 296 U.S. 93 (1935). Illustrative cases on the issue of revocation by the settlor of an
otherwise irrevocable trust include Woodruff v. Trust Co., 233 Ga. 135, 210 S.E.2d 321
(1974) (inherent right of settlor sole beneficiary to terminate irrevocable trust); Underhill v.
United States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S.W.2d 502 (1929) (with consent of beneficiaries).
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the transferee's gross estate. In Helmholz the Court held that an irrevoca-
ble trust that was subject to the transferor's expressed power of revocation,
but only with the consent of all beneficiaries, was not includable in the
transferor's gross estate. It explained that her reserved right of revocation
with consent of all the trust beneficiaries was no different from the right
that state law gives her to revoke with the consent of the beneficiaries of
the trust.
Despite these precedents, there does not appear to be any convincing
argument against recognizing retention by operation of law so long as the
question is whether the decedent has an interest at death in property that
he transferred during life. The effect is the same whether he expressly re-
tained the interest or whether it was given to him by operation of law. The
only qualification that perhaps should be attached to the new test of reten-
tion by operation of law is to require that the decedent actually benefit or
intend to benefit from the retention. In other words, when the taxpayer
knows that local law will give him an interest in the transferred property,
perhaps the property should be included in his estate.'' It is a much dif-
ferent case when the decedent had neither the knowledge nor the benefit
from the transferred property. Of course, even in such cases, at the trans-
feror's death, his will disposes of that portion of the income produced by
the transferred property that is now the donee spouse's separate prop-
erty. 8 2 Yet perhaps, and most probably, it is enough to include only the
income produced in the transferor's estate without asserting the retention
issue as a basis for recapturing the means of production.
F. Conclusion: As to Castleberry and McKee
Thus, while retention by operation of law is not a troublesome issue,
that is not the question in Castleberry. The unanswered question is
whether the connection between the donor spouse's transfer of property
and his right to any income produced from the transferred property is bro-
ken by either the donee spouse's unfettered right to dissipate the trans-
ferred property or the donor spouse's inability to compel the production of
income or otherwise control the enjoyment of the transferred property.
Notwithstanding Estate of Grace, the retention issue cannot be resolved
by simply pointing out that before and after the transfer Messrs. Castle-
berry and McKee had the right to any income produced by the transferred
property. It is one thing to have control of the means of production before
the transfer, and quite another to be totally at the mercy of the transferee's
management of the means of production for one's enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property after the transfer. Barring any agreement or understand-
ing between the transferor and the transferee as to how the means of
production would be managed, the transferor should not be deemed to
have retained a life estate in the transferred property.
181. This would make the retention by operation of law test analogous to the facts and
circumstances test. See text accompanying note 152 supra.
182. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text.
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G. The Economic Effects Test.- As Applied to Wyly
As applied to the Wyy transfer, the Estate of Grace economic effects test
might be a basis on which to rest inclusion of Mr. Wyly's transfer in his
gross estate inasmuch as Mr. Wyly is in substantially the same economic
position after the transfer as he would have been had the transfer been
made to a trust established expressly for his benefit. This assumes, of
course, that trust income is community property. 8 3 If that is the case, the
only difference between a trust Mr. Wyly established for his own benefit
and the one established for his wife's benefit is that it appears that Mrs.
Wyly had the sole management of the income generated by the transferred
community property.'" 4 Had the transfer been made to a trust established
expressly for Mr. Wyly's benefit, he would have had the sole management
of the trust income once it was distributed.'85 Only a jury could decide
whether Mr. Wyly was in approximately the same economic position in
both cases.' 8
6
H. The Express Retention, Facts and Circumstances, and Operation of
Law Tests.- As Applied to Wyly
In order for the express retention, facts and circumstances, and opera-
tion of law tests of includability to apply, it is not necessary that Mr. Wyly
be in substantially the same economic position both before and after the
transfer. These tests require either a de jure or a de facto retention. The
economic position test, in contrast, does not require a finding of a retention
so long as the economic position of the transferor would be substantially
the same after the transfer as it would have been if the transfer had been
made to a trust established expressly for the benefit of the transferor. 8 7
Under the other tests, the finding of a de jure or a de facto retention
means the courts will find a retained life estate even in cases in which the
interest retained is of significantly less value than the transferor's interest
in the property before the transfer. Nonetheless, applying the facts and
circumstances test, it cannot be said that Mr. Wyly had a retained life es-
tate. There is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that the transfer
in trust was conceived of as a device to allow Mr. Wyly to continue to
enjoy the transferred property yet keep it out of his estate. Moreover, there
is nothing to indicate that was the effect of the transfer. There were no
income distributions during the continuance of the trust, 88 and Mr. Wyly
never contemplated having any interest in the property transferred in trust.
Clearly, from the facts and circumstances, it could not be implied that Mr.
Wyly retained a life estate in the transferred property.
183. See notes 195-344 infra and accompanying text.
184. See note 27 supra.
185. Id
186. See note 150 supra.
187. See text accompanying notes 126-32 supra.
188. See Brief for Appellant at 16, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, No. 78-1306 (5th
Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
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Obviously Mr. Wyly did not expressly retain a life estate in the property
transferred in trust. The state law of Texas, however, arguably gave him
an interest in the income distributed from the trust to Mrs. Wyly.18 9 There
would seem to be a retention here inasmuch as the terms of the irrevocable
trust were fixed at the time of the transfer. Mr. Wyly knew that Mrs. Wyly
would get all the income since the trust mandated such distributions. Be-
cause trust income is arguably community, the effect of the transfer was to
give Mr. Wyly a right to income for life. His knowledge of these legal
consequences would seem to be relevant only under the facts and circum-
stances test.
The only basis for avoiding this conclusion is to note that:
(1) Only Mrs. Wyly could compel the trustees to honor the terms of
the trust. Mr. Wyly had no enforceable rights against the trust-
ees. 1
9 0
(2) Mrs. Wyly had the right to withdraw $5,000 from the trust annu-
ally.' 9 ' In addition, Mrs. Wyly could have divorced Mr. Wyly or
moved to another state and thereby divested him of any interest
in the trust. It is unclear whether Mrs. Wyly's ability to termi-
nate Mr. Wyly's interest by exercise of these rights is sufficient to
break the connection between Mr. Wyly's transfer and the fact
that he had for a period, which in fact did not end before his
death, an interest in any trust income that was distributed.
(3) This proposition assumes, of course, that trust income is commu-
nity property. Perhaps it can be said that Mr. Wyly clearly
earmarked' 9 the trust income as his wife's separate property in-
asmuch as the Wyly trustees could pay the income from the trust
directly to the wife, to any legal guardian appointed for her, or
directly to a third party for the wife's maintenance and sup-
189. See note 7 supra. But see text accompanying notes 195-344 infra.
190. See notes 231-33 infra and accompanying text.
191. See Record, Exhibit 2-B, Section III(c), Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal
docketed, No. 78-1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978). The Commissioner acknowledges right of
withdrawal raises the "possibility that [thel decedent's income interest in the withdrawn
corpus might be extinguished," but concludes that the possibility is immaterial to the opera-
tion of § 2036(a) because there has been no showing that it was, in fact, extinguished. Brief
for the Appellee at 30, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, appeal docketed, No. 78-1306 (5th
Cir. Feb. 10, 1978). The critical issue is not so much whether the decedent had an interest in
any income produced which in fact did not end before his death. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
He obviously did. The question is whether he could have retained an interest by operation
of law within the meanin& of § 2036 in the income produced by transferred property when
the transferee could terminate or cut off such income interest by death, departure, divorce,
or dissipation. The Commissioner would appear to be saying that these events are mere
possibilities that in fact never occurred. What if one or more of them did occur? Suppose, for
example, that Mrs. Wyly withdrew the trust corpus over the year in $5,000 installments as she
had a right to do. If the $5,000 were safely secured in a savings account that produced
income that was community property, would the Commissioner take the position that Mrs.
Wyly had found a safe harbor and the connection between transfer and Mr. Wyly's right to
any income produced from the savings account had been broken? If so, would it have
behooved Mrs. Wyly and others similarly situated to make those annual withdrawals to
defeat the principle of the Wyly case? Would it have behooved Mrs. Castleberry to con-
vert the municipal bonds to cash and reinvest the proceeds to break the chain. Or would the
Commissioner insist upon tracing? See text accompanying notes 347-48 infra.
192. See notes 309-15 infra and accompanying text.
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port. 193 Payment of the trust income to her legal guardian would
not impair its community character if it was community prop-
erty, but such authorization would suggest that the income was
earmarked as separate property.
I. Conclusion. As to Wyly
Thus, it is unclear whether Mr. Wyly retained an interest in the trans-
ferred property. Both the taxpayer and the Commissioner will find sup-
port for their respective positions under both the Estate of Grace economic
effects test and the retention by operation of law test. The Fifth Circuit
will be forced to balance the competing interests. Perhaps one factor in its
decision should be whether there are tax avoidance implications in any
decision for the taxpayer. Alternatively, perhaps the standard in retention
by operation of law cases should be whether, from the facts and circum-
stances, the transferor had the actual use, possession, or enjoyment of the
transferred property or whether he actually received the income to which
he had the right under state law. In other words, perhaps the standard
should be that taxpayers not have unwittingly visited upon them tax conse-
quences that they never contemplated in cases where the purpose of the
statute is to frustrate tax avoidance schemes. Finally, there should be some
means by which Texas taxpayers could avoid having property from which
they have done all that is possible to divest themselves included in their
estates. Whether taxpayers like Mr. Wyly should have such protection is
another question inasmuch as Mr. Wyly could have inserted a stipulation
in the trust agreement that no benefits under the trust would accrue for his
benefit.' 94 But, then, what lawyer would even have believed in 1971, when
the Wyy trust was established, that the Commissioner would take the po-
sition he has taken in Wyy and succeed!
V. WHETHER TRUST INCOME IS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
The Tax Court in Wyly believed that income from a trust is community
property. 95 Accordingly, the court reasoned that the decedent spouse re-
tained a life estate in the community property he transferred to a trustee
for the benefit of his spouse for life because one-half of the income from
the trust would be his community property.
Whether trust income is separate or community has been the subject of
debate in Texas for years. There are four notions that play a role in this
determination:
(1) In 1925, the Texas Supreme Court announced in Arnold v.
Leonard 96 that neither the legislature nor the parties can ex-
pand the constitutional definition of separate property. Since the
193. Brief of Appellant at 16-17, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, No. 78-1306 (5th Cir.
Feb. 10, 1978).
194. See notes 309-15 infra and accompanying text.
195. Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1306
(5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
196. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), discussed at note 7 supra.
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constitution states that separate property is that received by gift,
bequest, or inheritance,197 the court reasoned that all other prop-
erty must be community property. Accordingly, income from
separate property must be community property.
(2) Except in the employee benefits cases, only one Texas court
claims to have held that trust income is community property and
the facts in that case make the alleged holding questionable. 98
(3) Several pre-1925 Texas Supreme Court opinions hold that the
income from a trust is separate property.'9
(4) The Fifth Circuit has announced that Texas permits income
from separate property to remain separate when the donor
clearly indicated that the income was to be separate, but in all
the other cases income from a trust is community property.2"'
It is submitted that careful analysis will dispel the myth that the Texas
courts have declared trust income to be community property. That is not
to say, however, that trust income is necessarily separate. Rather, classifi-
cation of trust income as separate or community depends upon the circum-
stances that gave rise to the transfer in trust. There is no policy reason for
adopting a blanket rule that trust income is necessarily separate or that it is
necessarily community. In fact, the integrity of the community property
system requires that in some instances trust income be considered commu-
nity.
A. Analysis
The most important determination that must be made is whether policy
reasons exist for rendering the civil law concept of community property
inapplicable to trusts, that is, for treating trust income as separate property.
On balance, there seems to be no reason not to extend community property
principles to property held in trust in appropriate circumstances. More-
over, in some instances the integrity of the community property system will
require such an extension. For example, in the case of employee benefits
held in trust, both spouses must receive equal portions of those benefits in
the event of divorce or death to prevent emasculation of the principle of
community property inasmuch as these benefits are clearly the fruits of one
or both spouses' labor. There is equally no reason why property trans-
ferred in trust by gift, devise, bequest, or inheritance for the benefit of one
spouse cannot be classified as his or her separate property, notwithstanding
Arnold v. Leonard.
Arguably, administtative problems20" present themselves when the veil
of the trust is pierced in the guise of classifying trust property as separate
or community, particularly if the trust must bear the burden of the Arnold
197. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
198. In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no
writ), discussed in text accompanying notes 259-62 infra.
199. See cases cited in note 219 infra and text accompanying notes 238-40 infra.
200. See text accompanying notes 285-87 infra.
201. See Branscomb & Miller, Community Property and the Law of Trusts, 20 Sw. L.J.
699, 718 (1966).
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v. Leonard principle that income from separate property is community.
The response, however, is that classification as separate or community is
no more difficult with personal trusts than with employee benefit trusts.
Moreover, any competent trustee will segregate trust income and principal
in his books of account.2°2
Furthermore, in the case of most trusts, classification never becomes an
issue. Practically speaking, classification is only important in the event of
divorce or death. In the event of divorce, interests in trust are matters of
negotiation for property settlement purposes, and if agreement cannot be
reached, equitable division is committed to the courts. Upon the death of
a spouse, the decedent has the right to dispose of his or her half of any
community property held in trust,2"3 and the decedent's executor would
seem to be under a duty to identify and collect the decedent's portion of
any community property held in trust, whether it be a personal trust or an
employee benefit trust.2"
Civil law characterization of trust income as community or separate
property introduces no additional complexity into federal income tax de-
terminations. For federal income tax purposes, trusts are taxed on the in-
come they retain2 5 and beneficiaries are taxed on the income distributed
to them.2°6 Furthermore, every distribution from a trust will be deemed to
carry out the income of the trust to be taxed to the recipient 2 7 to the extent
of the trust's distributable net income,20 8 except when the distribution is in
satisfaction of a specific bequest.20 9 Classification of trust income as com-
munity property would simply mean that if the spouses filed separate in-
come tax returns, each could report fifty percent of the income on his
separate return.210
Similarly, no real problems are presented in the case of discretionary
pay trusts2t ' or trusts in which the trustee's discretion to pay is limited by a
standard.212 Such cases, however, invite the development of different rules
because it is difficult to justify treating trust income as community property
that merely awaits the trustee's exercise of discretion to distribute the in-
come. When the trust is not mandatory pay, that is, when there is no right
202. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 111 (5th ed.
1973); A. ScoTT, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 172 (1960).
203. See note 273 infra.
204. See Johnson & Jones, How Community Property Laws Affect Employee Benefit
Plans, 3 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 3 (1976).
205. I.R.C. §§ 641, 661(a).
206. Id § 662(a).
207. Id
208. Id § 643(a).
209. Id. § 663(a)(1).
210. See id § I(d).
211. "Discretionary pay" trusts, as used in this Article, refer to those trusts in which all
distributions are committed to the sole discretion of the trustee or person other than the
beneficiary.
212. "Discretionary pay trusts subject to a standard," as used in this Article, refer to
those trusts in which the trustee's discretion in making distributions is subject to an ascer-
tainable standard such as maintenance, care, and support. Such a standard has been identi-
fied in Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(c)(2) (1958).
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to income on the part of the beneficiary, it is reasonable to conclude that
the settlor of the trust intended that the beneficiary spouse have the benefit
of the trust property as needed, earmarking any remaining balance for the
remainderman. Whether known to him or not, such a settlor is thinking of
the trust as a power of appointment. He sees himself setting in motion a
transfer of property and committing to his trustee the obligation to com-
plete the gift by either exercising his discretion in favor of the income ben-
eficiary or by withholding his exercise of discretion, thereby completing
the gift in favor of the remainderman. Essentially, the trustee is charged
with filling a gap in the settlor's instrument of gift.2t 3 In such a case,
whether the property actually distributed is income or principal is irrele-
213. See Bolich, The Power of Appointment. Tool of Estate Planning and Drafting, 1964
DUKE L.J. 32, 33.
In Counts, Trust Income-Separate or Community Property?, 30 TEX. B.J. 851, 914 (1967),
it was said:
As to the truly discretionary trust, by the very terms of the instrument itself,
the beneficiary has no indefeasible interest or claim to the item until it is dis-
tributed, certainly no such interest as would require it to be regarded as "ac-
quired" by the beneficiary, in the sense of the constitutional provision and
thus, hardly can it be said that the community would have some kind of inter-
est when the beneficiary of the trust has acquired no interest, and at best has
some nature of expectancy, or some contractual remedy depending upon the
particular trust involved (e.g. perhaps founded on abuse of discretion by the
trustee). Moreover, after distribution, and receipt by the trust beneficiary even
if it is a distribution of current income it is acquired by way of gift or devise by
the beneficiary. In the first place, it was the income item itself which the trus-
tor gave. In the second place, the trustee in exercising his discretionary au-
thority to make the distribution qualifies as a donor for the purpose of a
decision that the beneficiary receives the item as a gift within the meaning of
the constitutional provision. Thirdly, it is quite realistic to treat the trustee as
completing the gift from the trustor which remained incomplete until the dis-
tribution was made. If the distribution is of an item which was originally in-
come to the trustee but by virtue of the terms of the trust had been added to
the principal of the trust by the trustee, then the further contention may be
made that the distribution to the beneficiary of the item is legally the same as a
distribution of that which came into trustees hands initially as principal.
Mr. Counts also objects to treating trust income distributed from a discretionary pay trust
subject to a standard as community property:
[Ilt is in direct violation of the terms of the trust and thus of the terms of the
original transfer made by the person who presumably had the fee simple title
in the property and the right to transfer it by such means and subject to such
conditions and restrictions as he chose so long as his desires were not illegal or
contrary to public policy.
Id at 915.
Others have made an analogy to a corporation in support of the proposition that
undistributed trust income in a discretionary pay trust cannot be community property:
It is clear that corporate stock owned by a husband prior to his marriage or
given to him during his marriage is his separate property, regardless of in-
creases in value due to retained corporate earnings. The wife, in a divorce
suit, cannot claim any interest in undistributed corporate earnings, nor force a
distribution, even though a distribution, if made, would be community prop-
erty. Furthermore, although the directors of a corporation have a broad meas-
ure of discretion in determining the amount of dividend distributions, as do
the trustees of a discretionary trust, the discretion of both is subject to equita-
ble limitations.




vant to the settlor. He simply wants such distributions as in the judgment
of the trustee are necessary.
Accordingly, it is appropriate for a court to conclude that since the
beneficiary spouse has no interest in the corpus of a discretionary pay trust,
the settlor has made a gift of the property distributed whether it be income
or principal. Having received this distribution by way of gift, the property
distributed is the beneficiary spouse's separate property.2 4 This is the only
sensible conclusion because the beneficiary spouse has no right to compel
distribution from the trust absent a showing that the trustee has acted in an
arbitrary and capricious fashion.2t5 In other words, she would have no
legally enforceable claim against the trust for any distributions whatso-
ever. In such a case it could not be said that the settlor gave the benefici-
ary the trust corpus as her separate property and therefore any income is
community. The settlor's gift to the beneficiary is that which the trustee
determines to distribute to her. That distribution is the gift and it is sepa-
rate property.
It goes almost without saying that a property owner can give away less
than a fee simple;216 a life estate, for example, can be the subject matter of
a gift.21 7 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in applying Texas law has suggested
that when the settlor of a trust clearly earmarks a mandatory pay income
interest in a trust as separate property, such income when distributed shall
remain separate property.218 The rule of Arnold v. Leonard is not frus-
214. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975).
215. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 202, § 89; A. ScoTT. supra note 202,
§ 128.3; see, e.g., In re Ferrall's Estate, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009 (1953).
216. Judge Ocie Speer has stated:
It must be conceded that if an estate were conveyed by any other than the
husband to a trustee, in trust that the issues, rents, increase, profits, and the
like be by such trustee delivered to the wife, in her separate right, the gift,
bequest, or devise, as the case might be, would be specifically of such issues,
rents, increase, or profits, and would hence be within the letter and spirit of the
statute making them the separate property of the wife. For surely one entitled
to convey the greater, may convey the lesser, estate. In such a case it is not the
fee nor the corpus of the property granted, but only its use, rents, profits, and
increase.
1 E. Oakes, supra note I 11, § 420, at 622 (footnotes omitted).
217. G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, supra note 202, § 25, at 70-71; A. ScoTT, supra note
202, § 77; see, e.g., Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill, 77 Tex. 199, 13 S.W. 975 (1890), discussed at
text accompanying notes 240-42 infra; Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App.
1902, writ ref'd), discussed at text accompanying notes 245-47 infra.
218. See text accompanying notes 285-93 infra.
A number of reasons have been offered to support the proposition that a settlor need not
expressly earmark trust income as separate in order to have the income treated as the sepa-
rate property of the trust beneficiary.
In the first place, there certainly does not seem to present itself any valid rea-
son why the stated intention of the trustor should be frustrated on the grounds
of public policy, or illegality, and the trust property having been transferred
upon the express trust condition that the sole beneficiary of the trust should be
the beneficiary designated by the trustor, not his or her spouse, or a "Commu-
nity estate" such conditions should control. Indeed, the trustor never parted
with the property except subject to this condition. The rights of the benefici-
ary's spouse are certainly in no manner violated. If analysis is to be required
in relation to the constitutional provision, it can be said (1) that it was the
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trated by such a result because the gift is the income interest rather than
the underlying property that gives rise to the income.
Since a donor can earmark a mandatory pay interest in a trust as the
beneficiary's separate property, can it not be said that any gift of a
mandatory pay interest in a trust is separate property whether or not the
donor so declared? In most cases in which one beneficiary is given the
income for life with remainder to a third party, it is clear that the donor
did not intend to make a gift of an interest in the trust corpus to the life
tenant. Rather, the gift to the life tenant is only the income interest, and
the remainderman has the interest in the trust corpus. Whether or not the
donor earmarks his gift to the life tenant as separate property, it seems
clear that the gift is of the income interest, and the income interest, there-
fore, must be separate property inasmuch as property acquired by gift is
separate property.
Furthermore, on several occasions prior to its 1925 decision in Arnold v.
Leonard, the Texas Supreme Court stated that common law equity princi-
ples, and not civil law principles, apply in resolving questions arising out
of the trust relationship, and, for that reason, if for no other, trust income
is separate property whether it is produced by a mandatory pay trust or a
discretionary pay trust, and without regard to whether it is earmarked as
219separate property. While the Texas Supreme Court has never modified
income itself which was given by the trustor, (2) that there is no completed gift
until the distribution is made by the trustee and (3) there is no completed gift
except subject to the prescribed preexisting condition which the trustee at-
tached to the distribution.
Counts, supra note 213, at 915. Mr. Counts offered these additional remarks:
To ascribe to the receipt the legal status of community property is plainly to
make the spouse of the beneficiary a co-beneficiary of the trust contrary to the
express desires of the trustor and to recognize in the beneficiary's spouse any
rights of the beneficiary in respect of the trusteed funds is to violate the trust
and contractual stipulations which the trustor made applicable to the funds.
Id. Finally, Mr. Counts recalled the United States Supreme Court's remarks about spend-
thrift trusts, offered in Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 725 (1875):
To compel them (the trustees) to pay any of this income to a son after bank-
ruptcy, or to his assignee, is to make a will for the testatrix which she never
made; and to do it by a decree of a court is to substitute the discretion of the
chancellor for the discretion of the trustees . . . .[A] court of equity will not
interfere to control (trustees) in the exercise of a discretion vested in them by
the instrument under which they act. . . .And certainly they would not do so
in violation of the wishes of the testator.[ .. Tihe doctrine, that the owner of property, in the free exercise of his
will in disposing of it, cannot so dispose of it, but that the object of his bounty,
who parts with nothing in return, must hold it subject to the debts due his
creditors, though that may soon deprive him of all the benefits sought to be
conferred by the testator's affection or generosity, is one which we are not
prepared to announce as the doctrine of this court.
Counts, supra note 213, at 916.
219. See McLeod v. Board, 30 Tex. 238 (1867); Magee v. White, 23 Tex. 180 (1859);
Gamble v. Dabney, 20 Tex. 69 (1857); Shelby v. Burtis, 18 Tex. 644 (1857); Cartwright v.
Hollis, 5 Tex. 152 (1849); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-45 (Vernon 1960); New-
man, Income Distributions from Trusts.- Separate or Community PropertO, 29 TEX. B.J. 449
(1966); notes 238-40 infra and accompanying text.
Could not Mrs. Wyly also argue that trust income is not community property because it
was not acquired, using the words of the Texas Supreme Court, as "income from their prop-
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or questioned its holdings in these early cases, Arnold v. Leonard is cited as
inferential authority for the proposition that trust income is community
inasmuch as the Texas Supreme Court held that income from separate
property is community.22 ° It is submitted that Arnold v. Leonard does not
support any such conclusion and that, accordingly, the old Texas prece-
dents correctly state that trust income is separate property in Texas. All
that Arnold v. Leonard held was that the legislature cannot expand the
definition of separate property.22' Later cases have also held that spouses
may not alter or expand the definition of separate property.222 These deci-
sions are not incompatable with the earlier Texas Supreme Court cases
that hold trust income to be separate property. The basis for those early
decisions was (1) that the principles of community property do not apply
to trusts inasmuch as trusts are a creature of the common law, and (2) the
income interest in the trust is the subject matter of the gift to the income
beneficiary, and if it is a gift, it is her separate property even though the
settlor did not expressly so state.
It could even be argued that it is inappropriate to extend the principle of
Arnold v. Leonard to the trust context inasmuch as it mixes common law
precepts with civil law precepts. The civil law does not even contemplate
the institution commonly known as a trust,223 and the community property
system is a civil law concept. Pursuing this argument to its logical conclu-
sion, thus, could lead to the conclusion that property held in trust is neither
separate nor community inasmuch as the community property system is
inapplicable to trusts. That position is untenable inasmuch as the integrity
of the community property system demands a case by case determination,
with the court integrating the different systems. Perhaps it can be said that
where the transaction is donative in nature, that is, where the acquisition is
by lucrative title, the trust income will be separate, but where the transac-
tion is commercial, that is, where the acquisition is by onerous title, the
trust income will be community. 224 Such a classification scheme would
erty," Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390, 392 (Tex. 1972), discussed at note 7 supra, inas-
much as the trust principle cannot be considered the property of the life income
beneficiaries? See notes 216-18 supra and notes 259-67 infra and accompanying text.
220. See Davis, Income Ariingfrom Trusts during Marriage Is Community Property, 29
TEX. B.J. 901 (1966), discussed at note 226 infra.
221. See note 7 supra.
222. Id
223. 1 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 1.8-.9 (3d ed. 1967); Note, Common Law Trusts
in Cii1 Law Courts, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1954).
224. William Q. de Funiak in his treatise excellently summarizes the definition of oner-
ous and lucrative title and explains the distinction between the same according to the dic-
tates of Spanish civil law:
That property acquired by husband and wife during the marriage through
their labor or industry or other valuable consideration is said to be acquired
by onerous title. Other valuable consideration might consist of payment of
money, rendition of services, performance of conditions, payment of charges
to which the property was subject, and the like. With the exception that prop-
erty acquired through valuable consideration which is wholly the separate
property of one spouse naturally retains the character of separate property,
property acquired by onerous title is always community property .. .
Property acquired by lucrative title is that acquired through gift, succession,
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accommodate both the employee benefits situation in which the trust prop-
erty was produced by the labor of one or both spouses and, also, the situa-
tions in which the gifts have been made in trust as a means of
fractionalizing interests in the transferred property.
If the civil law recognized the trust in the English law sense, apparently,
trust income would be separate property and not community. This would
be consistent with the treatment of the legal life estate. Surely the legal life
estate is the gift, and accordingly, any income produced must be separate
property because it is the subject matter of the gift. 225
A line of federal tax cases suggests that the income interest in a trust
cannot be the subject matter of the gift. That is, the gift is of the interest in
the underlying property, and, therefore, income from the trust is commu-
nity property.2 26 These cases are premised on Irwin v. Gavil,227 which held
inheritance or the like. It has its basis in pure donation on the part of the
donor ....
W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHAN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 62, at 127-28 (2d
ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
225. Professor de Funiak apparently believes that trust income should be classified as
separate property even in jurisdictions in which income from separate property is commu-
nity. After discussing Judge Hutcheson's decision in Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 567
(5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text accompanying notes 282-85 infra, he comments:
The only actual gift involved is a gift of trust income itself to a married per-
son. Since this is given to a named married person it would seem to be given
to such married person as separate property. Any so-called equitable interest
in the trust has no value to the beneficiary since by the very nature of the trust
as a spendthrift trust, it could not be sold or otherwise disposed of. All that is
given, to repeat, is certain income and it would appear to be plainly the sepa-
rate property of the recipient.
W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 224, § 71.2, at 165 (footnote omitted). His conclu-
sion is significant inasmuch as he demonstrates that the Texas principle that income from
separate property is community is historically correct. The Spanish law, which was based on
the Visigothic laws and customs, insisted that the fruits and profits of separate property were
community. Id § 71. Thus, de Funiak apparently believes trust income is different from
income produced from separate property. But see Commissioner v. Terry, 69 F.2d 969 (5th
Cir. 1934), discussed at text accompanying notes 276-78 infra.
226. See notes 275-93 infra and accompanying text.
Professor Davis agrees with the federal courts on the issue: "Analysis of the controlling
principles laid down by Texas and Federal cases indicates. . . . that the Texas law is that
income arising from such trusts and distributed to the married beneficiary is community
property. The principles also indicate that undistributed income from such trusts is also
community property." Davis, supra note 220, at 901. However, he cites no cases for this
conclusion except those already discussed in this paper, which he analyzes as follows:
Applying the principles laid down in Arnold v. Leonard, it is seen that the
method of acquiring income arising from the corpus of trust property during
marriage is different than by "gift, devise or descent." Such income is ac-
quired by earnings of the trust corpus, Lesage v. Gately, 287 S.W.2d 193 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1956 error dism.). Therefore such income does not, by definition,
fall within the class of separate property, as fixed by the Constitution. There
can be no title to income nor any acquisition of income until the income
comes into existence. If income comes into existence during marriage its prop-
erty status as community property is thus fixed.
Id at 902. The analysis is deficient, however, in that Professor Davis fails to consider
whether there can be a gift of an income interest in a trust.
Professor Davis' argument appears to be as follows: if income accrues in a trust whether it
be discretionary pay or mandatory pay-for the benefit of a married person, the income
must be community because it is not acquired by gift, devise, or bequest, which is the only
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that a gift of an income interest in trust does not qualify for the exclusion
constitutionally permissible basis on which to acquire separate property. See TEX. CONST.
art. XVI, § 15; Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Branscomb & Miller,
supra note 201, at 723. Thus, if the accrued income is distributed to a designated income
beneficiary, it comes out as community property if the distributee was married at the time
the income was earned, whether or not the distributee was married at the time of distribu-
tion. Cf. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976) (military pension), discussed at text
accompanying notes 269-72 infra. If the income is accumulated, added to principal, and
subsequently distributed to a remainderman, the income comes out as community property
if the remainderman was married at the time the income was earned by the trust even if the
remainderman was not married at the time of distribution. Shades of the accumulation
throwback rules! See I.R.C. §§ 665-667.
Other commentators have stated:
It is conceivable that one set of rules might be used to determine how much
money the fiduciary should distribute, another to determine how much of each
distribution is community property, and a third to determine the taxable in-
come of the trust. In a substantial trust, however, even if the trustee is willing
to operate under three accounting systems, the computation of income and
principal based strictly on the source of the funds distributed becomes ex-
tremely difficult.
Branscomb & Miller, supra note 201, at 715 (footnote omitted). Referring to McFaddin v.
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text accompanying note 288 infra,
Messrs. Branscomb and Miller emphasized the difficulties encountered in a system such as
that proposed by Professor Davis:
Even here, where all of the net income was distributable annually, and the
beneficiaries upon termination were the same persons as the income benefi-
ciaries, tracing became impractical and the court was forced to apply the pre-
sumption that commingling creates community, although it was unwilling to
follow the presumption entirely. An attempt to segregate corpus and income
by tracing where diverse assets are held in trust would present even more diffi-
culty where irregular distributions are made to multiple beneficiaries under
discretionary distribution provisions.
Branscomb & Miller, supra note 201, at 716.
Further support for Professor Davis's position is offered by analogizing the trust to a cor-
poration where the shares of stock represent a bundle of rights.
[T]he collective rights of the beneficiary, viewed as an abstraction, are consid-
ered as the "property" from which the income flows, and distributions are
classified as community income when made out of income of the trust, as de-
termined for trust accounting purposes, much as corporate dividends are com-
munity income when declared in cash or property out of accumulated
corporate profits. Similarly, under this approach, corpus distributions from a
trust are treated as separate property just as dividends paid by a corporation
out of capital are separate property where the stock itself is separate.
Id at 718 (footnotes omitted).
Nonetheless, there is ample-if old-precedent to suggest that the Texas courts have re-
solved this issue in favor of recognizing gifts of an income interest to be the separate prop-
erty of the trust beneficiary, see notes 310-15 infra and accompanying text, even though the
federal courts applying Texas law may arguably have reached a different result. See notes
275-93 infra and accompanying text. With the Wyly case casting a shadow over interspousal
transfers in trust by Texas taxpayers, the Texas courts will undoubtedly be asked to look at
this issue again. Resolution of the controversy will depend upon a balancing of interests.
What policy considerations argue against allowing a taxpayer to make gifts of an income
interest in a trust to his spouse as her separate property? While Texas strictly adheres to the
notion that the Constitution allows spouses to change the character of their community
property only by partition after the property is in being, but see note 451 infra, it would seem
difficult to support an argument that a gift of an income interest is tantamount to a prospec-
tive alteration of the community character of one's property. On the one hand, you have the
gift of the income interest, and on the other, a clear judicial determination that a transfer in
trust cannot anticipatorily alter the community character of property. Apples and apples or
apples and oranges?
227. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
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from income treatment accorded gifts under the predecessor of section 102.
Irwin is in accord with the basic federal tax notion that income remains
income until it is taxed as income to someone. Justice Holmes explained
the Court's decision thusly: "Apart from technicalities we can perceive no
distinction relevant to the question before us between a gift of the fund for
life and a gift of the income from it. The fund is appropriated to the pro-
duction of the same result whichever form the gift takes. 228 Several
courts have relied upon Justice Holmes's language in holding that the re-
cipient of trust income has an interest in the trust corpus, 229 although Jrwin
stands only for the proposition that income from a gift in trust is taxable to
the recipient.23°
One remaining question is whether the nonbeneficiary spouse has a le-
gally enforceable claim to his portion of the alleged community income as
against the trustee of a mandatory pay trust if that trustee refuses to make
the distribution. Upon the death of the nonbeneficiary spouse, his execu-
tor would appear to have such a claim,23 ' and upon divorce a court un-
doubtedly has jurisdiction to compel the trustee to make distributions in
accordance with court orders.232 Nevertheless, the question is whether the
nonbeneficiary can enforce the terms of the trust. In other words, is the
effect of Texas community property law that allegedly declares income
from separate property to be community such that each mandatory pay
trust in Texas has an invited, albeit unwelcome, beneficiary looking to the
trustee for an accounting? Or could it be said that because the trust in-
come will be sole management community property,233 enforcement of the
trust is committed to the beneficiary spouse who has management respon-
sibility? If that were the case, query whether the remedy would be against
the beneficiary spouse for breach of duty to the community for not secur-
ing enforcement of the terms of the trust.
For the reasons just given the Tax Court may have wrongly assumed in
Wyly that trust income is community property. If so, all the other issues in
Wyy, are moot.
B. The Precedents
Notwithstanding the foregoing analysis, whether trust income is sepa-
rate or community property remains, after more than a century, an unset-
tled question, largely because of the Fifth Circuit opinions and a lack of
careful delineation of what was said in Arnold v. Leonard. This portion of
228. Id. at 167-68.
229. Commissioner v. Sims, 148 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text accompanying
notes 286-87 infra; Commissioner v. Snowden, 148 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at
note 282 infra; Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 282-83 infra; Commissioner v. Wilson, 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935), dis-
cussed at text accompanying notes 279-81 infra; Commissioner v. Terry, 69 F.2d 969 (5th
Cir. 1934), discussed at text accompanying notes 276-78 infra.
230. See notes 294-305 infra and accompanying text.
231. See Johnson & Jones, supra note 204.
232. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861, at 11-13 (2d ed. 1962).
233. See note 11 supra.
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the Article demonstrates that the Texas Supreme Court has resolved that
question, despite assertions to the contrary.234 Because of the uncertainty
that has prevailed now for more than fifty years, it is also necessary to
examine all of the Texas cases that have considered this question to
demonstrate that the original holdings of the supreme court have not been
changed.
The following propositions are relevant to donative transfers in trust.
(1) Trust income is separate property if it is earmarked as sepa-
rate.235
(2) Trust income is separate property even if it is not earmarked as
separate, because:
(a) the common law rules apply to trusts and not civil law or
community property rules; 23 6 or
(b) the gift is of the income interest in the trust and, therefore,
the income interest is separate property.237
Creditor Claims. In an 1873 decision on the issue, Hutchison v.
Mitchell,23 8 the Texas Supreme Court held that the husband may by deed
declare an express trust in favor of his wife, giving her the exclusive use
and enjoyment of all the rents and profits of the trust estate, provided there
is no fraud in the transaction. In such a case, the court held that the rents
and profits would be the separate property of the wife and not subject to
the debts incurred by the husband after the creation of the trust.
Had Mrs. Mitchell held this property in her own name and right,
there can be no doubt but that its accumulations would have belonged
to the community estate of herself and her husband, and might have
been subject to the execution levied upon it ...
. . . [W]e think the rules of the common law, and no other law, apply
to the estate of Mrs. Mitchell, under the trust deed to Douglass. The
deed appears to have been made at a time when the husband was free
from debt, and in such circumstances as utterly to repel the idea of
234. Brief for the Appellee at 13-18, Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, No. 78-1306 (5th
Cir. Feb. 10, 1979).
235. Hutchison v. Mitchell, 39 Tex. 488 (1873), discussed at note 238 infra.
236. Id; Magee v. White, 23 Tex. 180, 191 (1859) (dictum).
237. Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill, 77 Tex. 199, 13 S.W. 975 (1890), discussed at text ac-
companying notes 240-42 infra; Gamble v. Dabney, 20 Tex. 69 (1857). In Gamble a father
established a trust "to provide for, support, and maintain" his married daughter. A creditor
obtained a judgment against her and her husband and sought to levy against the trust prop-
erty. The court barred the levy "[blecause the deed expressly stipulates that her interest is to
be enjoyed by her, and shall not be liable to pay the debts of the husband." Id at 77.
Describing the interest of the wife, the court said:
It gives Mrs. Dabney a usufructuary interest, jointly with her children, during
her life, separate and apart from the power of her husband; and at her death it
vests the remainder of the property in her children then living. From the na-
ture of the gift her interest is varying and indeterminate, according to the exi-
gencies of her own condition and that of her children.
Id at 77.
238. 39 Tex. 488 (Tex. 1873) ("Her separate property was not the land, but its produce."
Id at 490-91.)
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fraud in the establishment of the trust.239
In a later case, Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill,24° the wife's grandfather's
will directed that her share "'be secured to her for life, with power to give
it to her children, if any.' ,241 The decedent's executor transferred the
property to the wife's husband, who agreed to hold the fund as her trustee.
The husband's creditors claimed that the trust income was community.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the income from this essentially
mandatory pay trust was the wife's separate property. The court explained
its decision in these terms:
The court concur in the opinion that appellants' contention cannot be
maintained, and we agree substantially in the result, that the judg-
ment is in this particular correct. As to the grounds of that conclu-
sion, we are not in accord. One opinion is that it is the income, and
not the corpus, of the fund that was bequeathed to the plaintiff by her
grandfather, and that, therefore, the interest on the money comes lit-
erally within the definition of "separate property," as given in the stat-
ute; that is to say, that the income of the fund is acquired directly "by
devise." Rev. St. art. 2851. The other opinion is that when the hus-
band borrows the money of the wife, and agrees to pay her interest,
the effect of the contract is to make the interest her separate prop-
erty.
2 4 2
A similar finding was reached in Shepflin v. Small,24 3 in which a debtor
and his wife conveyed the wife's separate property to a trustee, with the
provision that the rents collected by the trustee were to be used for the
support of the wife and children. The court refused to allow a creditor of
the husband to garnish the rent, holding that the creation of the trust had
the effect of withdrawing the rents from the community estate. Relying on
Shepflin, the court in Monday v. Vance 244 held that a married woman has
the right to convey her property, in trust, to herself and her children, so as
to withdraw the rents from the community estate, and the conveyance will
not be fraudulent as to her husband's creditors.
In Sullivan v. Skinner245 creditors of the husband garnished tenant
rental payments due the wife. The wife's father had bequeathed the rental
property to her for life, but not in the trust, with the remainder to her
children in fee simple. The terms of the will were "[flor the term of her
natural life, with full power to receive for her sole and separate use, and no
other, the rents and profits of the same, and on her death the same to
239. Id at 493-94 (emphasis added).
240. 77 Tex. 199, 13 S.W. 975 (1890).
241. Id. at 202-03, 13 S.W. at 976.
242. Id at 204, 13 S.W. at 977.
243. 23 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ). The language of the discretionary pay
trust was as follows: "In trust to collect the rents and appropriate the same to the support
and maintenance of the wife and to the education and maintenance of their children." Id at
432.
244. 32 S.W. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ). The language of the discretionary pay
trust was as follows: "The rents and profits, if any, to be applied to the support of Mrs. Rice,
and to the support and education of her children." Id at 559.
245. 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref'd).
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belong to any child or children of the said [wife]." 246 The court held that
the rental payments were the subject matter of the father's gift to his
daughter and, therefore, those rental payments when produced constituted
her separate property. The court stated:
In other words, the rents and profits issuing from the property during
her life was all she could get out of it, unless she should sell her life
estate therein. These "rents and profits" she was empowered by the
will "to receive for her sole and separate use and no other." This use
excluded the right of her husband to any interest in the rents and prof-
its, and made them her separate property.247
In Mercantile National Bank v. Wilson,248 one of the more recent state
court decisions, the Dallas court of civil appeals stated, in what appears to
be a dictum, that undistributed trust income is community property from
the date of the wife-beneficiary's marriage to her husband. Nevertheless,
the court concluded that such trust income was special community prop-
erty249 and therefore not reachable for satisfaction of a community debt
incurred by the husband. Thus, the creditor would have lost whether the
court determined the income to be the separate property or the special
community property of the wife. Unfortunately, the orderly development
of the law in this area has been distorted because of the dictum in
Mercantile. Mercantile is cited as holding that trust income is community
property,2 0 even though the court's dictum apparently played no role in
its decision.
Property Rights on Divorce. McClelland v. McClelland"5' apparently was
the first Texas case to address the issue of property rights in a trust on
divorce of the beneficiary and spouse. McClelland involved a suit for di-
vorce and a determination of property rights. The wife alleged that her
husband was the sole heir to a large estate held in trust and that the in-
come accrued therefrom during marriage amounted to $120,000 at the
commencement of the suit. She contended that the income was commu-
nity property, notwithstanding the fact that the property had been devised
by the husband's father in trust for the husband. The trustee had, under
the terms of the will, the discretion to accumulate all of the income from
the trust property with the exception of a small support payment. The
court of civil appeals held that the wife was not entitled to any income
246. Id at 681.
247. Id
248. 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ refd n.r.e.). The application
for writ of error was refused on the ground of "no reversible error." Thus it is at least
possible to infer that the supreme court regarded the lower court's comment on undistrib-
uted income as a dictum in view of the fact that whether the undistributed income was
viewed as special community, separate, or rather property of the trust itself, the same result
would have been reached.
249. Id at 654. Special community property is another way of describing sole manage-
ment community property. In this case, the so-called special community property was in-
come derived from the spouse's separate property.
250. L. SIMPKINS, supra note 7, § 15:42; Branscomb & Miller, supra note 174, at 713.
251. 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refd).
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actually distributed by the trustee to the husband "because these amounts
were his separate property, devised to him by the will, in which the wife
had no community interest. 152  Further, the court held that since the hus-
band could not demand distribution of the accumulated income, the wife
could not assert a claim that the husband did not have. The court stated:
It is not the purpose and object of the statutes that create the commu-
nity interest of husband and wife in property to prevent a testator
from making a disposition of his property to either upon conditions
and trusts which limit the right of the beneficiary, or restrict his inter-
est to a limited extent, and define what its character shall be. This is
the right of the testator. The law did not impose upon him the duty of
devising and bequeathing his property to his son, and when he elected
to do so he had the authority to determine what interest in his estate
the son should enjoy; and, having defined this interest, the wife, by
force of the community statutes, could not exceed and extend it.2 53
In the relatively recent case of Buckler v. Buckler254 the provisions of a
spendthrift trust created for the benefit of a husband were found to so
restrict his rights and interests as to exclude his entitlement to income that
the trustees had not seen fit to distribute to him. The Fort Worth court of
civil appeals held that the undistributed income did not constitute commu-
nity property for purposes of the distribution of the property on divorce.
The court relied on McClelland v. McClelland2 55 in making its determina-
tion, and rejected the wife's argument that McClelland had been indirectly
overruled by the Texas Supreme Court in Arnold v. Leonard.256 The issue
before the court was the nature of income arising from the corpus of a
discretionary pay trust in a divorce action, and the court stated that the
McClelland holding on that issue was unaffected by Arnold v. Leonard.25 7
252. Id at 359.
253. Id. at 358.
254. 424 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The Texas
Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction of the property dispute because it was merely ancillary to
the divorce action, and there was no conflict among courts of appeals on this point. See
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1728(2) (Vernon 1962).
255. 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ refd), discussedat text accompanying notes
251-53 supra.
256. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), discussed at note 7 supra.
257. The court stated:
Arnold Y. Leonard held that property acquired during marriage other than as
the result of gift, devise or descent necessarily could not be part of the separate
estate, in view of the Texas Constitution, and hence would have the character
of community property. The decision does overrule a portion of the holding
in McClelland, but it does not overrule the holding which is material to the
question before us. As to such the Supreme Court, which disposed of the ap-
plication for writ of error in McClelland by the notation "writ refused", has
not had occasion to reconsider the decision therein made. It is not the prov-
ince of a Court of Civil Appeals to anticipate that the Supreme Court would,
if afforded the opportunity, reverse itself as applied to a prior holding it has
made. We are bound by the prior holdings of that court, specific or construa-
ble.
424 S.W.2d at 516 (emphasis added). While the reference in the opinion is unclear, appar-
ently the portion of the McClelland decision that the court considered overruled is the
McClelland court's holding that distributed trust income is separate property.
1979] 1147
SO UTH WESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Currie v. Currie2 "8 clearly holds that undistributed trust income is not
community property in a case where trust income was to be added to
corpus and all distributions were made according to the trustee's "uncon-
trolled discretion."
Unfortunately, in the most recent divorce case involving trust income, In
re Marriage of Long,259 the Texarkana court of civil appeals added to the
confusion by its opinion explaining its decision. The trust in dispute pro-
vided that the income of the trust was to be either distributed or accumu-
lated at the discretion of the trustee until the beneficiary, H, reached
twenty-five, at which time fifty percent of the trust corpus was to be distrib-
uted to him. When H reached thirty, the balance of the trust was to be
distributed to him. H and his wife, W, separated before H reached
twenty-five, but the divorce proceeding was not commenced until a later
time. When H reached twenty-five, he "decided to leave his half interest
in the trust though he was entitled to withdraw approximately $85,000.''26°
The court held that the income accumulated by the trustee prior to the
time H reached twenty-five was -/s separate property and the income ac-
cumulated in the portion of the trust not distributable until H reached
thirty was his separate property. Only the income earned after H reached
twenty-five by that portion of the trust that became distributable at age
twenty-five was community property and therefore subject to distribution
in the divorce proceeding.
The opinion is unclear as to whether I's decision to allow the distribut-
able one-half of the trust to continue in trust was in fact a reconveyance in
trust subject to the terms of the existing trust or merely a decision to post-
pone acceptance of the distribution. In the latter event, one-half of the
trust would have remained immediately available to H and the trustee
would have been acting as a mere agent. In such case the income gener-
ated by the portion of the trust held by the trustee as ifs agent would be
community property in accordance with the principle of Arnold v.
Leonard.
Unfortunately, the explanation given by the court for its decision was
misleading if it considered the trustee to be merely ifs agent as to one-half
of the trust. The court said:
Unlike the situation in Currie, supra, the beneficiary in the case
before us was entitled to a present possessory interest in one-half of
The court also commented further on the effect of the writ refusal by the Texas Supreme
Court, stating:
In 1896 the notation "writ refused" by the Supreme Court meant that said
court approved the result reached by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas but
did not necessarily approve the opinion; or it might not even mean approval of
the result reached where error was not preserved and presented to the
Supreme Court. It is, however, inconceivable that the matter here under con-
sideration was not made a point of error before the Supreme Court in that
case.
d at 515.
258. 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd).
259. 542 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
260. Id at 718.
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the trust corpus and the income from that one-half. In the Mercantile
Bank case, supra, undistributed income was in the hands of the trus-
tees but the beneficiary had a present possessory interest in the funds.
As in the Mercantile Bank case, we conclude that the income on the
trust corpus should have been labeled community property.
26
'
On the other hand, the court's opinion would be both significant and
internally inconsistent if H had irrevocably reconveyed the distributed
portion of the trust to the trustee and it had become a part of the corpus to
hold until H reached thirty. Except for the distributed portion of the trust,
the court had said that the corpus and accumulated income was separate
property, citing Currie v. Currie.262 If it now said that the portion H con-
veyed irrevocably to the trust on the same terms of the property already in
trust was to be classified differently, it would mean either that the identity
of the trust settlor was relevant to classification, or that B's reconveyance
in trust was akin to a fraudulent transfer.
It is unfortunate that the court's narrow holding was explained by such
broad statements. It made necessary this analysis and speculation inas-
much as it has become fashionable to cite Marriage ofLong for the broad
proposition that trust income is community. The court held no such thing.
In In re Marriage of Burns,263 decided by the Texarkana court of civil
appeals on September 19, 1978, the court had before it all of the issues
discussed in this subpart. Bill and Barbara Burns were divorcing, and Bar-
bara claimed that undistributed trust income held for Bill's benefit was
community property. Bill Burns was the beneficiary of six trusts, three of
which had been established by his parents and grandparents. Bill had es-
tablished the other three trusts. Five of the trusts came into existence prior
to the marriage. Bill established the sixth trust after the marriage with
separate property. The three trusts established by Bill's ancestors were
spendthrift trusts. Five of the six trusts were discretionary pay trusts in
which "the trustee or trustees could either withhold or distribute the in-
come and/or corpus at their sole discretion." 2" The remaining trust re-
quired that its income be accumulated until May 28, 1982, when the entire
corpus and accumulated income was to be distributed to Bill.
The court held that the undistributed trust income in each of the trusts
was separate property. While correct in result, the explanation offered by
the court may be questionable. The court relied on section 5.01(b) of the
Texas Family Code, which provides that "[clommunity property consists
of the property, other than separate property, acquired by either spouse
during marriage., 265 The court concluded that Bill had not "acquired" the
trust income during marriage as required by the statute inasmuch as it had
not been distributed and he did not "have a present or past right to require
261. Id
262. 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd), discussed at note
258 supra.
263. 573 S.W.2d 555 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1978, writ filed).
264. Id at 557.
265. TEx. FAM. CODE ANIj. § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
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its distribution so as to compel a finding that there was a constructive ac-
quisition., 26 6 The court, thus, seemed to ignore the question whether the
trust income was the subject matter of the gift and, therefore, separate
property. As the opinion stands, the court would appear to be saying that
had the income been distributed it would have constituted community
property.
The opinion is internally inconsistent in one significant respect. The
court did not seem to appreciate that the trust scheduled to terminate in
1982 was a mandatory pay trust. It called for the accumulation of income,
but it also required a distribution of all of the accumulated income in 1982.
While Bill Bums did not have a right to reduce the accumulated income to
possession during marriage, his right to such income was certainly "ac-
quired" during the marriage.
While the opinion is not clear as to whether this 1982 trust is the one
established by Bill Bums after marriage from his separate property, one
could draw that inference. If that were the case, could the court have been
saying essentially that a spouse can convert what would otherwise be com-
munity income into separate income by laundering the income producing
property through a trust? Alternatively, even assuming that the court
would hold distributed income to be community, could the court be saying
that a spouse could prevent community income from coming into being by
sheltering that income in a trust? That is doubtful. Accordingly, the 1982
mandatory pay trust should have been controlled by the dicta in Marriage
of Long and it should have been eligible for division by the court in the
divorce proceeding. Yet when it comes to whether a spouse can make a
gift to his spouse of the income interest in a trust, the question is much
different, and so too should be the results.
Employee Benefits Cases. Issues related to the classification of income as
separate or community property have arisen in the employee benefit area,
but the development and resolution of these issues have in no way been
premised on the Texas rule that income from separate property is commu-
nity property. The employee benefit cases are mentioned here only be-
cause upon casual inspection they could be interpreted as precedent for
classifying undistributed trust income as community property since Texas
clearly classifies trusteed employee benefits as community property. The
obvious basis for such classification is that such trusts are established in
consideration of the performance of services by one spouse, and therefore
the contributions to the trust, as well as the income generated by those
contributions during the continuance of the trust, must be community
property. To hold otherwise would effectively emasculate the community
property system.
The leading case of Herring v. Blakeley67 is indeed appropriately styled,
266. 573 S.W.2d at 557.
267. 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965).
The basis of Herring is the proposition that the community character of property cannot
be altered by placing it in trust, c. Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961)
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for a red herring was introduced that has successfully diverted the atten-
tion of at least one writer268 on the issue of trust income classification. The
husband, while employed, participated in a profit-sharing trust together
with rights under a retirement annuity agreement. Both the employer's
and the husband's contributions were made during marriage. The benefits
under both plans were payable only upon the husband's death or termina-
tion of employment. The plans contained spendthrift provisions and
clauses forbidding the husband to assign or otherwise dispose of his inter-
ests in the trusts, although he could name parties other than his wife as the
beneficiary of the plans. Under both plans the interests were vested. The
marriage ended in divorce, and subsequently the former husband died.
The trustee argued that the plan benefits were not community property
because of the spendthrift and nonassignment provisions of the plans. The
court, however, held the interest in the plans to be community property,
reasoning that the vested interest in the plan was "property" at the time of
divorce even though neither spouse could compel distribution of either
fund at the time of divorce. Thus, the former wife was entitled to one-half
of the interest in the profit-sharing trust and the annuity plan determined
as of the date of the divorce.
The later case of Cearley v. Cearley6 9 held that retirement benefits that
(stock purchased with community funds), discussed in note 451 infra; Brown v. Lee, 371
S.W.2d 694 (Tex. 1963) (life insurance policy purchased with community funds), unless such
conveyance is for the benefit of the community and not a fraud on the community. See note
131 supra and accompanying text. Since the contributions to the employee benefits plan
trust are community, they have been placed in trust for the benefit of the employee. More-
over, income from community property must be community.
On the other hand, property placed in a trust as a result of gift, devise, or bequest is not
community, and for that reason, there is no reason to ignore the trust entity as is necessary
when the property placed in trust is community, the integrity of which must be secured as a
matter of policy.
Thus, is property placed in trust by gift separate? It is submitted that that is irrelevant and
that this line of investigation is inappropriate. The real question is what is the subject matter
of the gift. In most cases, it is the amounts distributed by the trustee to the trust beneficiary.
See text accompanying note 213 supra.
Speculation as to whether the trust income is separate or community is fruitless. For
example, if you conclude it is community, that would mean by definition that both spouses
have a legally enforceable claim to it whether or not it is distributed. That would be non-
sense in cases where all distributions are discretionary with the trustee. Moreover, in cases
of mandatory pay trusts, you could hold that trust income is community and that each
spouse has a legally enprovable claim to the income when produced even if not yet distrib-
uted. But why should that be the result? What policy reason precludes analyzing the trans-
action in terms of the donor's having made a gift of an income interest, and gifts are separate
property?
Furthermore, it is inappropriate to reason as has been suggested, see Davis, supra note
220, at 975, that a gift in trust is based on an agreement between the trustee and the donor to
alter the character of property and that such agreements are invalid. Trusts by definition are
not governed by contract principles. They are donative transactions requiring delivery, don-
ative intent, and acceptance. The use of the word "agreement" in connection with the word
"trust" is a misnomer. In this context, agreement means acceptance by the trustee of the
property transferred in trust subject to the terms and conditions outlined in the acceptance
document commonly referred to as the agreement.
268. Davis, supra note 220, at 976.
269. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); accord, Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
1977).
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were not yet vested also constituted community property and, therefore,
were divisible upon divorce. In Cearley, the husband had served nineteen
years in the Air Force, eighteen of those years married, and on divorce
lacked one year before his retirement benefit interest was "vested." The
husband argued that the benefits were not acquired or vested during mar-
riage and thus were not community property. The court of civil appeals
agreed with him, stating an all events test to the extent that "[tihe condi-
tions must be such as would entitle the claimant [husband] to institute an
action, if necessary, for a money judgment. '27° The Texas Supreme Court,
however, reversed the court of civil appeals, stating:
The portion that he earned during the months of coverture became
contingent earnings of the community which may or may not bloom
into full maturity at some future date. We hold that such rights, prior
to accrual and maturity, constitute a contingent interest in property
and a community asset subject to consideration along with other
property in the division of the estate of the parties under Section 3.63
of the Family Code.27'
Although the Cearley court quoted Herring to support its position,272
Herring stands only for the proposition that the plan rights must be
"vested." The Texas Supreme Court, however, recognized that the hus-
band's employee benefits might never vest, and, therefore, it stated that the
trial court could provide for the nonemployee spouse by giving her an in-
terest in the benefits "if, as, and when the benefits are received by the retir-
ing spouse., 273 In other words, the court said that actual recognition of the
270. Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976).
271. 544 S.W.2d at 665-66.
272. The portion of the Herring opinion that was quoted was the statement that
"[c]ommunity rights may exist in interests that cannot be reduced to possession, such as
remainder or reversion rights." Id at 665 (quoting Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 847
(Tex. 1965)).
273. 554 S.W. 2d at 666; see Cruse v. Cruse, 572 S.W.2d 68 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1978, no writ). If the employee spouse is the first to die, the problems of deter-
mining the community nature and valuation of vested retirement benefits are not as com-
plex, since the benefits are currently payable. However, if the nonemployee spouse is the
first to die, her personal representative should have a claim against the plan for the nonem-
ployee decedent's community interest, and the same problems of determining community
character, valuation, and settlement arise in this context as in divorce situations. But see
Valdez v. Ramirez, 574 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. 1978), discussed at notes 124-34 supra and accom-
panying text. "If the personal representative fails to pursue the claim, he may be liable to
the decedent's heir for loss of the claim." See Hughes, Community-Property Aspects of Profit-
Sharing and Pension Plans in Texas--Recent Developments and Proposed Guidelinesfor the
Future, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 860, 877-78 (1966); Johnson & Jones, supra note 204, at 7.
Furthermore, does Cearley make a nonvested plan interest a community asset for death
purposes, and thus an asset in the gross estate of the nonemployee spouse? How would such
a nonvested interest be valued for estate tax purposes? Section 2039(d) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code presents some relief, but not as to the part of the plan benefits applicable to em-
ployee contributions. Could it be argued that § 2039 requires inclusion of such plan benefits
in the gross estate of the nonemployee spouse, subject to a later refund should the benefits
fail; or, alternatively, that estate tax on this amount must be paid at a later date when the
benefits are finalized. This is a perplexing problem, and one not easily escapable since
Cearley states that the nonvested interest is definitely a property interest.
Of course, it may be argued that Cearley applies only to the divorce situation inasmuch as
1152 [Vol. 32
INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFERS
community interest of the nonemployee spouse can be postponed until the
benefits are distributed.
Furthermore, the Texas courts have recognized that the employee bene-
fits cases are of limited precedential effect. Recently, in Vibrock v.
Vibrock274 the court of civil appeals held that if renewal commissions on
insurance policies are unearned and unaccrued at the time of divorce, an
award in favor of the wife for the property right of the husband that had
not yet come into existence at the time of the divorce decree is impermissi-
ble, since as of that time one might never come into existence. The court
expressly refused to apply the rationale of Cearley to the facts before it,
even though the wife urged it to do so.
The Fifth Circuit Income Tax Cases. The Fifth Circuit has consistently
held that distributed trust income is community property under Texas law.
Each case arose as the result of a taxpayer claim that the trust income was
community, and therefore he should be permitted to split his income with
his spouse for federal income tax purposes. This question has been moot
since the 1948 changes in the Internal Revenue Code allowing spouses
who file joint federal income tax returns to split their separate income.27 5
In Commissioner v. Terry,27 6 the first in a series of cases on this issue
handed down by the Fifth Circuit, the court held that the income gener-
ated by a legal life estate was community income. The court explained
that the testator's gift was the life estate as separate property, and, there-
fore, the income from the separate property was community property. The
court cited Irwin v. Gavitt277 and quoted this portion of Justice Holmes'
opinion: "Apart from technicalities we can perceive no distinction relevant
to the question before us between a gift of the fund for life and a gift of the
income from it."278
Commissioner v. Wilson 279 involved a trust that required annual distri-
bution of all trust income. In holding the distributed income to be com-
munity property, the Fifth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's argument
that the property lost its character as separate or community as the result
of the interposition of the trust. Citing Irwin v. Gavitt, the court stated:
It is argued that the result should be otherwise because the hus-
bands do not get the revenue directly from the property but through
the hands of the trustee and subject to the expenditures which he is
authorized to make. But the trustee is bound to act always for the
the Texas courts seem to have developed a different standard when the nonemployee spouse
dies first. See notes 124-28 supra and accompanying text.
274. 549 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977), writ refdn.r.e. per curiam, 561
S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1977).
275. Prior to 1948, taxpayers were not permitted to file joint income tax returns. Since
then, joint returns and income splitting are permitted between spouses even though one
spouse has no income of his or her own. See I.R.C. § 6013.
276. 69 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1934).
277. 268 U.S. 161 (1925), discussed at text accompanying notes 294-308 infra.
278. 69 F.2d at 969.
279. 76 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
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benefit of the beneficiaries and to divide the net results among them.
All net income and corpus ultimately go to them. The beneficiaries
receive the income as income. The corpus is theirs in equity, the legal
title being conveyed to the trustee expressly for their benefit. In Irwin
v. Gavitt, . . . where the trust instrument did not expressly give the
corpus to the beneficiary but only the income, it was held that the
payments were taxable income from a corpus impliedly given. In-
come accruing from the separate equitable estates of the husbands
during the marriage though collected and paid over by a trustee be-
longs to their respective communities.28°
Thus, the Fifth Circuit totally disregarded the trust entity on the basis of
the alleged holding in Irwin v. Gavilt that the gift was of the trust corpus
and not of the right to income. Turning to oil royalty income, however,
the court felt compelled to follow state law and accordingly held that "so
much of the trust income of respondents as can be shown to be derived
from royalties is their separate property."28'
Commissioner v. Porter28 2 involved income distributed to two married
women from a New York trust created by their father. All distributions
from the trust were made at the discretion of the trustee. The Commis-
sioner argued that the trusts were created for the "separate use and bene-
fit" of the two women, and therefore the income was their separate
property. In holding the distributed property community, the Fifth Circuit
stated:
Taxpayer, invoking the rule settled in Arnold v. Leonard, ... that
income from separate property falls when received into the commu-
nity, the rule settled in Commissioner ofInternal Revenue v. Terry...
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wilson. . .that the fact that
the income is from property given in trust instead of direct to the tax-
payers does not alter the general rule, and the rule that "a gift of the
income of a fund ordinarily is treated by equity as creating an interest
in the fund", Irwin v. Gavitt. . .insists that the Tax Court was right,
the commissioner was wrong.
The commissioner, arguing that a spendthrift trust, a trust for the
collection and distribution of income, is the same in legal effect as one
in which it is provided that the income "is to be received to their sole
and separate use and no other", stoutly insists, on the authority of
McClelland v. McClelland,. .. that the income in question here was
separate property.
• ..Here what is in question is not undistributed income in the
hands of the trustees as in McClelland's case, but income distributed
to the daughters, no longer fettered but their own, and our only con-
cern is to determine in what character it became their own. Did it
come to them, as the commissioner contends, within the constitutional
280. Id at 769 (citations omitted).
281. Id at 770.
282. 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945). The next case in the sequence, Commissioner v.
Snowden, 148 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1945), dealt with precisely the same issue except the benefi-
ciary was a male.
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definition of separate property, by gift, devise or descent, for their sep-
arate use and benefit, and, therefore, as their separate property? Or
did it, as taxpayers contend and the Tax Court has found, come to
them as ordinary income from trust property of which they are benefi-
ciaries, and, therefore, as community? We think it entirely plain that
when they received the income it fell into the community.
283
McClelland v. McClelland284 involved both distributed and undistributed
income and the court of civil appeals held that both kinds of income were
separate. The Fifth Circuit, however, apparently believed that McClelland
involved only undistributed income and distinguished McClelland on this
basis.
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit stated that the donor could make a valid
gift of an income interest as the separate property of a spouse, but to make
such a gift, the trust instrument must, "in the most precise and definite
way, and by the use of language of unmistakable intent, make that desire
and intention clear." '285 The court, however, further stated that there was
no such language in the trust instrument in question.
In Commissioner v. Sims286 Judge Hutcheson held that whether the trust
was a spendthrift trust was not material under Porter, but again com-
mented on how a gift of separate income is made: "Here, as there, the trust
instrument contains no clause or provision manifesting an intent to make
the income from the trust property other than the Texas law makes it, com-
,,287munity property.
McFaddin v. Commissioner288 standing alone would have little impact
on the question of the role of trust language on the characterization of
property. It reflects the Fifth Circuit's insistence upon disregarding the
trust entity in order to find that trust income is community for income tax
purposes. While finding that property originally placed in trust by the set-
tlors became the beneficiaries' separate property, it noted that the trust in-
come consisted of both oil royalties, which are separate property under
Texas law, and other income that if received directly by the beneficiaries
would be community property under Texas law. It then concluded that
the community property portion of the trust income was commingled with
the separate property income to such an extent that the two were
unidentifiable, and thus, the income from the whole became community.
The trustees had used the separate property income of the trust to purchase
other property for the trust. The Fifth Circuit rejected the Tax Court con-
clusion that such after-acquired property was separate property and that,
therefore, the income from that property was separate.
The theory of the Tax Court that none of the commingled property
with which the after-acquired property was purchased was commu-
283. 148 F.2d at 567-69 (citations omitted; footnotes omitted; emphasis added).
284. 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref d), discussed at text accompanying notes
251-53 supra.
285. 148 F.2d at 568.
286. 148 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1945).
287. Id
288. 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945).
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nity property because, under the terms of the trust instrument, gross
income was treated as corpus, the rights of the beneficiaries did not
attach to gross income but only to the distributable net income, and
the gross income used by the trustees was, therefore, not community
property, will not at all do. The taxpayers were the beneficial owners of
the trust properties, and every part and parcel of them, including income
from them, belonged beneficially to them, either as separate or as com-
munity property, in the same way that it would have belonged to them
had the property been deeded to the taxpayers and operated by
themselves. The greater part of the normal income from the property
during the years preceding the tax years in question was community
income. When it was commingled in a common bank account with
other funds of the trust so that the constituents had lost their identity,
the whole fund became community; and when it was used by the
trustees to purchase additional properties, those properties, taking the
character of the funds which brought them, were community prop-
erty.
289
The Fifth Circuit opinions in Porter, Sims, and McFaddin were all writ-
ten by Judge Hutcheson. While Judge Hutcheson found for the taxpayer
in each case that the income was community property, he noted in both
Porter and Sims that the donor could have earmarked the income pro-
duced from the separate property as separate. The judge consistently ad-
hered to this position through his final decision on the subject in
Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds,290 in which he stated:
It seems to me. . .we should meet the issue head on and also hold
that the Texas law, in instances where it is made clearly to appear,
permits that to be done which General Hinds clearly undertook to do
in the trust instrument here, viz., to make the income from theprop-
erty conveyed to the trustee the separate property of the wife.2 '
Judge Waller concurred in the majority's opinion in Hinds, but felt the
majority had not "fully met the issue in this case as its importance seems to
deserve."'2 92 In his opinion the judge made the following statement:
It seems undisputed that even though the corpus of the community
property conveyed by the husband and wife to the trust estate is no
longer community property, nevertheless the income of the wife re-
ceived from the trust estate would, during the existence of the com-
mounity [sic], have been community income unless there was a clear,
definite, and distinct intention expressed in the trust indenture to
make such income her separate, rather than community, property. I
think that the trust indenture did make it quite clear not only that
"neither the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from" the trust estate was retained by the husband but that the in-
come from the property of the trust estate was clearly and expressly
made the separate property of the wife, for which she and she alone
should be taxable.
289. Id at 573 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).
290. 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), discussed at text accompanying notes 31-39 supra.
291. 180 F.2d at 934.
292. Id at 932.
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I believe that the income-not the corpus-would have been com-
munity pro ty had the trust agreement not clearly provided to the
contrary.29
In summary, each of the Fifth Circuit's decisions were premised on the
notion expressed in Irwin v. Gavitt that the gift was of an equitable interest
in the trust corpus and not of the income, and, therefore, the income was
subject to income tax and would not qualify for the exclusion from gross
income applied to gifts. The Fifth Circuit essentially reasoned that since
the trust distribution was income for federal tax purposes, it must be in-
come for state law purposes. Furthermore, if it is income for state law
purposes, it will be community property since income from separate prop-
erty is community.
The decisive question is whether the corpus of the trust is the subject
matter of the gift and, therefore, the separate property, or is the income the
subject matter of the gift. The Fifth Circuit answers by saying that Irwin v.
Gavitt tells us that the trust corpus is the subject matter of the gift. In
concluding, however, the Fifth Circuit carved out an exception where the
donor expressly declares the income produced to be separate property in
deference to those Texas cases holding that the income is the subject mat-
ter of the gift.29
4
Regrettably, this premise relied upon by the Fifth Circuit was not cru-
cial to the court's decision in Irwin v. Gavitl and, thus, is of limited prece-
dential value. Moreover, it should not have been seized upon by the Fifth
Circuit in these property law cases because income for tax accounting pur-
poses is not necessarily income for trust accounting or state law pur-
poses.295 Gain realized from the sale of trust property, for example, is
gross income for federal income tax purposes, 296 but is credited to trust
corpus for trust accounting purposes unless the governing instrument
otherwise provides.297 Another example involves distribution in kind from
an estate. Suppose that the decedent's entire will consists of this one sen-
tence: "All to my wife." Assume further that shortly after the decedent's
death his automobile is transferred to his wife. That is obviously a distri-
bution in fulfillment of the bequest in the will. In other words, it is a distri-
bution of principal for state law purposes. Nevertheless, for federal
income tax purposes, the distribution of the automobile constitutes a distri-
bution of taxable income to the surviving spouse to the extent of the es-
tate's distributable net income.298
There are many other examples, but these few should suffice to illustrate
that the Supreme Court in Irwin v. Gavitt299 need not have suggested that
the gift was of an equitable interest in the corpus of the trust, and not of
293. Id
294. See text accompanying notes 238-52 supra.
295. See Browning, Problems ofFiduciary Accounting, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 931 (1961).
296. I.R.C. § 641(b).
297. See TEX. REV. CtV. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-27(B) (Vernon 1960); G.G. BOGERT &
G.T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 822 (2d ed. 1962).
298. I.R.C. § 662.
299. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
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the income, in order to explain its decision. Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court, could have simply said that income is income until it is taxed to
someone. He could have explained that to hold otherwise would result in
emasculation of the federal income tax inasmuch as such a ruling would
cause every taxpayer to seek the shelter of a trust for his income.
Actually Justice Holmes' opinion is closer to the mark than one would
be led to believe by the various lower courts' tendencies to quote portions
of the opinion out of context. Justice Holmes said, for example:
If these payments properly may be called income by the common un-
derstanding of that word and the statute has failed to hit them it has
missed so much. of the general purpose that it expresses at the start.
Congress intended to use its power to the full extent.300
The opinion continues:
The language quoted [from the statute] leaves no doubt in our minds
that if a fund were given to trustees for A for life with remainder over,
the income received by the trustees and paid over to A would be in-
come of .4 under the statute. It seems to us hardly less clear that even
if there were a specific provision that .4 should have no interest in the
corpus, the payments would be income none the less, within the
meaning of the statute and the Constitution, and by popular speech.
In the first case it is true that the bequest might be said to be of the
corpus for life, in the second it might be said to be of the income. But
we think that the provision of the act that exempts bequests assumes
the gift of a corpus and contrasts it with the income arising from it,
but was not intended to exempt income property so-called simply be-
cause of a severance between it and the principal fund.3"'
Moreover, it was more of an afterthought that caused Justice Holmes to
use the words that became the basis of the Fifth Circuit decisions on these
property law issues.
The Courts below went on the ground that the gift to the plaintiff
was a bequest and carried no interest in the corpus of the fund. We
do not regard those considerations as conclusive, as we have said, but
if it were material a gift of the income of a fund ordinarily is treated
by equity as creating an interest in the fund. Apart from technicalities
we can perceive no distinction relevant to the question before us be-
tween a gift of the fund for life and a gift of the income from it. The
fund is appropriated to the production of the same result whichever
form the gift takes.30 2
Finally, even Justice Holmes recognized that the gift was of the income
and not the corpus: "This is a gift from the income of a very large fund, as
income. 3 ° 3 Thus, he did not find it necessary to rule that if it is a gift it
could not be income and vice versa. Today there is little question but that
the income tax and the gift tax are not mutually exclusive.304 For example,
300. Id at 166.
301. Id at 167 (emphasis added).
302. Id at 167-68 (emphasis added).
303. Id at 168.




a gift of an income interest does not mean that the transfer is not subject to
both the gift tax and the income tax. The income tax is a tax on the reali-
zation of income. The gift tax is an excise tax on the transfer of property,
and the property transferred could easily be a right to income that will be
taxed as income when the income is realized.3 °5
Finally, the precedential effect of these Fifth Circuit cases is limited be-
cause in applying federal tax law federal courts follow state property law
determinations. 3" In ascertaining applicable state property law, federal
courts are only bound by the determinations of the highest court of the
state.30 7 If the highest court of the state has not addressed the issue, the
federal court is free to make its own independent determination of what
state property law would be in a particular case. The Texas Supreme
Court, however, has indicated in cases decided before Arnold v. Leonard
that trust income is separate property. 308 The Fifth Circuit expressly rec-
ognized those cases as apparently consistent with Arnold v. Leonard, but
held that the rulings were limited to situations in which the donor ex-
pressly earmarked the income interest as the spouse's separate property.30 9
Examination of the opinions in question reveals that in Hutchison v.
Mitchell,31° Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill,3"' Shepflin v. Small,31 2 Monday v.
Vance,3 13 MeClelland v. McClelland,3 14 and Sullivan v. Skinner3 5 the do-
nor had not so earmarked the income interest, yet the Texas courts held
that the income was the donee's separate property. Note, too, that Martin
Brown Co. and Sullivan involved legal life estates and not trusts. Thus,
these cases in effect involved mandatory pay trusts, yet the respective
courts held that the income was separate property. Furthermore, the
Texas Supreme Court reached the same result in Hutchison, which in-
volved an express trust.
Beyond this, efforts to distinguish the Fifth Circuit decisions from the
Texas state court decisions will probably not be productive. For example,
the presence or absence of a spendthrift provision in a particular case does
305. See I.R.C. § 102(b)(2).
306. See Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
307. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 463 (1967); Estate of Salter v.
Commissioner, 545 F.2d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1977); Cox v. United States, 421 F.2d 576, 580
(5th Cir. 1970); C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 304, §§ 4.15-.28.
308. See Martin Brown Co. v. Perrill, 77 Tex. 199, 13 S.W. 975 (1890), discussed at text
accompanying notes 240-42 supra; Hutchison v, Mitchell, 39 Tex. 488 (1873), discussed at
notes 238-39 supra and accompanying text.
309. See text accompanying note 285 supra.
310. 39 Tex, 488 (1873), discussed at notes 238-39 supra and accompanying text.
311. 77 Tex. 199, 13 S.W. 975 (1890), discussed at notes 240-42 supra and accompanying
text.
312. 23 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ), discussed at note 243 supra and accom-
panying text.
313. 32 S.W. 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no writ), discussed at note 244 supra and accom-
panying text.
314. 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896, writ ref d), discussed at notes 251-68 & 284-85
supra and accompanying text.
315. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, writ ref d), discussed at text
accompanying notes 245-47 supra.
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not appear to be significant. McClelland certainly contained a valid
spendthrift clause that prevented the beneficiary from reaching prospective
trust distributions until the funds were actually distributed to him. In Mer-
cantile National Bank,3 16 however, the spendthrift clause appears to have
been invalid, since the settlor was the sole beneficiary. Although the court
in Buckler317 refers to the trust as a spendthrift trust, it seems clear from
the opinion that it was merely a discretionary pay trust entitling the benefi-
ciary only to such income as the trustee, in his discretion, decided to give
him. In Sims3 8 Judge Hutcheson made it clear that spendthrift clauses
were of no moment in reaching the tax decisions.
Any attempt to characterize trust income as separate or community
property on the sole basis of whether it has been distributed meets with
little success as well. The early cases of Hutchison, Shepflin, Monday, and
Sullivan, all of which were creditor claims cases decided prior to Arnold v.
Leonard, held distributed trust income to be the separate property of the
trust beneficiary. The tax cases of Porter 9 and Snowden 32" reach pre-
cisely the opposite result.
Undistributed income was characterized as separate property in
McClelland and Buckler, both of which involved divorce actions. Yet the
fact that the trust income cannot be reduced to possession by the trust ben-
eficiary is not determinative. Benedict v. Benedict321 indicates that there
may be community property rights in such property that must be recog-
nized on divorce. Moreover, Herring322 and Cearley,323 both divorce ac-
tions, if construed broadly, suggest that it makes no difference whether the
property is reduced to possession by the married beneficiary. If it is com-
munity, then it is community for all purposes. Finally, Mercantile Bank, a
creditor case, states in a dictum that trust income is community property
from the date of the marriage of the trust beneficiary.
Finally, it is interesting to note that in none of the Fifth Circuit tax deci-
sions discussed in this subpart was the settlor of the trust the spouse of the
trust beneficiary. Score another one for Mr. Wyly's claim to have
earmarked the income interest from the trust as Mrs. Wyly's separate
property.
316. Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed at notes 248-50 supra and accompanying text.
317. Buckler v. Buckler, 424 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967, writ
dism'd), discussed at notes 254-57 supra and accompanying text.
318. Commissioner v. Sims, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text accompanying
notes 286-87 supra.
319. Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 282-83 supra.
320. Commissioner v. Snowden, 148 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1945), discussed at note 282
supra.
321. 542 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
322. Herring v. Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. 1965), discussed at notes 267-68 supra
and accompanying text.




Conclusion. Any attempt to categorize the cases must be on the basis of
whether the action involves creditor's claims, divorce, or tax consequences
with some attempt made to effect any clearly expressed intent of the set-
tlor. Efforts to characterize along the lines of distributed or undistributed
income or spendthrift trust provisions show little promise. Until the Texas
Supreme Court speaks, Arnold v. Leonard continues to stand squarely
across the threshold of any meaningful analysis. Nevertheless, Buckler, in
rejecting Arnold v. Leonard as not encompassing the issue of trust income,
displays cogent reasoning that should be given respect by the Texas
Supreme Court when the issue comes before it.
What lesson is there in the meantime for those who wish to determine
whether Mr. Wyly's gift was of the trust corpus or the income produced by
the trust corpus? Could it not be argued that undistributed trust income in
a discretionary pay trust is merely community property awaiting distribu-
tion, and therefore transfers to such a trust by one spouse for the benefit of
the other spouse constitute transfers subject to a retained life estate by op-
eration of law? To paraphrase a famous quotation, you could make that
argument-but it would be wrong! It would be wrong because a discre-
tionary pay trust arising by gift, bequest, or devise-as contrasted with one
established as a means of compensation for services rendered-is more
like a power of appointment awaiting the donee or trustee's exercise of
discretion to complete the gift. In Tobin v. Commissioner324 the Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that undistributed trust income in a discretionary pay trust was
separate property. It explained:
The express purpose of each of these trusts was to provide for the
financial protection of loved ones against misfortune and their own
improvidence. It becomes manifest that if undistributed income held
in an irrevocable trust, as here, solely for the protection of certain
beneficiaries against financial want, is community property and held
subject to community debts, that such holding would clearly defeat
the express purpose for which the trusts were originally created.325
The Commissioner had attempted to couple the grantor trust rules326 and
the reciprocal trust doctrine as then articulated in Lehman v.
Commissioner327 to cause undistributed trust income to be taxed to the
husband and wife as their community income rather than to the trust,
which the Commissioner apparently perceived to be a tax shelter without
substance. Both husband and wife had each used their respective portions
of their community estate to establish trusts for the benefit of the other
spouse. All distributions from the respective trusts were committed to the
discretion of an advisory committee of three individuals.
In addition, there seems to be agreement that a donor may expressly
earmark the income produced by a gift in trust as the donee's separate
324. 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950).
325. 183 F.2d at 921.
326. The grantor trust rules were codified by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and
today appear as I.R.C. §§ 671-678.
327. 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S, 637 (1940).
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property. There is also some indication that even the Fifth Circuit will
infer such an intention in appropriate circumstances. Thus, there is no
reason why the income produced from a mandatory pay trust such as in
Wyly could not be earmarked expressly or inferentially as the separate
property of the donee spouse. The pattern of conduct in Wyly and the
language of the trust agreement would support a determination that the
donor spouse had manifested an intention to make the income produced
by the trust Mrs. Wyly's separate property.
VI. ADDITIONAL BASES FOR CRITICIZING CASTLEBERRY AND MCKEE
The Tax Court has focused on the concept of "retention" of a life estate
and held that the life estate can be either expressly or impliedly retained.
Castleberry, Wyly, and McKee added "by operation of law" to the means
by which a life estate can be retained.
A. Margrave v. Commissioner
On October 10, 1978, the Tax Court announced its decision in Margrave
v. Commissioner.328 In Margrave the decedent's spouse had all of the
incidents of ownership in a policy of insurance on the decedent's life, in-
cluding the right to change the beneficiary. The proceeds were paid to an
inter vivos trust established by the decedent that became irrevocable at his
death. The surviving spouse could have changed the beneficiary at any
time, but chose not to do so. Since the proceeds were paid to the dece-
dent's trust, the Commissioner asserted that the proceeds should be in-
cluded in the decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court found for the
taxpayer on the ground that the decedent's spouse had the right to change
the beneficiary and thereby deprive the decedent of any ability to direct
the disposition of the proceeds.
Prior to decedent's death, the designation of the trustee as benefici-
ary created only an expectancy that it would continue to remain such
until the policy became payable. . . . Thus, decedent's interest in the
trust as regards the policy proceeds was merely a power over an ex-
pectancy subject to the absolute whim of the policy owner, Mrs. Mar-
grave, and was, by the terms of the trust itself, extinguished at the
moment of his death. . . . This simply does not constitute an incident
of ownership.329
Throughout its opinion the court emphasized that the critical fact in its
decision was Mrs. Margrave's power to change the beneficiary.
By the terms of the policy, the trustee had only the right to receive
the proceeds and this right was subject to Mrs. Margrave's power, as
the owner of the policy, to change the designation of the trustee as
beneficiary. The trustee, therefore, did not have an enforceable right
to the proceeds, as it might have had if the beneficiary designation
had been irrevocable-a right which could have been treated as
328. TAX. CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 35,456.
329. Id at 3505-06 (footnote omitted).
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"property" subject to the decedent's power of appointment. Clearly,
during his lifetime, decedent did not have the ability to "enlarge or
shift the beneficial interest" (see section 20.2041(b)-(1), Estate Tax
Regs.) in "any property." He could not confer any benefit upon any-
one, including himself or his creditors. As a consequence, prior to his
death, decedent had no more than a power over an expectancy.3"'
Again, the court stated:
The fact is, however, that the right to the proceeds did not become
vested in the trustee until death had actually occurred. Until that mo-
ment, Mrs. Margrave could have changed the beneficiary designation
and destroyed decedent's control of the proceeds via the trust and,
therefore, the capacity of the trustee to receive the proceeds. 3
31
There were seven dissenting judges in Margrave. The dissenting opin-
ion of Judge Fay commented on the surviving spouse's right to change the
beneficiary of the policy and thereby deprive her husband of any ability to
direct the flow of the policy proceeds. Unfortunately, all that Judge Fay
said was that this right of the surviving spouse was "simply of no rele-
vance" and of "no significance" since Mrs. Margrave never exercised her
power.33 2
In a separate dissent, Judge Chabot could find no distinction between
the case where the proceeds are payable to an insured's executor, and
therefore included in the insured's estate by virtue of the literal language
of section 2042, and the facts in Margrave where the proceeds are payable
to the insured's revocable trust, which is essentially a testamentary de-
vice.333 Admittedly, the distinction seems to be without substance unless
the majority's opinion is interpreted as an exception to section 2042; that
is, the holding may imply that even if the proceeds were payable to the
insured's executor, the fact that the surviving spouse had the power to
change the beneficiary immediately before the insured's death, although
she did not, means that the proceeds would not have been included in the
insured's gross estate. Alternatively, the majority opinion may stand for
the proposition that since the scheme for payment of the policy proceeds is
not within the literal reach of the statute, the proper emphasis is on the
substance of the transaction. The question then becomes whether this was
a tax avoidance scheme or an attempt by the surviving spouse to use the
insured's revocable trust as a vehicle for completing her own dispositive
scheme.
It is more than likely that the surviving spouse simply used the insured's
revocable trust as an economical means of completing her legitimate estate
planning objectives. She probably did not want the proceeds of the insur-
ance to be included in her estate if her husband died first. To avoid that
result she could have established an irrevocable trust and directed the pro-
ceeds to that trust for her benefit, thus keeping the proceeds out of her
330. Id. at 3507.
331. Id
332. Id at 3510-12.
333. Id at 3514-18.
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estate if all distributions to her from the trust were absolutely discretionary
with the trustee.334 Instead of her creating her own trust, however, she
directed the insurance proceeds to her husband's revocable trust, which
undoubtedly contained a by-pass trust 335 that set forth terms similar to
those that she would have included in any irrevocable trust she would have
created to receive these proceeds. Thus, the scheme involved only legiti-
mate tax avoidance. Consequently, why should the taxpayer be penalized
by an extension of the statute on the grounds of substance over form when,
in fact, the substance of the transaction was decidedly not illegitimate tax
avoidance. In other words, let us give expression to substance over form,
that is, the substance of the transaction, which involves inquiry into inten-
tion, rather than the form of the transaction, which might call for literal
application of the statute.
Margrave may have been incorrectly decided because section 2042 is
clear in calling for the inclusion in the insured's gross estate of policy pro-
ceeds payable to his executor. Nonetheless, the case is important because
the court recognized either (1) that the surviving spouse's right to change
the beneficiary was significant, or (2) that the court will look at the tax
avoidance implication of transactions before extending a statute to reach
transactions not within the literal language of the statute. If the former,
the taxpayers in Castleberry and progeny now have a case in which the
court has recognized the significance for federal estate tax purposes of the
right of a third person to totally deprive the decedent of an interest in
property. Even Judge Quealy's dissent seemed to indirectly accept the va-
lidity of this proposition. Stating that he was "not persuaded by the argu-
ment that the decedent merely had an 'expectancy' or that the right of the
decedent to direct the proceeds of the policy could be revoked or termi-
nated by his wife, the owner of the policy," '3 36 the judge then said: "The
real question is whether, at the time of his death, the decedent was pos-
sessed of the power to direct the proceeds of the policy. It is clear that he
was." '3 37 Why? Because Judge Quealy was convinced that Mr. and Mrs.
Margrave colluded33 ' in devising this scheme.
Furthermore, there is nothing in this record from which it could be
inferred that the decedent's wife would, contrary to decedent's inten-
tions, deprive the decedent of his right to designate to whom would be
paid the proceeds of the insurance. In order for her to obtain a policy
of insurance on decedent's life, it was necessary for the decedent to
334. See Pyle v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1963); Goodnow v. United States,
302 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957),
rev'g 25 T.C. 22 (1955).
335. See text accompanying notes 428-37 infra.
336. TAX. CT. REP. (CCH) Dec. 35,456, at 3514.
337. Id
338. Judge Goffe, in his concurring opinion, reproduced some of the testimony devel-
oped at the trial to demonstrate that there was no prearrangement or collusion between the
spouses to allow the proceeds of the insurance to be disposed of under the insured's trust.
Judge Goffe concluded: "In view of Mr. Schwartz' testimony it is not difficult to understand
why respondent never requested a finding of fact in his brief that decedent and Mrs. Mar-
grave had a prearranged plan for disposition of the insurance proceeds." Id at 3510.
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consent to and to join in the application for such insurance. The
decedentfilled out the applicationform. Logic would lead to the infer-
ence that decedent had a voice in the disposition of the proceeds. This
was not a plan that could be evolved without the mutual agreement
and consent of both the owner of the policy and the insured.
It is clear from the record that the designation of the trust as benefi-
ciary resulted from a prearranged plan which gave decedent the op-
portunity to direct the proceeds.33 9
Does this mean that in the absence of the collusion he perceived to have
existed Judge Quealy might have been with the majority?
In Castleberry there was no prearrangement or agreement that the donee
spouse would manage the transferred property for the benefit of the donor.
State law requires her to manage any income produced by the transferred
property for the benefit of the community, but how she manages the trans-
ferred property-the means of production-is committed to her absolute
and complete discretion.340 As commented earlier, she could dissipate it
all during a day at the races. Mrs. Margrave could have done the same
thing had she wanted to do so.
Looking at other precedents, the contingent retained life estate cases
341
are different, as are the reversion cases.3 42 In both situations, the interests
were to become possessory in the transferor upon the timely expiration of
prior estates. Possession and enjoyment depended upon the natural
processes of chance selection in the order of deaths. Margrave and
Castleberry and progeny are different; in neither case is chance selection a
factor. The donor spouse in Castleberry and progeny takes an interest only
so long as a third party, the donee spouse, does not exercise her right to
die, depart, divorce, or dissipate the transferred property.34 3
Accordingly, the principle of Margrave is support for the taxpayers in
Castleberry, Wyly, and McKee even if the principle of Margrave was in-
correctly applied to the facts in that case. Admittedly Mr. Castleberry had
more than an expectancy; he had an ownership interest in any income pro-
duced by the transferred property.3 4 In fact, however, no income was
produced, and more importantly, his wife could have deprived him at any
time of receiving any income, other than that already produced, by death,
divorce, departure, or dissipation of the transferred property.
339. Id at 3514 (footnote omitted).
340. See notes 105-37 supra and accompanying text.
341. See note 149 supra.
342. See note 176 supra and note 352 infra and accompanying text.
343. This right to cut off interests of third persons has significance for questions in other
tax contexts. For example, in Crummey v. United States, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968), a
minor child's unexercised right to demand immediate distribution of property transferred to
an accumulation trust for his benefit qualified the transfer for the $3,000 per donee per
annum gift tax exclusion. Furthermore, such unexercised rights to demand distribution are
sufficient to warrant including in the gross estate of the person having those unexercised
demand rights the portion of the property subject to the rights. See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2);
Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d)(3) (1958); Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374; Rev. Rul. 73-405,
1973-2 C.B. 321.




A literal reading of section 2036 suggests that it is impossible for a tax-
payer who has transferred property and retained a life estate in that prop-
erty to later avoid having the property included in his gross estate by
divesting himself of the life estate, by gift or release. While there are no
cases on this point, United States v. Allen345 raised the issue in a contem-
plation-of-death context. W had transferred "Blackacre," but retained a
life estate. Within three years of her death, she sold the life estate for its
actuarially determined value to one of the remaindermen, a son. The
court included Blackacre in her gross estate, but gave her credit for the
consideration she received when she sold the life estate to the remainder-
man. The court's majority based the inclusion of Blackacre in Ws gross
estate on a contemplation-of-death theory. The concurring opinion, on the
other hand, stated that Blackacre would have been in Ws gross estate pur-
suant to section 2036 even if she had transferred it beyond the three-year
period because she had retained a right to income for life at the time of
transfer.
The result suggested by the concurring opinion would be bizarre, but
literally this is happening in Texas with interspousal transfers. The trans-
feror can never exclude the property from his estate if he transfers it to his
wife.346 Incredible you say! Consider that the Tax Court clearly seemed
to contemplate tracing transferred property in cases in which the donee
spouse converted the transferred property and reinvested the proceeds. 347
To hold otherwise would, as the court suggests, allow taxpayers to frustrate
the principle of Castleberry by converting the transferred property into
cash and then reinvesting the proceeds. Extending the Tax Court's logic,
does that mean that in cases in which tracing is impossible the last dollar
held by the donee spouse would be presumed to bear the taint of the trans-
fer? Certainly that would be the case where the transferor has retained a
legally enforceable life estate, say, for example, in a transfer in trust for the
benefit of the transferor. The same principle should apply to Castleberry-
like transfers if the logic of Castleberry is correct, even though the donor
spouse has no ability to restrict the donee spouse in her enjoyment of the
transferred property. His only right is to any income produced after it is
produced. Whether that right should be enough to bring it within section
2036(a), inasmuch as the transferor has no enforceable right to control the
tree that produces the fruit, 348 is for the Fifth Circuit.
345. 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
346. Such a conclusion would not be unprecedented. See Howard v. United States, 125
F.2d 986, 989-90 (5th Cir. 1942) (Louisiana law).
347. See note 96 supra and accompanying text. The spectre of tracing seemed so remote
before McKee that it never even occurred to the first commentator on Castleberry who
opined that "the husband has a retained life estate in one-half of all the gifts that he has
given to his wife and that are still possessed by her at his death." Note, Goft Tax Liability
Resulting From Marriage in Texas, 55 TEXAs L. REV. 1427, 1427 (1977) (emphasis added);
see note 191 supra.




Congress has long been reluctant to include property in a decedent's
gross estate after he has parted with dominion and control over the prop-
erty. For example, in 1954, when Congress abolished the premium pay-
ment test for determining the estate tax consequences of life insurance, the
committee report commented on the unfairness of taxing proceeds of life
insurance to the premium payer long after he lost control of the policy, or
in cases in which he never had dominion and control of the policy, but
merely paid premiums. The report stated: "No other property is subject to
estate tax where the decedent initially purchased it and then long before
his death gave away all rights to the property. .. .
D. Hypertechnical Basis
Courts have also been reluctant to include property in the decedent's
gross estate on hypertechnical grounds. For example, in Morton v. United
States350 the proceeds of life insurance were excluded from the insured's
gross estate even though he had the technical power to change the benefici-
ary. The court held that it was "legally impossible" for the decedent to
exercise any of the powers purportedly given to him in the policy in any
way that would cause economic benefit to accrue to him notwithstanding
the "policy facts" giving him the legal right to change the beneficiary.35'
E. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner 352
The Deobald opinion states that "[a]s the foundation for its argument,
the government refers the Court to Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner., 353
Spiegel transferred certain stocks to a trust that provided that "the trust
income was to be divided among his three children; if they did not survive
him, to any of their surviving children. On his death. . . the corpus was
to be distributed in the same manner., 354 No provision was made as to
disposition of the trust corpus if Spiegel survived all of the indicated
beneficiaries. The Supreme Court included in Spiegel's gross estate the
value of his contingent right to receive the corpus should he survive the
indicated beneficiaries.
Estate of Spiegel is correct because Spiegel had an interest in the trust at
his death. But if Spiegel is the basis for the Commissioner's position in
Castleberry, the holding should also be extended to transfers of separate
property to a spouse in those separate property jurisdictions that have in-
349. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124, reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4621, 4757.
350. 457 F.2d 750 (4th Cir. 1972).
351. Arguably the case is in conflict with Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678
(1965), which accepted the policy facts principle as applied to flight insurance and rejected
the actual ability theory.
352. 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
353. Estate of Deobald v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 374, 380 (E.D. La. 1977), discussed
at note 85 supra.
354. 335 U.S. at 703.
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testacy statutes providing that each spouse is an intestate taker of the other
spouse's estate. The Government probably would resist such an extension
by explaining that in such a case, the donee spouse-the prospective dece-
dent--could dispose of the property by gift during life or by will at death.
However, the same could be said of Castleberry, yet Castleberry's gift was
included in his gross estate.3 5
F. Pearson v. Campbell35 6
In addition to Deobald,357 Pearson v. Campbell seems plainly contrary
in result to Castleberry, yet the Commissioner in his reply brief in the Tax
Court dismisses the precedential effect of Pearson by stating that "[tihe
opinion does not set forth the reason or any authority in support of the
court's finding. ' 3 8 Nonetheless, Pearson seems directly on point. The
355. See text accompanying notes 54-70 supra.
Spouses domiciled in Ohio, for example, face many of the same limitations as Texas
spouses on separate property, including that received by gift from the other spouse. The
donor spouse has a forced heirship right to any property subject to disposition by the donee
spouse's will and his right is superior to any disposition of that property made in her will.
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.39 (Page 1976). This means he can claim his intestate
share of her probate property notwithstanding a contrary disposition in the donee spouse's
will. In addition, the donor spouse has a claim to a $5,000 allowance for support that is
superior to any disposition of that property by the donee's will. See id § 2117.20. More-
over, the donee spouse cannot make a lifetime conveyance of any of her real prop-
erty-whether such property was acquired from the decedent or not-without the donor
spouse's consent. Id § 2103.02. If such property is disposed of without his consent, after her
death, he can claim dower interest in the transferred property equal to one-third its value for
life. Id
These interests are contingent in the sense that the claimant must survive his spouse in
order to assert their rights. Admittedly, that is different from the right of the Texas donor
spouse to any income produced by the transferred property. His interest is contingent only
on there being income and the donee spouse neither dissipating the property, moving to a
separate property jurisdiction, or divorcing him. If she divorced him, he can claim one-half
the income produced from the transferred property prior to divorce but will have no further
claim to any income subsequently produced by the transferred property. In a separate prop-
erty jurisdiction, the divorced spouse may have a claim to alimony which is not available to
him in Texas.
Are all these similarities and differences worth further analysis? Of greater importance is
whether federal tax consequences should be dependent upon such subtle distinctions. One
hopes not. It would almost seem probable that Congress contemplated including transferred
property in the transferor's gross estate only where he intended to retain benefits from the
transferred property for his life and not simply where he unknowingly, unwittingly, and
involuntarily acquired various interests in that property which he attempted to dispose of
completely. Of course, in applying federal law, courts are concerned not only with what
Congress intended but also what it did in fact. Thus, the question, did Congress provide in
§ 2036(a)(1) that all transfers between spouses in Texas will be included in the transferor's
gross estate at his subsequent death? See text accompanying note 370 supra.
356. 10 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d $ 145,932, 62-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 12,120 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7,
1962). The Commissioner dismisses the precedential effect of Pearson, Estate of Robert W.
Wier, 17 T.C. 409 (1951), discussed at text accompanying note 361 infra, and Frankel v.
United States, No. 75-H-1806 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1977), discussed at text accompanying note
366 infra, as "simply make-weights." Brief for Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 15, Estate of
Castleberry v. Commissioner, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
357. Estate of Deobald v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 374 (E.D. La. 1977), discussed at
note 85 supra.
358. Reply Brief for Respondent at 13, Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.
682 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978).
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facts of Pearson, using the Commissioner's own words, are as follows:
In that case the decedent-husband had purchased various stocks over
various years and registered the stock in his wife's name. The stock
certificates were kept in her possession and the findings of fact state
that the husband never exercised any control over the disposition. It
was further found that the decedent intended to make a gift of the
stocks to his wife, and in each instance there was a delivery of the
certificates. In setting forth its conclusions of law, the court found
that the interest of the decedent in these corporate stocks was not suffi-
cient to make it a part of his taxable estate within the meaning of
Code § 2036.359
The Tax Court in Castleberry adopted this very same language to explain
away Pearson.36°
G. Estate of Robert W. Wier36 1
Perhaps the case most strongly supportive of the taxpayer in Castleberry
is Estate of Robert W Wier, in which the decedent made various gifts to
his wife including his community interest in their homestead. The Internal
Revenue Service attempted to include one-half the value of the homestead
in the decedent's gross estate because Texas law gave the decedent his
homestead interest. The Tax Court found for the taxpayer, relying on
Hinds,362  because the decedent's interest in the homestead was
subordinate to the wife's power to control and manage her separate prop-
erty.
3 6 3
Interestingly, the Commissioner chose to distinguish Wier from Gutch-
ess.364 The Service acquiesced in Gutchess in 1967 and again confirmed
its position in 1970.365
H. Frankel v. United States366
In Frankel the District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted
summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer. Mr. Frankel had made trans-
fers to his wife of cash and bonds. The taxpayer argued in his brief that,
on the authority of Hinds, Pearson, and Estate of Wier, the donor spouse's
community property interest in the income after the transfer was not the
kind of interest that was intended to come within the scope of section
359. Id
360. 68 T.C. at 690.
361. 17 T.C. 409 (1951), acq. 1952-1 C.B. 4, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. 1966-2 C.B. 8.
362. Note 31 supra.
363. The Tax Court's opinion noted that the Commissioner conceded in his brief that
"none of the cash and securities transferred by the decedent to his wife are includable in the
decedent's gross estate by reason of a retention of an interest in the income from such prop-
erty." 17 T.C. at 421.
364. Estate of Hinds v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 314 (1948), af'd on other grounds, 180
F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950), nonacq. 1949-1 C.B. 5.
365. Rev. Rul. 70-155, 1970-1 C.B. 189.
366. No. 75-H-1806 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1977) (order granting summary judgment), appeal
docketed, No. 98-2585 (5th Cir. July 26, 1978).
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2036.367
I. Estate of Uhf v. Commissioner3 68
Estate of Uhl v. Commissioner provides further support for the taxpayer
in Castleberry. In Uhl the decedent had established a trust that provided
that the trustee was to distribute $100 to him each month and such other
amounts of the trust income as the trustee determined in the exercise of his
sole discretion. The court held that only that portion of the trust necessary
to produce $100 of income per month was included in the decedent's gross
estate. The remaining portion of the trust was excluded because the dece-
dent "reserved no right to compel the trustee to pay him any sums other
than the $100.00 a month., 369
Similarly, it can be said that the Castleberry taxpayer has not reserved a
right, express, implied, or by operation of law, to compel the donee to in-
vest or dispose of the transferred property in any particular way whatso-
ever.
J. Legislative History of Section 2036
There does not appear to be anything in the legislative history of section
2036 that would indicate a congressional intent to include interspousal
gifts in the estate of the donor spouse solely on the grounds that he re-
tained an estate for life in the transferred property because of the local law
principle that income from separate property is community property.37°
K. Section 2034
The law is replete with analogous situations where Congress or the
courts have recognized the contingent nature of interests in property. So
as not to make the list longer, the final example is section 2034. In that
section Congress specifically says that a surviving spouse's dower interest
is not an interest in property such as would cause its exclusion from the
decedent's gross estate. Why? Because the spouse's interest is inchoate
until the death of her spouse. So too, a Texas spouse's right to community
income is inchoate until such time as that income is produced.
367. Brief for Plaintiffs in Support of Their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4-
10.
368. 241 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1957), rev'g 25 T.C. 22 (1955); see Commissioner v. Irving
Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941)
(dictum); Estate of Pardee, 49 T.C. 140, 149 (1967), acq. 1973-2 C.B. 1; Rev. Rul. 76-273,
1976-2 C.B. 268.
369. 241 F.2d at 869 (emphasis added).
370. See 74 CONG. REC. 7078-79, 7198-99 (1931); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.
49 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 532; H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 46
(1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 490-91. See also Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U.S. 632 (1949); Commissioner v. Estate of Arent, 297 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1962). Of
course, the clear intent of Congress was to tax at death any transfer where an interest was




Taxpayers have relied on Hinds and the decisions that have followed it
for thirty years. The present seems like an awkward time to produce a
different result. Major tax revision was accomplished in 1954, 1969, and
1976, thereby giving Congress numerous opportunities to change the result
in Hinds if it were so minded. For instance, Congress acted in 1976371 to
change the rule declared in 1972 by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Byrum3 72 when it last considered section 2036. Interest-
ingly, the Supreme Court in Byrum explained its decision in part by refer-
ence to taxpayer reliance:
The modification of this principle now sought by the Government
could have a seriously adverse impact . . . . Courts properly have
been reluctant to depart from an interpretation of tax law which has
been generally accepted when the departure could have potentially
far-reaching consequences. When a principle of taxation requires re-
examination, Congress is better equipped than a court to define pre-
cisely the type of conduct which results in tax consequences. When
courts readily undertake such tasks, taxpayers may not rely with as-
surance on what appear to be established rules lest they be subse-
quently overturned. Legislative enactments, on the other hand,
although not always free from ambiguity, at least afford the taxpayers
advance warning.
M. Conclusion
Clearly there seems absolutely no basis for the decision in Castleberry
except the Government's interest in exploring the outer perimeters of sec-
tion 2036. It is a test case that succeeded without any real foundation in
the statutes, legislative history, regulations, or prior cases.
N. Epilogue
The Government's reliance on section 2036(a)(1) was wrong on all
fronts. If it was serious about including all interspousal transfers into the
donor's gross estate, it should have pitched its case on section 2038, which
provides:
In General. The value of the gross estate shall include the value of
all property-
(1) Transfers after June 22, 1936.-To the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a tansfer (except
in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment
thereof was subject at the date of his death to any change through the
exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent
alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person (with-
out regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such
371. See I.R.C. § 2036(a) (last sentence); JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 588-89 (1976).
372. 408 U.S. 125 (1972).
373. Id. at 134-35.
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power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such
power is relinquished during the 3-year period ending on the date of
the decedent's death.374
Under section 2038 there is no concept of retention or reservation of a life
estate as there is under section 2036. The only issue under section 2038 is
whether the transferor has an interest at death in the property that he
transferred during his lifetime. Thus, in cases like Castleberry, Wyly, and
McKee, where the donee continued to hold the transferred property at the
death of the donor, it may arguably make some sense to include a portion
of the transferred property in the donor's gross estate on the grounds that
at his death the income from the transferred property was community
property.
It is appropriate to note, however, that despite the literal language of
section 2038, it appears that no court has ever included in a transferor's
gross estate, pursuant to section 2038, property that he transferred during
life unless the transferor retained dominion and control over the trans-
ferred property at the time of the transfer. The Second Circuit claims in
Estate of Skier v. Commissioner 371 to have performed an exhaustive anal-
ysis of the cases in search of such precedent and could find none.
From this it can be suggested that there is no judicial precedent for in-
cluding any portion of an interspousal transfer in the donor's gross estate
solely for the reason that income from separate property is community
property. The donor must have some right to compel the production of
income or other enjoyment of the property.376 Moreover, he must have
some reasonable expectation that he cannot legally be deprived of such
enjoyment at the whim and caprice of the donee in order for the trans-
ferred property to be pulled back into his estate.377
VII. AMOUNT RECAPTURED
From Castleberry, Wyly, and McKee these rules can be stated:
(1) If community property is the subject matter of the transfer, only
twenty-five percent of the community property transferred will
be included in the donor's gross estate; and 378
(2) If community property is transferred to a mandatory pay trust,
fifty percent of the property transferred will be included in the
donor's gross estate. 7
Revenue Ruling 75-504 provided that when the subject matter of the inter-
spousal transfer is separate property, one-half of the value of the trans-
374. I.R.C. § 2038.
375. 468 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1972), nonacq. 1978-1 C.B. 3.
376. See note 368 supra and accompanying text.
377. See text accompanying notes 62-70 supra.
378. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978), nonacq. 1979-1 I.R.B. 7; Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 37
T.C.M. (CCH) Dec. 35,049 (1978).
379. See Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
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ferred property is included in the transferor's gross estate.38°
A. Castleberry and McKee
The Commissioner believes that fifty percent of the community property
subject to an interspousal transfer should be included in the transferor's
gross estate on the ground that after the transfer, the donor is in substan-
tially the same position as he was before the transfer since income from
separate property is community property.38'
This substance over form argument prevailed in Bomash,382 but the Tax
Court in Castleberry rejected it on three grounds:
(1) The court claimed that the Commissioner ignored Treasury Reg-
ulation section 20.2036-1 (a), which provides: "If the decedent re-
tained or reserved an interest or right with respect to a part only
of the property transferred by him, the amount to be included in
his gross estate under section 2036 is only a corresponding pro-
portion of the amount described in the preceding sentence. 383
(2) Next, the court said:
Decedent retained a right to only one-half of the income
from his interest in the bonds he transferred to his wife. In
addition he was entitled to one-half of the income from his
wife's interest in the bonds by virtue of Texas community
property law. Respondent ignores these facts when he sug-
gests that decedent in effect retained 100 percent of the in-
come from the interest he transferred in the bonds.384
(3) Finally, the court said:
In addition, United States v. Estate of Grace ...relied
upon by the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Bomash would be
inapplicable to the present case as only decedent made a
transfer of property. Unlike Estate of Bomash, in this case
no reciprocal transfers were made by decedent and his wife
which would give rise to invocation of the reciprocal trust
doctrine as enunciated in Estate of Grace. We therefore con-
clude decedent retained only one-half of the income from
the property he transferred to his wife and only one-half of
the value of the property he transferred (or one-quarter of
the total value of the bonds) is includable in his gross estate
under section 2036(a)(1).385
The Tax Court would seem to have misapplied Estate of Grace.386 The
essence of Estate of Grace as expressed by the Supreme Court itself is that
380. 1975-2 C.B. 363, discussed at text accompanying notes 42-45 supra.
381. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682, 690 (1977), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978), nonacq. 1979-1 I.R.B. 7.
382. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
383. Estate of Castleberry v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 682, 692 (1977), appeal docketed,
No. 78-1612 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1978), nonacq. 1979-1 I.R.B. 7 (quoting Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1(a) (1958)).
384. 68 T.C. at 692.
385. Id. at 693 (citation omitted).
386. United States v. Estate of Grace, 395 U.S. 316 (1969), discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 154-57 supra.
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"'the law searches out the reality and is not concerned with the form.' ,387
Accordingly, the fact that the decedent, Mr. Grace, was not the transferor
of the property in which he was deemed to have retained a life estate was
not at all significant to the Supreme Court. Similarly, unless form is to be
exalted over substance, it should not matter that Mrs. Castleberry did not
transfer her one-half of the community. Before the transfer Mr. Castle-
berry had a right to one-half the income from the transferred property and
after the transfer he had the same right.388
That raises the question that if she did not transfer it, how was it trans-
muted into separate property. Further, if it was not transmuted, it must
still be community. Fortunately, Texas law is clear that the transfer by one
spouse of his half of the community to his spouse as her separate property
transmutes the spouse's community interest in the transferred property
into her separate property.389 But for this authority, it could have been
argued that H's transfer of his half of the community did not transmute
Ws one-half of the community into her separate property. If that had
been the case, the Tax Court should have included in Mr. Castleberry's
gross estate one-half of Ws one-half of the community under section 2033
and one-half of his one-half of the community under section 2036 and the
authority of Revenue Ruling 75-504."39
Extending this analysis, to reach the results the Tax Court reached in
both Castleberry and McKee, the court would have had to have found that
H and W first partitioned their community property into their respective
separate property. In such a case H would include in his gross estate only
one-quarter of the separate property he transferred to W, his former one-
half of the community. It is doubtful that a partition occurred in either
Castleberry or McKee inasmuch as Texas law requires a partitition of
community property to be formalized.3 9'
B. Wyy
In Wyly community property was transferred to a mandatory pay trust
387. 395 U.S. at 321.
388. This analysis assumes that it has already been decided that Mr. Castleberry retained
a life estate in the transferred property and the only issue is how much is included in his
estate. On the question whether he has retained such an interest, see text accompanying
notes 151-94 supra.
389. H may transfer his interest in the community property to W, and the character of
the title will be changed thereby to that of Ws separate property. The cases hold that the
entire property, including Ws community interest, becomes the separate property of W
upon such a transfer. Although such cases are subject to the construction that the interest
not transferred remains community property, the courts have given effect to the parties in-
tention that the transfer makes the entire property the separate property of the transferee.
See Kellett v. Trice, 95 Tex. 160, 66 S.W. 51 (1902); Kahn v. Kahn, 94 Tex. 114, 58 S.W. 825
(1900); Lewis v. Simon, 72 Tex. 470, 10 S.W. 554 (1889); Story v. Marshall, 24 Tex. 306
(1859) (land purchased with community funds; Y's conveyance of his interest to Wchanged
the character from community to the separate property of *J; Forman v. Glasgow, 219
S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1949, no writ); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 282 (1925) (convey-
ance of community property by one spouse to the other).
390. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
391. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.42(a) (Vernon 1975).
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for the benefit of W for life. The Tax Court included fifty percent of the
value of the transferred property in ifs gross estate on the ground that H
retained a right, by operation of law, to the income from one-half the
transferred property because in Texas trust income is community property.
In reaching this result the Tax Court had to distinguish Wyly from
Castleberry, in which it included only twenty-five percent of the trans-
ferred community property in the decedent's gross estate. To do this the
court relied on United States v. Estate of Grace392 and the reciprocal trust
doctrine. Noting that both Mr. and Mrs. Wyly transferred their respective
community interests to the irrevocable trust, unlike Castleberry wherein
only Mr. Castleberry made a transfer, the Tax Court stated:
In this case, by contrast, the wife did make a transfer into the trust of
her community share. At the same time that the husband gave her a
one-half life interest in the income from his share of the community,
she gave him under Texas law a one-half interest in the income from
her share. We cannot validly distinguish this case from United States
v. Estate of Grace. . . .In that case it was held that, regardless of the
presence of tax-avoidance purposes or bargained-for consideration,
reciprocal transfers by spouses who created crossed life estates in each
other would be treated as transfers with retained life estates. The only
significant difference between Estate of Grace and the present case is
that in Estate of Grace the reciprocal life estates were expressly cre-
ated, while here they were created by operation of Texas law. In view
of the pragmatic rationale of Estate of Grace, this distinction appears
immaterial. We hold, therefore, that the decedent's gross estate in-
cluded his full community one-half of the property transferred in trust
for the benefit of his wife. 3
9 3
VIII. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF CASTLEBERRY, WYLY, AND MCKEE
So far this Article has been devoted to analyzing the bases for the opin-
ions in Castleberry and its progeny. What, however, are the effective tax
consequences of transfers already made? Clearly the transfers in Castle-
berry, Wyy, and McKee were subject to federal gift tax when the transfers
were initially made. The transfers were then "complete ' 394 in that the
transferor no longer had any dominion and control over the transferred
property. The federal gift tax and the federal estate tax, however, are not
mutually exclusive.39 5 The same transfer, therefore,can be subject to both
taxes, which is the case in Castleberry and its progeny if the Tax Court
opinions are upheld. The harshness of this result is ameliorated, however,
by the fact that each transferor's estate will receive credit against its ulti-
392. 395 U.S. 316 (1969), discussed at notes 154-57 supra.
393. Estate of Wyly v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 227, 233 (1977), appeal docketed, No. 78-
1306 (5th Cir. Feb. 10, 1978).
394. See Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941); Rheinstrom v. Commis-
sioner, 105 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1939); Estate of Ben F. Hazelton, Jr., 9 T.C.M. (P-H) 40,425
(1940); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2 (1972); Rev. Rul. 76-273, 1976-2 C.B. 269. But see Commis-
sioner v. Vanderweele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-1 C.B. 181.
395. C. LOWNDES, R. KRAMER & J. MCCORD, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
§ 31.1, at 769 (3d ed. 1974).
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mate estate tax liability for the gift tax paid at the time of the transfer.396
The real injury to the taxpayer results because the Castleberry pull back
of interspousal transfers will frustrate time-honored legitimate tax plan-
ning techniques. If the transferor dies first, his estate will include a portion
of the transferred property. At the subsequent death of the donee spouse,
her estate will include 100 percent of the transferred property unless she
has consumed or otherwise disposed of the property before her death.397
Thus, in cases in which the spouses are committed to equalizing their re-
spective estates and saving the so-called second tax, 398 the portion of the
property pulled back into the transferor's estate nonetheless will be subject
to estate tax twice, once in his estate and once in hers. There is nothing
wrong with taxation of the same property in both spouses' estates when
they have the appropriate ownership interests. It is unfortunate, however,
that such double taxation is brought about by the frustration of time-
honored legitimate tax planning.
The transferor's one consolation is that the dollars paid in gift tax at the
time of the transfer are out of the transferor's gross estate for purposes of
computing his federal estate tax liability.399 Of course, he does not have
396. See I.R.C. §§ 2001(b)(2), 2012.
If Castleberry and Wyly are sustained on appeal, will donor spouses be deemed to have
made a gift for federal gift tax purposes of only a remainder interest to the donee spouse?
Appealing as the suggestion may be, the Commissioner might assert that the value of the
donor spouse's interest in the income produced by the transferred property is unascertaina-
ble and therefore incapable of valuation inasmuch as the donee spouse could cut off the
donor's interest in the income produced by the transferred property by dissipation, divorce,
death, or departure from Texas. Cf Private Letter Ruling No. 7838042 (release of a puta-
tive donor's rights held not to create a taxable gift under I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) because the
rights were too speculative in nature to be valued).
397. See I.R.C. § 2033.
398. See text accompanying notes 422-24 infra.
399. However, if the transferor dies within three years of the transfer, both transferred
property and the gift tax paid will be included in his gross estate. See I.R.C. § 2035.
Would the Commissioner be barred from claiming that the donor spouse retained an
interest under I.R.C. § 2036 in the transferred property if the Commissioner accepted the
donor spouse's gift tax return reflecting a transfer of the entire interest in the transferred
property to the donee spouse and not merely the transfer of a remainder interest? Attention
should be given to Richard V. Madden, 52 T.C. 845 (1969), a fd per curiam, 440 F.2d 784
(7th Cir. 1971), in which it was held that for purposes of the basis rules of I.R.C. § 1014, the
decedent's executor has the burden of proving that jointly held property was required to be
included in the estate of the deceased joint tenant. In this case, the surviving spouse argued
that the jointly held property had acquired as its basis for income tax purposes that value at
which it was included in the estate of the deceased joint tenant. Noting that the estate tax
rules for jointly held property have been on the books since 1916, the court said:
However, we cannot believe that Congress contemplated that the term "re-
quired" should be construed so as to give survivors an option to decrease in-
come tax by increasing estate tax, or to shift to the respondent, in income tax
controversies, the burden of proving that less property was required to be in-
cluded in gross estate than was actually included. There is no indication that
Congress contemplated that it was conferring upon a surviving joint tenant the
privilege of paying more estate tax than was necessary so as to reduce his
income tax liability on the subsequent sale of the property. It seems more
likely that when the term "required" was used, it was assumed that the execu-
tor or other interested person would attempt to secure the maximum exclusion
of the jointly owned property from the estate; only to the extent that the execu-
tor was unable to show that the property was not excludable was it required to
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those dollars available for his use in the meantime.
Last, but most importantly, note that if the property transferred is the
donor's separate property, the one-half of the property pulled back into his
estate qualifies for the marital deduction and, therefore, the pull back will
in most cases wash out.4 ° ° Thus, if the interspousal transfer is made from
be included in gross estate. Such an interpretation of "required" is consistent
with the practice that existed in 1954 and has the effect of imposing the burden
upon the person who has the information most readily available.
52 T.C. at 849.
In considering Madden it may be appropriate to note that the government voluntarily
refunded the estate tax paid by the decedent's executor that was attributable to the inclusion
of the joint property in her estate. The court seemed to find this significant. It said: "We are
not concerned with a situation in which there has been a final determination of the amount
includable in gross estate; the estate tax return involved herein was not accepted by the
respondent." Id
Obviously, the standards for inclusion under I.R.C. §§ 1014 and 2040 respectively are
different. Perhaps, for that reason, it is inappropriate to even suggest that Madden may have
any application in this context.
400. See I.R.C. § 2056. The estate tax marital deduction is limited to the lesser of:
(a) the property actually passing to the surviving spouse; and
(b) the greater of:
(i) $250,000; or
(ii) one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
It seems that this "wash out" will always occur in the following cases:
(a) where the decedent's separate property estate is valued at less than
$500,000 and he gives his spouse up to, but not beyond, $250,000; and
(b) where the decedent's separate property estate is valued at more than
$500,000 and he gives his spouse not more than 50% of his separate prop-
erty.
The wash out will also occur in some cases where the decedent gives his spouse more than
50% of his adjusted gross estate, but identification of those cases will depend upon case-by-
case analysis for the wash out will not occur in all such cases.
More importantly, to secure the wash out and avoid either overqualifying or underquah-
fying the marital gift, the donor spouse should use a formula marital deduction clause in his
will. See notes 432-37 infra and accompanying text.
May it be suggested that with the advent of adjusted taxable gifts, I.R.C. § 2001(b), there
will be some cases in which the Commissioner will have little revenue incentive to assert the
Castleberry principle to pull back interspousal transfers of community property. Gifts made
after Dec. 31, 1976, will be taken into consideration as adjusted taxable gifts in computing the
donor's federal estate tax liability. If Castleberry applies, post-'76 gifts will be included in the
donor's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. The only difference in treatment is that if
the gift is taken into consideration as an adjusted taxable gift, (1) it will be assigned its fair
market value on the date of the gift, and (2) the $3,000 per donee per annum exclusion, id
§ 2503(b), will not be taken into consideration as an adjusted taxable gift. On the other
hand, if § 2036(a) applies to the transfer, the transferred property will be included in the
donor's gross estate at its fair market value at the date of his death, id. § 203 1(a), or on the
alternate valuation date, id § 2032(a), and any claim at the time of the gift to the $3,000
exclusion will be ignored and the entire value of the transferred property-at the estate tax
valuation date-will be included in the donor's gross estate. If the transferred property has
experienced substantial appreciation, the tax revenue produced by recapture on retained life
estate grounds under § 2036(a) would be greater than if the transferred property is recap-
tured as an adjusted taxable gift under § 2001(b). However, if the transferred property has
depreciated since the date of the gift it would be to the Commissioner's advantage to avoid
recapture on § 2036(a) grounds inasmuch as recapture as an adjusted taxable gift will pro-
duce more tax. It is also doubtful that the Commissioner would attempt recapture under
§ 2036(a) for the sole purpose of disallowing the $3,000 exclusion. Given these considera-
tions, perhaps the Commissioner's pull back power under Castleberry will be infrequently
exercised.
Furthermore, where the donee spouse dies first, divorces the donor, or moves to a separate
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separate property, whether Castleberry and its progeny are upheld on ap-
peal is totally irrelevant for purposes of the bottom line. For such cases,
Castleberry and its progeny hold only academic interest.
IX. AVOIDING CASTLEBERRY, WYLY, AND MCKEE
Under such circumstances, how can interspousal transfers be structured
so as to avoid Castleberry-like consequences? Unfortunately, the answer is
not very appealing. Unless Castleberry and its progeny are reversed by the
Fifth Circuit, interspousal transfers will have to be made to a trustee under
an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the donee spouse. Moreover, to as-
sure avoidance of the Wyly principle, distributions from the trust must be
committed to the discretion of the trustee. Probably, the trustee's exercise
of discretion could be subjected to a standard without running afoul of
Wyy.
40 1
For estate tax purposes, transfers to an irrevocable trust will not be in-
cluded in the transferor's gross estate unless made within three years of
property jurisdiction, the transferred property will not be included in the donor's gross estate
under § 2036(a). However, where the donee spouse merely dissipates the transferred prop-
erty or exchanges it for cash or other property, Estate of McKee v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.
(CCH) Dec. 35,049 (1978), would be authority to include the transferred property in the
donor's gross estate. See note 96 supra.
401. See notes 211-13 supra and accompanying text. Note, however, that when distribu-
tions are subject to a standard, the trustee's discretion is clearly more limited than it would
be if distributions were solely discretionary with the trustee. Accordingly, the beneficiary
will have a legally enforceable claim against a trustee whose discretion is subject to a stan-
dard. Does that mean that the trust is more like a mandatory pay trust than a discretionary
pay trust? And if it is more like a mandatory pay trust, is it important to earmark all distrib-
uted trust income as the separate property of the trust beneficiary? See notes 310-15 supra
and accompanying text.
Suppose the settlor transfers property to an irrevocable trust that provides that the trustee
will distribute income and principal as needed for his spouse's maintenance, care, and sup-
port. In such a case apparently nothing will be included in the settlor's gross estate unless
collusion can be shown between the trustee and the settlor. See Commissioner v. Estate of
Douglass, 143 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1944); Estate of Green v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1049
(1975), acq. 1976-2 C.B. 2; Estate of Mitchell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 576 (1970), acq.
1971-2 C.B. 3.
Estate of Mitchell held that an irrevocable trust created by decedent was not included in
his gross estate even though the trustee, the decedent's son, had discretion to pay income and
principal for the decedent's wife's support. The court said the trustee was not controlled by
the decedent and under Connecticut law neither the decedent nor his wife could compel
distribution since the trust was not set up to discharge the decedent's obligation to support
his wife.
In the earlier case, Estate of Douglass, the court held that property transferred by a dece-
dent during his lifetime to trustees, not including decedent, with discretion to apply income
to maintenance, education, and support of his minor child was not includable in the dece-
dent's gross estate even though the income was to be used to discharge his legal obligation of
support. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1960) would seem to command a different result.
See Estate of Chrysler, 44 T.C. 55, 60-62 (1965), rev'd with respect to other issues, 361 F.2d
508 (2d Cir. 1966).
But Estate of Green held that the entire date of death value of a trust was includable in the
decedent's gross estate under § 2036 when the irrevocable trust had been created by the
decedent for her children. The trustee had discretion to pay the decedent a maximum of
$25,000 yearly for her "health, welfare, and happiness," but the trustee orally agreed to




death.40 2 Such transfers, however, will be subject to the federal gift tax,40 3
and the $3,000 per donee per annum exclusion 41 will not be available to
offset the gift because the transfer in trust will be deemed a gift of a future
interest.405 The trust income will be taxed to the trust except to the extent
of amounts distributed to the beneficiary.40 6 In that case, the amounts dis-
tributed will be deductible by the trust 407 to the extent of the trust's distrib-
utable net income,40 8 and, to the same extent, the distributions will
constitute taxable income to the beneficiary.40 9
To the extent that the trust accumulates income it will be subject to the
throwback rules.410 Of course, the accumulation distributions have some
appeal in that distributions in kind will receive a step-up in basis to the
extent such distributions do not exceed distributable net income and undis-
tributed net income.4a '
The accumulation throwback rules can be avoided by a mandatory pay
trust, but at the cost of the loss of the opportunity to distribute appreciated
property and thereby step up the basis of that property.412 In addition, the
donor spouse would have to declare expressly that the trust income is sepa-
rate property to avoid the application of the Wyly principle.413
Finally, is it possible to avoid Castleberry by having the donor spouse
declare at the time of the interspousal transfer that the income produced
from the transferred property shall be separate and not community prop-
erty? Dean McKnight has pointed out that "[t]he Supreme Court of Texas
has. . . stated on three occasions that the settlor of a trust or the donor of
other inter vivos gifts may provide that the future income from the prop-
erty shall be the separate property of the donee.' 414 While Dean Mc-
Knight is correct in his statement of Texas law, it would seem that in light
of Arnold v. Leonard the proposition may only be valid when the transfer
is in trust. When the transfer is in fee simple to the donee, the gift is of the
underlying property and it seems clear that in such a case the gift is of the
tree and not the fruit.
402. See 1.R.C. § 2035.
403. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (1972).
404. I.R.C. § 2503; see Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1973); Higgins v. Commissioner, 129
F.2d 237, 242 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942); Dwight W. Ellis, Jr., 51 T.C. 182
(1968), afdpercuriam, 437 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1971); Joseph Goldstein, 37 T.C. 897 (1962).
405. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(a) (1954).
406. I.R.C. §§ 641, 661(a).
407. Id § 661 (a).
408. Id § 643(a).
409. Id § 662(a).
410. Id §§ 665-667.
411. See Ferguson & Campfield, Post '76 Income Tax Planningfor Trusts, in 2 NOTRE
DAME EST. PLAN. INST. 789, 829-51 (R. Campfield ed. 1978).
412. Id
413. See text accompanying notes 310-15 supra.
414. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 79 (1976); see
McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 105,
113-15 (1977).
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X. STRATEGY FOR INTERSPOUSAL TRANSFERS
When all of the spouses' property is community, the only incentive for
interspousal lifetime gifts is possible avoidance of creditors and to gamble
that the donee spouse will outlive the donor spouse.415 In the latter case,
however, taxes at the donee spouse's death are likely to be greater than if
the property were taxed one-half at donor spouse's death and the other
half in donee spouse's estate. On the other hand, when some part or all of
the spouse's property is separate, there is some incentive to equalize the
respective estates of H and 416 to avoid the risk that the spouse with the
lesser estate will die first, resulting in the loss of the marital deduction and
estate splitting at death.
A. Creditor Avoidance
While separate property of one spouse is not subject to the separate
debts of the other spouse, separate property is subject to liability for com-
munity debts and the owner's separate debts.417 Moreover, there is a pre-
sumption that all debts incurred after marriage are community debts.
Accordingly, a spouse's separate property often cannot be insulated from
the claims of creditors as most debts will be community debts.4 8
Furthermore, although a judge "may determine, as he deems just and
equitable," the order in which particular separate and community property
will be subject to execution where both kinds of property are subject to
liability,4" 9 no authority directs the court first to satisfy community debts
from community property in marshalling the assets. In many Texas
courts, however, this may be the equitable practice and separate property
would be insulated to the extent that sufficient community assets were
available to satisfy community debts. In any event, a spouse's separate
property would not be subject to the separate debts of the other spouse.42
Clear and very strong evidence of separate debt status, however, is neces-
sary to overcome the presumption of community debt.42'
415. With the integration of the federal estate and gift tax taking into consideration post-
'76 gifts in determining federal estate tax liability, interspousal gifts seem even less attrac-
tive. The only tax incentive for gifts to a spouse after 1976 is to take advantage of the $3,000
per donee per annum exclusion, I.R.C. § 2503(b), and to avoid having any appreciation
experienced by the transferred property subsequent to the date of the transfrr included in
the transferor's gross estate. Compare I.R.C. § 2001(b) with id § 2031(a). See note 399
supra and text accompanying note 446 infra.
416. See text accompanying note 446 infra.
417. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975); Gleich v. Bongio, 128
Tex. 606, 99 S.W.2d 881 (1937).
418. 527 S.W.2d at 171.
419. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.62 (Vernon 1975).
420. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex. 1975); Pope Photo Records,
Inc. v. Malone, 539 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ); Texas Com-
merce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256, 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
no writ); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(a) (Vernon 1975).
421. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 171 (Tex. 1975); Broussard v. Tian, 156
Tex. 371, 373, 295 S.W.2d 405, 406 (1956).
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B. Possible Estate and Gift Tax Consequences
Section 2010 provides a phased-in credit of up to $47,000 for decedents
dying in 1981 or thereafter against federal estate and gift tax liability. The
exemption equivalent to the credit is $175,625. Accordingly, tax planning
is unnecessary for estates of less than $175,625 after 1981 except to take
advantage of the orphan's deduction provided in section 2057.
C. Saving the Second Tax
The key to tax planning for the married taxpayer is to cause each spouse
to be taxed on only one-half of the property held by the family unit. If H
and W have $600,000 of community property and H gives his half of the
community to W, ifs federal estate tax liability will be $40,800,422 but at
Ws subsequent death, her estate tax liability will be $145,800,423 assuming
she does not remarry. This can be displayed as follows:
ifs Death Ws Subsequent Death
Gross Estate $300,000 $600,000
Tax 87,800 192,800
Less: Unified Credit (47,000) (47,000)
Amount Due $ 40,800 $145,800
On the other hand, if fs will provided that his one-half of the commu-
nity property should be placed in trust for W for life with remainder to her
then living lineal descendants per stirpes, ifs estate tax would still be
$40,800, but the tax liability at Ws subsequent death would be reduced to
$40,800 since only one-half of the community property will be taxed to
her.424 The computations are as follows:
ifs Death Ws Subsequent Death
Gross Estate $300,000 Gross Estate $300,000
Tax 87,800 Tax 87,800
Unified Credit (47,000) Unified Credit (47,000)
Amount Due $ 40,800 Amount Due $ 40,800
If property is the separate property of one of the spouses, the key to
optimum estate taxation is to equalize the spouses' estates, perhaps by life-
time gifts, particularly if they can be made tax free.425 If the separate
property is divided equally between the spouses, each spouse can then di-
rect his fifty percent of the property to a by-pass trust for the benefit of his
spouse for life and the tax consequences will be the same as those indicated
in the preceding example as to community property.
422. I.R.C. § 2001(c).
423. For reasons of convenience, the author will (a) assume zero administration expenses
in all examples, (b) ignore all state inheritance taxes, (c) ignore any possible credit for prior
transfers, I.R.C. § 2013, and (d) assume that a rich uncle paid the federal estate tax on the
death of the first spouse to avoid depleting the estate of the surviving spouse.
424. I.R.C. § 2033.
425. See text accompanying notes 438-41 infra.
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In cases in which the client is not inclined to equalize his property with
his spouse by a program of lifetime gifts, the marital deduction becomes
the key to his tax planning. Each decedent survived by a spouse is entitled
to the marital deduction426 in computing his taxable estate. The deduction
is equal to the lesser of:
(1) the greater of $250,000 and one-half of I-'s adjusted gross estate;
and
(2) the value of the property actually passing from H to W.
Thus, in estates of less than $500,000 the maximum marital deduction is
always $250,000. In estates of more than $500,000 the maximum marital
deduction is equal to one-half the decedent's adjusted gross estate.
Until the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the marital deduction was only avail-
able as to separate property. Now the estate tax marital deduction, but not
the gift tax marital deduction, is applicable to community property in a
very limited sense as described below. Assume an estate consisting of
$300,000 of separate property and $300,000 of community property. As-
sume further that the decedent's debts, administration expenses, and




Less: Debts, etc. (45,000)
Marital Deduction (135,000)
Taxable Estate $20.00
The marital deduction reflected in this hypothetical is the maximum mari-
tal deduction available on these facts. Section 2056(c)(1) provides that the
maximum marital deduction is the greater of (1) $250,000, reduced by the
gift tax marital deduction adjustment provided in section 2056(c)(1)(B),
and further reduced by the community property adjustment provided in
section 2056(c)(1)(C); and (2) fifty percent of the decedent's adjusted gross
estate, reduced by the gift tax marital deduction adjustment provided in
section 2056(c)(1)(B). The computations, which assume no lifetime gifts
were made,427 can be displayed as follows:
(1) Computation of Adjusted Gross Estate
Gross Estate $450,000
Less: Comm. Prop. [§ 2056(c)(2)(B)(l)(ii), (iii)] (150,000)
Portion of Debts, etc. Allocable to
Separate Prop. [§ 2056(c)(2)(B)(iv)l:
$300,000 x 45,000 (30,000)
450,000
Adjusted Gross Estate $270,000
Fifty percent of Adjusted Gross Estate $135,000
426. I.R.C. § 2056(c).
427. For further explanation and an illustration of the gift tax marital deduction adjust-
ment, see text accompanying note 441 infra.
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(2) Community Property Adjustment to










Community Property Marital Deduction $115,000
Obviously, a marital deduction predicated on one-half the decedents ad-
justed gross estate of $270,000 will be greater than the $250,000 marital
deduction after it is adjusted as indicated above for the community prop-
erty in the decedent's estate.
Assume H has $600,000 of separate property, no community property,
and W has no separate property. H's will provides "all to W." Assuming






















While the marital deduction reduces the tax at I's death, it does noth-
ing to reduce the tax at Ws subsequent death. Accordingly, marital de-
duction planning is generally expressed in these terms: the spouse with the
larger estate should provide in his will for his surviving spouse to receive
the maximum marital deduction allowed his estate for federal estate tax
purposes with the balance going into a so-called "by-pass trust" for the
spouse. Generally, the by-pass trust will provide that the surviving spouse
is to receive all the income for life from the trust with the remainder to the
decedent's then living lineal descendants per stirpes. 428
Assume that H has $600,000 of separate property, no community prop-
erty, and that W has no separate property. With the will described above,






















428. In this case no part of the by-pass trust property will be included in the gross estate
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Marital deduction planning with a by-pass trust feature, however, is
ineffective if the spouse with the lesser estate dies first. To illustrate:
W Dies First IFs Subsequent Death
Gross Estate 0 Gross Estate $600,000
Less: Marital Deduction _ _
Taxable Estate $600,000
Tax $192,800
Less: Unified Credit (47,000)
Amount Due $145,800
Because the order of spouses' deaths cannot be predicted, at a minimum
it is incumbent upon the taxpayer with separate property who is relying on
the marital deduction, and his dying first, to provide in his will a presump-
tion that he will be deemed to be survived by his spouse if there is any
uncertainty about the order of death.4 29 Otherwise the Texas Uniform Si-
multaneous Death Act 430 will deem his spouse to have predeceased him
and the marital deduction will be lost.
Where the decedent's estate includes both separate property and com-
munity property, the taxpayer's will should provide that W take an
amount equal to the maximum marital deduction and the balance of the
decedent's separate property and his one-half of the community should be
directed to a by-pass trust for the benefit of W for life with remainder to
his then living lineal descendants per stirpes.
Importantly, a taxpayer can avoid the necessity of characterizing prop-
erty as separate property or community property for federal estate tax pur-
poses by using a formula marital deduction clause.4 3' Such clauses are
either:
(1) a pecuniary formula that usually begins: "I give to my spouse an
amount equal to the maximum marital deduction"; or
(2) a fractional formula that usually begins: "I give to my spouse that
fraction of my estate that is equal to the maximum marital de-
duction."
of the surviving spouse. The federal estate tax only applies to transfers, I.R.C. § 2001, and,
in this case, the surviving spouse is not a transferor of the trust property. I.R.C. § 2041
causes some nontransferors to be treated as transferors, but a properly drafted by-pass trust
would not give the surviving spouse any § 2041 powers.
429. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(e) (1958).
430. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 47 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1978-79).
431. See Johanson, Community Property. The Migrant Client, 252 TAX MNGM'T (BNA)
A-20 to -21 (1971).
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The Internal Revenue Service lacks interest in classifying property as sepa-
rate or community whenever the formula clause is used since only one-half
the property will be in I's estate whether his property is characterized as
separate or community. Choosing between the clauses is a complicated
process. In the most general of terms, these points are noteworthy:
432
(1) For purposes of preparing the federal estate tax return, it makes
no difference whether you use a fractional formula or a pecuni-
ary formula.
(2) The issues relative to the respective clauses usually arise at the
time for distribution of the estate.
(a) Use of a pecuniary formula means that the surviving
spouse is entitled to a dollar amount. If the estate does
not have adequate amounts of cash in hand, it means the
property must be sold or distributed in kind to W. If ap-
preciated property is sold, the estate will be forced to rec-
ognize the gain on the property as taxable income
(eligible for capital gain treatment). 33 If the property is
distributed in kind, it means that not only must the prop-
erty be valued at the time of distribution" (a second val-
uation), but also any appreciation in the property will be
recognized as taxable income (capital gain) by the es-
tate.43 5
(b) Use of the fractional formula clause means that the sur-
viving spouse is entitled to a fraction of every asset in the
estate (or the fund against which the fraction is ap-
plied).4 36 This is allegedly a disadvantage, but perhaps it
can be overcome by providing for a non pro rata distri-
bution.437 Fractionalization can also be avoided by de-
fining the fund against which the fraction is applied so as
to exclude the property that should not be fractionalized.
D. Relationship of Lifetime and Death-time Marital Deduction
The tax consequences of interspousal transfers of separate property have
been complicated by the changes introduced by the 1976 Tax Reform Act,
and the Revenue Act of 1978 provided only modest clarification. The
most important factor is the critical interrelationship among the $3,000 per
donee per annum exclusion, the gift tax marital deduction, and the estate
tax marital deduction.
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the gift tax marital deduction was
equal to fifty percent of the value of the property transferred to the spouse.
432. See generally Berall, Marital Deduction Planning, in 2 NOTRE DAME EST. PLAN.
INST. 183 (R. Campfield ed. 1978).
433. See I.R.C. § 1040(a).
434. See Edwards, Marital Deduction Formulae-A Planner's Guide, 1967 DUKE L.J. 254,
260.
435. See I.R.C. § 1040(a).
436. See Edwards, supra note 434, at 264.
437. See Rev. Rul. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159; Campfield, Carry-Over Basis: Enormous
Implications, 41 TEx. B.J. 689 (1978).
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After the 1976 changes, the gift tax marital deduction is unlimited as to the
first $100,000 of transfers to the spouse, zero as to the second $100,000, and
fifty percent of the value of the property transferred as to gifts in excess of
$200,000.
The taxpayer contemplating a transfer to his spouse, perhaps to equalize
estates, faces this further question: is the $3,000 per donee per annum ex-
clusion subtracted before the marital deduction is taken? It did not matter
under prior law unless the amount of the gift was less than $6,000, in
which case the Internal Revenue Service maintained that the exclusion
was subtracted first. Treasury Regulation section 25.2524-1, example 2
provides:
The only gifts made by a donor to his spouse during calendar year
1969 were a gift of $2,400 in May and a gift of $3,000 in August. The
first $3,000 of such gifts is excluded under the provisions of section
2503(b) in determining the "total amount of gifts" made during the
calendar year. The marital deduction for 1969 of $2,700 (one-half of
$2,400 plus one-half of $3,000) otherwise allowable is limited by sec-
tion 2524 to $2,400. The amount of taxable gifts is zero ($5,400-$3,000
(annual exclusion) - $2,400 (marital deduction)).
Under the new law, the gift tax minimum marital deduction is affected
by whether the exclusion is subtracted before or after the marital deduc-
tion is taken. Thus, the question is whether a gift of $100,000 to a spouse
provides a marital deduction of $100,000 or only $97,000. The answer is
that the $3,000 exclusion is subtracted first, and the marital deduction is
only $97,000. How do we know this? For two reasons. First, because
Treasury Regulation section 25.2524-1, example 2 tells us so! Secondly,
because section 2524 limits the gift tax marital deduction to "the amount
of gifts against which such deductions are applied."
Could the Treasury have been wrong in the position it took in Treasury
Regulation section 25.2524-1, example 2? It is not likely since the Treas-
ury adhered to the position with full knowledge of the hardship imposed
on some taxpayers in the years following 1971 by the advent of the quar-
terly gift tax filing requirement.4 38 The hardship is illustrated as follows.
Assume H gives W$4,000 in the first quarter of 1975. His gift tax compu-
tation would look like this:




as Limited by § 2524 (1,000)
Taxable Gift
In the second quarter of 1975 assume H gives $5,000 to W, His gift tax
computation would look like this:
Transfer to W $5,000
Less: Exclusion -0-





Prior to 1971 and the introduction of the quarterly filing requirements for
gift tax returns, ifs taxable gift for 1975 would be as follows assuming he
made no other gifts during 1975:
Transfer to W




Less: Marital Deduction (4,500)
Taxable Gift _150
Thus, there was a difference of $1,000 in the amount of gifts H was
deemed to have made in 1975 simply because of the quarterly filing re-
quirement as it integrated with the substantive provisions of the statute.
The Tax Reform Act seems to have changed the above result by indirec-
tion by providing that quarterly returns are not required until the total
gifts for the current quarter and all prior quarters exceed $25,000.4 3 9 In all
other cases, the return will be due on the 15th day of the second month
after the close of the calendar quarter." 0 In the case discussed above,
then, no gift tax returns would be due until February 15th of the year
following the one in which the gifts were made. Moreover, H will be
deemed to have made only $1,500 in taxable gifts in 1974 as is reflected in
the last example appearing above, rather than $2,500. How did the change
beneficial to the taxpayer come about? It is the direct result of the change
in the filing requirements. Thus, a substantive change was brought about
by a procedural change.
In addition, those contemplating interspousal transfers must also recog-
nize that a lifetime transfer to one's spouse of less than $200,000 against
which the gift tax marital deduction is claimed will reduce the decedent's
estate tax marital deduction.44 ' There is, however, no reduction in the es-
tate tax marital deduction if the taxpayer makes gifts of more than
$200,000 to his spouse. This rule can be expressed in these terms: The
estate tax marital deduction shall be reduced by an amount equal to the
difference between fifty percent of the total lifetime gifts and the gift tax
marital deduction claimed. Applying this rule, for example, to the
$250,000 estate tax minimum marital deduction will result in a maximum
reduction of $48,500, to a minimum of $201,500, following a single martial
gift of $103,000. This conclusion is demonstrated in the following table.
Note the dependence of the conclusions in the table on the limiting effect
439. Id. § 6075(b)(2).
440. Id § 6075(b)(1).
441. Id § 2056(c)(1)(B). The reduction in the decedent's estate tax marital deduction
will occur only if the gift to his spouse was required to be reported for federal gift tax
purposes and the gift was not made within three years of the donor's death. See Revenue
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 702(g)(1), (2), 92 Stat. 2931.
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of old section 2524 on the new marital deduction as was more fully de-
scribed earlier.
E. Planning Considerations
For effective estate planning two conclusions may be made:
(1) Bromide I: The new $250,000 minimum marital deduction prob-
ably should never be utilized. As can be seen from Schedule B
appearing at the end of this subpart, there are no tax advantages
to its utilization, and serious tax disadvantages arise at the death
of the second spouse. At best, it should be utilized only to the
extent of taking advantage of the exemption equivalent to the
unified credit available to the surviving spouse. Thus, in the case
in which H has a $300,000 estate and Ws estate is zero, H
should utilize the $250,000 alternate maximum estate tax marital
deduction by giving W $175,625.
(2) Bromide II: Effective utilization of the new unified credit is es-
sential to responsible estate planning. It is imperative that
taxpayers avoid underutilization of the exemption equivalent
($175,625) to the Unifed Credit ($47,000).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduced an extraordinary degree of
complexity into the planning for the smaller estate (those under $500,000)
under the guise of taxpayer benefit. Those who take advantage of the al-
leged benefit at the death of the first spouse-namely, the $250,000 mini-
mum marital deduction-will often pay a heavy price at the death of the
second spouse. Schedule B at the end of this subpart compares the cost of
dying under the different assumptions discussed in the balance of this sub-
part.
There are two kinds of estate planning clients. Some want property
management as well as tax planning for the property passing to their loved
ones. Others want only tax planning and would prefer to avoid the use of
trusts. Clients falling into the latter group need only a nonmarital or by-
pass trust and it is almost dishonest in such cases to routinely direct the
marital share into a life estate, power of appointment trust." 2 The client
who also wants property management to accompany his tax planning, on
the other hand, should have the benefit of both a by-pass trust and a mari-
tal trust, probably of the life estate, power of appointment variety.
In addition, when the client's estate is relatively modest, but large
enough to warrant tax planning, the formula for allocation of his assets
between the marital and nonmarital share should be determined by
whether the client wants tax planning only or tax planning coupled with
professional management of the property passing to his loved ones. For
example, if the client has an estate of $250,000 of separate property,
$175,625 should be directed to the nonmarital or by-pass trust if the client
wants both property management and tax planning. If he wants tax plan-
ning only, however, only $75,000 should be directed to the nonmarital or
by-pass trust with the balance, $175,000, directed to the surviving spouse in
fee simple to be taxed to her at her death to the extent not consumed or
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disposed of in the meantime.
44 3
Drafting such dispositive instruments is not easy. Yet, clients who do
not want the bulk of their property tied up in trust should not be thrust
into that kind of arrangement when it is unnecessary.
F. Contrast the Old with the New.- Some Examples
Under pre-1977 law, the maximum tax free transfer to a spouse was
$186,000, determined as follows:
Lifetime Transfer $ 66,000
Less: Exclusion $ 3,000
Marital Deduction 33,000
Exemption 4 4 4  30,000 (66,000)
Taxable Gifts 0
Deathtime Transfers $120,000
Less: Exemption 4 4 5  60,000
Marital Deduction 60,000 (120,000)
Taxable Estate 0-o--
After 1980, a taxpayer willing to make a lifetime transfer of $354,250 of
separate property to his spouse can transfer an additional $250,000 of sep-
arate property to her tax free at death, for a total of $604,250 tax free









Less: Marital Deduction (250,000)
Taxable Estate -0--
Adjusted Taxable Gifts $175,625
$175,625
Tentative Tax $ 47,000
Less: Unified Credit (47,000)
Tax Liability _--4)-
G. Special Incentive to Make Lifetime Gifts to One's Spouse. Trap or
Windfall?
After 1980, the combination of the unlimited $250,000 estate tax marital
deduction and the $47,000 unified credit ($175,625 exemption equivalent)
443. This assumes that the surviving spouse has no property of her own.
444. I.R.C. § 2521 (repealed for gifts made after Dec. 31, 1976 by Tax Reform Act of
1976, P.L. 94-455, § 2001(b)(3), 90 Stat. 1849).
445. I.R.C. § 2052 (repealed for estates of decedents dying after Dec. 31, 1976, by Tax
Reform Act of 1976, P.L. 94-455, § 2001(a)(4), 90 Stat. 1848).
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will allow a taxpayer to transfer $425,652 of separate property tax free to
his spouse at death. Again, as was discussed under Planning Considera-
tions above, and demonstrated in Schedule B, which appeared at the end
of that subpart, a taxpayer would never want to do this because of the
onerous tax liability that would result at Ws subsequent death.
However, a taxpayer who is willing to make a lifetime gift of $103,000 to
his spouse can actually increase the amount of separate property passing to
his spouse tax free to $480,125 and, at the same time postpone payment of
all transfer taxes (estate and gift) until his wife's subsequent death! This
argues well for making lifetime transfers to the surviving spouse. In the
meantime, of course, there is the old adage: A tax postponed is a tax saved!
This example assumes, of course, that H uses a by-pass or nonmarital trust








Less: Marital Deduction (201,500)
Taxable Estate $175,625
Adjusted Taxable Gifts -0--
Total $175,625
Tentative Tax $ 47,000
Less: Unified Credit (47,000)
Tax Liability -0-
Caveat. Note in this example that the maximum unlimited estate tax mari-
tal deduction has been reduced to $201,500 because the taxpayer used the
$100,000 unlimited gift tax marital deduction." 6
At W's Subsequent Death
Ws Taxable Estate:
fs Lifetime Gift $103,000
ifs Death-time Gift 201,500
$304,500
Adjusted Taxable Gifts _
Taxable Estate $304,500
Tentative Tax $ 89,330
Less: Unified Credit (47,000)
Tax Liability $ 42,330
Total Transfer Taxes
At fs Death -0--
At Ws Death $ 42,330
Total $ 42,330
446. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(I)(B).
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The taxpayer could gradually restore the full estate tax marital deduction
by making gifts of $3,001 to his spouse annually without gift tax cost. Or,
in lieu of making a lifetime gift of $103,000 to his spouse, he could make
annual gifts of $6,000 to his spouse without gift tax cost, without reducing
the maximum estate tax marital deduction, and without creating any ad-
justed taxable gifts.
If H declines to make lifetime transfers and holds his property until
death-time, the computation can be displayed as follows:
At Ii's Death
H's Gross Estate $480,125






























As the illustration shows, it does not cost much more to make lifetime
transfers than it does for the testator to hold his property until death. The
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real incentive for the lifetime transfer is demonstrated by the final display
showing the consequences of the spouse with the lesser estate dying first
when compared to the tax consequences when the estates are equalized or
the spouse with the larger estate dies first.
Ws Death I's Subsequent Death




Finally, the new three-year recapture rule of section 2035, which re-
places the old contemplation of death rule, should not discourage a tax-
payer from making a lifetime transfer of separate property to his spouse.
Such a turn of events would simply cause inclusion of the lifetime transfer
in the decendent's gross estate as if no transfer had been made.
XI. PRENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
With the increasing frequency of second marriages, prenuptial agree-
ments will become more common as prospective spouses attempt to pre-
serve their respective property for the benefit of their offspring from prior
unions. In addition, career minded prospective spouses might choose this
device as a means of maintaining the integrity of their respective property
interests. Furthermore, if Texas would allow self-executing agreements to
partition community property, a person who transfers property to his
spouse could stipulate that any income produced by the transferred prop-
erty is the separate property of the transferee spouse and thus prevent the
inclusion of a portion of the transferred property in the donor spouse's
gross estate under the rationale of Castleberry and its progeny.
A. Validity of Prenuptial Agreements in Other Jurisdictions
Prenuptial agreements are apparently valid in all separate property ju-
risdictions and all community property jurisdictions other than Texas.
Courts have commented that such agreements enjoy a favored place in the
law and are to be encouraged as settling marital rights." 7 Nonetheless,
447. See 2 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS
§ 90, at 90-25 & 90-30 (rev. ed. 1978, May 1978 Supp.). Similarly, antenuptial and postnup-
tial agreements were enforceable under the Spanish system of community property. See W.
DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 224, § 135. It has been pointed out that Texas stat-
utes, prior to the first Texas Constitution, declared that the community property "laws
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there are literally hundreds of cases throughout the United States invali-
dating prenuptial agreements. These are often older cases, many of which
involve surviving spouses who, because of education or experience, appear
to have been taken advantage of by their spouse.
Such agreements, however, are sustained by the courts provided:
(1) the old cases can be distinguished; and
(2) the court can be convinced that:
(a) a disproportionate distribution of the decedent's property
in favor of his spouse is not inherently evil (some courts
recite that such agreements are favored by the law but
then proceed to invalidate the agreement on grounds of
inadequate provision for the surviving spouse);
(b) in fact, contemplation of such disproportionate distribu-
tion is the primary reason for such an agreement; and,
(c) the critical issue is whether the agreement is fairly made
and whether both parties understood its terms.
To best insure that a prenuptial agreement will be upheld, each party
should be represented by separate and independent counsel, and full dis-
closure of the net worth and incomes of each party should be made." 8
B. Validity of Prenuptial Agreements in Texas
Williams v. Williams. In Williams v. Williams" 9 a husband and wife exe-
cuted a prenuptial agreement in which the wife agreed to relinquish all of
her rights in the separate property of the husband, which included the
homestead, the household furnishings, and the family car. The husband in
turn agreed to relinquish all of his rights in the wife's separate property.
The parties further agreed that "[aill income from the separate estate of
each party, including dividends, interest, rents and salaries . . . shall re-
main the separate property of each party."'45 The husband died four
months later and the wife decided to exercise her homestead rights. The
trial court held the agreement to be valid. The court of civil appeals re-
versed and held for the wife on the grounds that since the homestead right
did not arise until the death of one of the spouses, the contract purporting
to waive the wife's homestead rights was unenforceable because it at-
tempted to waive a right not then in existence.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of civil appeals and upheld
should operate only in lieu of voluntary premarital contracts." Note, Antenuptial Agree-
ments." Perspectives on the Texas Constitution and the Community Property System, 56 TEXAS
L. REV. 861, 863 (1978). The Texas Constitution did not alter this statute-it was not
changed until 1967-but the failure to provide expressly in the constitution for prenuptial
and postnuptial agreements that prospectively classify marital property allowed the courts to
find such agreements incompatible with the constitution. See text accompanying notes 449-
51 infra.
448. See, e.g., In re Borton's Estate, 393 P.2d 808 (Wyo. 1964).
449. 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978) (citing Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565
(1961); Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925); Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted); TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 5.01 (Vernon 1975)).
450. 569 S.W.2d at 869.
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the agreement to the extent it barred Mrs. Williams from claiming her
statutory rights as surviving spouse to the decedent's residence, automo-
bile, and household furnishings, all of which were his separate property.
However, the court went on to say that the agreement was void:
to the extent that income or other property acquired during marriage
should be the separate property of the party who earned or whose
property produced such income or acquisition. Such provisions were
no more than a mere agreement between*the parties to establish the
character of the property prior to its acquisition during marriage in
violation of both the Texas Constitution and the Family Code.451
451. Id. at 870 (citations omitted).
Apparently, spouses may enter into prenuptial agreements whereby one spouse agrees to
convey his portion of any community property produced during the marriage to the other
spouse as her separate property and such contracts are enforceable in Texas. The court in
Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933,judgmt adopted), expressed this
dictum by way of illustrating the function of art. 4612 of the Texas Revised Statutes of 1925,
which was the basis of the dispute in Gorman. The parties had entered into a marriage
agreement that provided that property acquired during marriage that would otherwise be
community property will be separate. The heirs of the first spouse to die asserted the valid-
ity of the agreement and asked what utility art. 4612 had if not to sanction agreements such
as their decedent entered into. Article 4612 provided, in pertinent part:
Parties intending to marry may enter into such stipulations as they may desire,
provided they be not contrary to good morals or to some rule of law; and in no
case shall they enter into an agreement, or make any renunciation, the object
of which would be to alter the legal orders of descent, either with respect to
themselves, in what concerns the inheritance of their children or posterity,
which either may have by any other person, or in respect to their common
children ....
56 S.W.2d at 857-58. The court held the agreement invalid on the ground of the Arnold v.
Leonard rule of implied exclusion. See note 7 supra.
It is difficult to perceive the distinction made by the Gorman court between contracts in
which the spouses anticipatorily agree that which would otherwise be community shall be
separate, and those contracts in which the spouses have a legally binding obligation to con-
vey community property, "when acquired," to the other spouse as her separate property.
Nonetheless, the court said:
When property has been acquired and its status once fixed as separate or com-
munity property as defined by the laws of this state, the husband and wife are
at liberty to make such disposition thereof as they please, or as they may have
obligated themselves to do in an antenuptial agreement, provided only that
the terms of such an agreement do not exceed the limitations specified in the
statute authorizing the same.
56 S.W.2d at 858.
While the Gorman court based its decision on the prohibition in art. 4612 of "stipulations
...contrary to good morals or to some rule of law," it is clear the court had to rest its
ultimate conclusion on the constitutional definition of separate property in TEX. CoNST. art.
XVI, § 15, as the rule of law that barred the agreement. Thus, the substitution of TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 5.21 (Vernon 1975) for art. 4612 is not relevant to the foregoing analysis.
In the later case of Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961), the Texas
Supreme Court continued to insist upon the same strict interpretation of the definition of
separate property in TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15 as it articulated in Arnold P. Leonard, with
the result being apparent frustration of the spouse's intent and an exaltation of form over
substance. In Hilley the court held that in order for spouses to create a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship relationship in community property, they must first partition the prop-
erty as provided in the predecessor of TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 46 (Vernon Supp. 1978-79),
and each spouse must then join in a conveyance to themselves as joint tenants with right of
survivorship. The court said a joint tenancy with right of survivorship could not be created
by the parties who simply register community property in their joint names with rights of
survivorship and ignore the intermediate partition step.
19791 1197
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This latter point was only in issue because Mrs. Williams claims that this
portion of the agreement was void-a point with which the court
agreed-and if one point of the agreement was void, the entire agreement
was void. The court held that the agreement was severable and that the
agreement's waiver of homestead rights was not affected by the fact that
another portion of the agreement was void.
Arguably, the Texas Supreme Court's declaration voiding agreements to
keep separate that property that would otherwise be community was
reached without a full consideration of the issue and, therefore, in another
case a different decision could be reached on this point. While such a
change of positions is unlikely, the current view of the court appears to
lack a policy basis. Of course, the easy retort is that the policy basis for the
court's decision is article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, defin-
ing separate property, and the rule of implied exclusion of Arnold v.
Leonard. It, nonetheless, seems rather anomalous to allow postnuptial
agreements partitioning existing community property as the constitution
has permitted since 1948, yet void agreements in which parties agree to
classify property that would otherwise be community when it comes into
being as separate property. Not anomalous, it is said, but required by the
constitution! Perhaps the draftsmen of the constitutional change simply
overlooked agreements to keep separate that which would otherwise be
community. Amending the constitution is no easy task-nor should it
be-and that may explain the failure to make further amendment. The
legislature in section 5.41 of the Texas Family Code seems to have done all
that it could in providing that persons "intending to marry" may "enter
into a marital property agreement as they may desire." Of course, it re-
mains unclear whether section 5.41 extends to postnuptial agreements.
From the face of the statute, it would appear that the legislature did not
contemplate postnuptial agreements in drafting section 5.41.
The outcome of the issue as to the validity of agreements to keep sepa-
rate that property that would otherwise be community when it comes into
existence is important to Texas domiciliaries, for as things presently stand,
transfers from one Texas spouse to the other will be recaptured on the
One possible justification for the court's view in Hilley is that Texas is committed to the
community property system as a matter of public policy, and to allow spouses to terminate
ownership interests given them by law in community property by simply registering commu-
nity property as joint tenants with right of survivorship may not be in the best interests of the
spouses. Requiring partition first may serve to induce a reflective state of mind and discour-
age overreaching.
Finally, by way of comparison, apparently all of the other community property jurisdic-
tions allow prenuptial and postnuptial contracts that purport to change the nature of marital
property acquisitions. Even the Spanish community property law allowed such contracts.
Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Interspousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L.
REV. 20, 67-68 (1967). Thus, the Texas view is strange inasmuch as Texas has adopted the
historically correct view that income from separate property is community. See note 7
supra.
It has been demonstrated that the Texas courts went to great lengths to protect the female
spouse from overreaching and fraud by her male counterpart. See Note, supra note 447, at
866-67. There was also concern about protecting creditors. Id. at 867-68.
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authority of Castleberry and included in the gross estate of the donor
spouse even where the transfer was accomplished many years before the
death of the donor. Given the importance of this issue to Texans, it is
pertinent to ask what policy considerations support the present view of the
Texas Supreme Court. Only one comes to mind. Apparently, the supreme
court believes that spouses' decisions to partition or not partition existing
community property will be more intelligently made with less fraud and
overreaching than would occur when such agreements are made prospec-
tively. While there is merit to this consideration, spouses would be simi-
larly protected by the standards of "full disclosure" and "agreements
understandably made" by which prenuptial agreements are currently judg-
ed for validity.
The Texas Supreme Court had a similar policy judgment to make in
Williams as to the validity of the portion of the prenuptial agreement that
barred the surviving spouse's claim to the homestead and exempt property.
The court noted that the rights in question are "provided by law for the
protection of the family and to secure a home for the surviving spouse"
and, for that reason, the public policy of the state, perhaps, should not
permit them to "be waived by a premarital agreement." '452 The court
stated that section 5.41 of the Texas Family Code, authorizing premarital
agreements,
should be construed as broadly as possible in order to allow the par-
ties as much flexibility to contract with respect to property or other
rights incident to the marriage, provided the constitutional and statu-
tory definitions of separate and community property or the require-
ments of public policy are not violated.453
The court, therefore, upheld the agreement, concluding that "[t]he weight
of authority and the better rule . . . allows the premarital waiver of these
rights., 454 In so doing, the court rejected Mrs. Williams' argument that
"the policy of the law favoring the security of the widow by preventing an
improvident relinquishment of the homestead, or other similar rights, is
paramount to the policy of the law favoring flexibility in premarital agree-
ments., 455 The court articulated the factors that should be considered in
determining the validity of prenuptial agreements that stipulate that prop-
erty otherwise community shall be separate. Those considerations are
whether the parties are mature individuals, whether there is any suggestion
of fraud, overreaching, or a lack of understanding, whether there is full
disclosure of the property interests, whether both parties have substantial
separate property, whether there are interests of minor children to protect,
and whether either party is adversely affected by the agreement.456
Interestingly, the constitutional prohibition against partitioning the
homestead contained in article XVI, section 52 of the Texas Constitution is
452. 569 S.W.2d at 869.
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much stronger and more direct than the rule articulated in Arnold v.
Leonard that spouses may not classify property as separate prior to acqui-
sition.457 While the former is an express constitutional prohibition,458 the
latter is merely a rule considered by the court to be a necessary derivative
of the constitutional definition of separate property set forth in article XVI,
section 15 of the Texas Constitution. Yet the court in Williams has al-
lowed the homestead to be partitioned in a prenuptial agreement, while
refusing to permit the partition of property to be acquired in the future in a
prenuptial agreement.
Possibly, as the dissent suggested, the reason that a spouse's waiver of
homestead rights had not been litigated prior to Williams is because of the
clarity of the constitutional provision, which specifically states that the
homestead shall not be partitioned. 59 The majority, however, determined
that although section 52 grants a "surviving" spouse the right to occupy the
homestead, it cannot be construed as "a constitutional prohibition to a
waiver of that right by prospective spouses.
' 460
With federal tax decisions like Castleberry and McKee hanging over-
head, the rule of implied exclusion46' as applied to prenuptial agreements
will continue to haunt Texas taxpayers. Fortunately, it appears that the
income produced by transfers in trust can be earmarked as separate prop-
erty to avoid Wyy. 4 6 2
Other Texas Cases. Huff v. Huff"463 presents the classic case. In Septem-
ber 1967, two days before their marriage, Jessie and Louis Huff, then dom-
iciled in Louisiana, entered into a prenuptial agreement declaring that the
property they acquired during marriage that otherwise would be commu-
nity would remain the separate property of the person producing the prop-
erty. They moved to Dallas in June 1968, where they resided until
divorced. Incident to their divorce Jessie sought to have the contract de-
clared invalid, although the contract was valid under Louisiana law. In
1977, prior to the Williams decision by the supreme court, the Waco court
of civil appeals upheld the Huff agreement as not in violation of Texas
457. Id at 874 (Chadick, J., dissenting). TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52 provides that a
homestead
shall not be partitioned among the heirs of the deceased during the lifetime of
the surviving husband or wife, or so long as the survivor may elect to use or
occupy the same as a homestead, or so long as the guardian of the minor
children of the deceased may be permitted, under the order of the proper court
having the jurisdiction, to use and occupy the same.
458. But see McLeod v. Board, 30 Tex. 239 (1869). The supreme court held that a pre-
nuptial agreement barred a surviving spouse's claim to intestate property. "That the hus-
band may be excluded, by an express stipulation, from all interest or participation in the
distribution on the death of the wife of property settled by marriage contract to her sole and
separate use is not a matter of dispute." Id at 244.
459. 569 S.W.2d at 874.
460. Id at 870.
461. See note 7 supra.
462. See notes 309-15 supra and accompanying text.
463. 554 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1977, writ dism'd).
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Constitution article XVI, section 15, and stated it was sanctioned by Texas
Family Code section 5.41.
Huff v. Huff would seem to declare that Texas allows prenuptial agree-
ments which anticipatorily partition or allow property that otherwise
would be community to remain the separate property of the person pro-
ducing the property. If Huff is good law, taxpayers could avoid
Castleberry and McKee results by agreeing with their donee spouses at the
time of the transfer that income from the transferred property will be the
separate property of the donee spouse.
Since Williams, the value of Huff as precedent is in doubt. Moreover,
while Huff states that the Louisiana premarital agreement to change future
community income to separate property income does not violate the Texas
Constitution article XVI, section 15, or Texas Family Code section 5.41,
which sanctions premarital agreements "as they may desire," the court's
actual judgment was merely to affirm the trial court's judgment which
"gave effect to this agreement in its division of the property" within its
wide discretion to make division of the property.
Arguably, Huff does not hold that the agreement was valid in Louisiana
and, therefore, was valid in Texas; nor, arguably, does it question prior
precedents that hold such agreements to be invalid. It could be said that
the decision of the trial court merely adopted the agreement for the pur-
pose of dividing the property existing at time of divorce.
The remaining Texas cases on this point support the decision in
Williams. For example, in Amarillo National Bank v. Liston4 64 and Chan-
dler v. Alamo Manufacturing Co.46 5 the respective courts declared that
both prenuptial and postnuptial agreements that attempted to change the
character of community property income to separate property were void.
In Chandler a gift of rentals before they accrued was void, and in Liston a
gift of interest and earnings before they accrued was void.
C. Postnuptial Agreements
Annual partition agreements with respect to community income gener-
ated by the transferred property would be effective to take that income out
of the decedent's estate. They, however, would not abrogate the existence
of the decedent's right to the income from the transferred property, and it
is the right to income that determines includability of the transferred prop-
erty in the decedent's gross estate under Castleberry and its progeny.
The Texas precedents are difficult to categorize, although there is clear
authority invalidating postnuptial agreements that purport to anticipato-
rily partition income that would otherwise be community property when it
comes into being. In Armstrong v. Turbeville,46 6 for example, the court
464. 464 S.W.2d 395, 407 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
465. 140 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1940, no writ). See also Frame v:
Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W.2d 152 (1931); Brokaw v. Collett, 1 S.W.2d 1090 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1928, judgmt adopted).
466. 216 S.W. 1101 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1919, writ dism'd); accord, Strickland v.
19791 1201
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held that H and W cannot by mere postnuptial agreement change the
character of property to be thereafter acquired so as to convert community
property into separate property. The court, however, noted that this does
not prevent a spouse from making a gift to his spouse of his interest in
community property "then in esse," when it can be done without injury to
the rights of others. Thus, the community property status of rents collected
was not affected by H and Ws agreement to treat rents as separate prop-
erty. Only when the agreement was observed and actually carried out by
delivery of the rents to the possession of W, would the collected rents be-
come the separate property of W by gift, unless such would be in fraud of
creditor's rights.
George v. Reynolds467 presents the classic case of a postnuptial separa-
tion agreement. Upon IFs death, W challenged the validity of the agree-
ment, which the two had entered into thirty-one years earlier, and won.
Although the court recognized that postnuptial agreements between H and
Wwho are separating will be upheld when fair and equitable, it refused to
imply that H and W have the power to change the status of property there-
after acquired from community to separate by mere agreement made in
advance.
D. The Will Contract Precedents
The Texas Supreme Court has indulged the development of a curious
precedent in the will contract cases of Graser v. Graser,468 decided in 1948,
and Weidner v. Crowther,469 decided in 1957. Article 4610 of the Texas
Revised Civil Statutes, since repealed,47 ° prohibited prenuptial agreements
that "alter the legal orders of descent." This led the court in Graser to
invalidate a prenuptial agreement that called for each spouse to make a
will in favor of the other spouse. Later, in Weidner, the court upheld a
contract calling for reciprocal wills where one spouse had kept his bargain
by dying with a will that complied with the terms of the contract. Even
though the surviving spouse refused the benefits provided her by the dece-
dent's will, the court said she was bound to leave a will that was in compli-
ance with the contract. The court explained that while article 4610 applied
by its terms only to prenuptial agreements, the courts as a matter of policy
Wester, 131 Tex. 23, 112 S.W.2d 1047 (1938); Cauble v. Beaver-Electra Ref. Co., 115 Tex. 1,
274 S.W. 120 (1925). Davis v. Davis, 108 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no
writ), indicated that in order for personal earnings of W, earned monthly, to be changed
from community property to separate property, it would be necessary for H, each month, as
the income was earned, to make a gift of the same to W See Speckels v. Kneip, 170 S.W.2d
255 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1942, writ ref'd). Contra, Corrigan v. Goss, 160 S.W. 652
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1913, writ ref d).
467. 53 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1932, writ dism'd); cf Jernigan v. Scott,
518 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref d n.r.e.). In Jernigan the court
applied "laches-type" reasoning, and held Wwas precluded from attacking an agreement's
validity because of a 30-year delay and acquiescence. Jernigan implied the agreement
would have been invalid but for the fact that W was barred from arguing this issue.
468. 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
469. 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
470. 1969 Tex. Gen. Laws ch. 888, § 6, at 2733.
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had extended it to postnuptial agreements as well; nonetheless, article 4610
could not apply to contractual wills because article 8281 of the Texas Re-
vised Civil Statutes, authorizing the making of wills, is "[o]f equal dignity
with Article 46 lO.,'
4 7 1
Thus, the Texas Supreme Court is in the anomalous position of saying
that it will validate contracts that the legislature has declared illegal, but it
will not validate contracts that the constitution allegedly declares illegal.
That is, the supreme court refuses to validate prenuptial or postnuptial
contracts that purport to declare that property that would otherwise be
community shall be separate on the grounds that article XVI, section 15 of
the Texas Constitution prohibits such contracts. Yet, in Gorman v.
Gause472 the court stated in a dictum that spouses may enter into premari-
tal agreements whereby one spouse agrees to convey his portion of any
community property produced during marriage to the other spouse as her
separate property.
Perhaps one unarticulated basis for reconciling Williams, Weidner, and
the Gorman dictum is that the court wishes to avoid protracted litigation
by limiting the possible ways that spouses can accomplish partition of their
community property by requiring strict compliance with the legislation im-
plementing the 1948 constitutional grant of authority to spouses to parti-
tion their community property.4 73 For example, in the famous case of
Spinks v. Rice4 74 the Virginia Supreme Court held that the legislature did
not contemplate that people could pass property at the time of death by
contract. While contracts to make or not make a will are generally en-
forced,4" the contract is not the dispositive instrument anymore than is the
contract to sell real estate. Contracts to sell real estate contemplate deliv-
ery of a deed, and the making of the deed will be required if the contract is
deemed enforceable. So, too, could the Texas Supreme Court be saying
that death-time transfers of property are accomplished by will, lifetime
transfers of property are accomplished by deed, and partitions of commu-
nity property are accomplished in the manner specified by the legislature.
None of the foregoing can be accomplished by self-executing agreements.
This literalism, the supreme court perhaps believes, should lighten the ju-
dicial burden in that it avoids litigation over various informal arrange-
ments where proof is at a minimum. Otherwise, there is no justification for
enforcing contracts to make wills, deeds, and partitions and declining en-
forcement of self-executing agreements to accomplish the task of passing
property interests.
Perhaps it is worth noting that the supreme court in Weidner said that
mutual wills will be enforced when the terms of the will are not inequita-
471. 157 Tex. 240, 247, 301 S.W.2d 621, 625 (1957).
472. 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933, judgmt adopted), discussed at note 451
supra.
473. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
474. 187 Va. 730, 47 S.E.2d 424 (1948), noted in 34 VA. L. REV. 741 (1948).
475. Comment, The Contractual Will: Inpitation to Litigation and Excess Taxation, 48
TEXAS L. REV. 909 (1970).
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ble. "We are not called upon in this case to decide whether one could
obtain the aid of a court of equity to enforce an inequitable disposition of
property by a mutual will. '47 6 Apparently, then, there are good will con-
tracts and bad will contracts. Is this to suggest that the Texas Supreme
Court may not, after all, recognize contracts in which spouses bind them-
selves to later accomplish a property transfer, the effect of.which is to pro-
spectively determine the status of their property? In other words, the result
in Weidner may have been reached on equity principles and not because
the court recognized the validity of the contract.477
However, if the dictum in Gorman is correct, it would seem possible to
avoid the application of Castleberry by having the donor spouse and donee
spouse contract at the time of the transfer for the donor spouse to convey
to his spouse his interest in any community income produced by the trans-
ferred property. In such a case, the only interest he has retained is the
consideration he received from the donee in return for his promise. Query
what consideration could be used, keeping in mind the requirement of
Treasury Regulation section 25.2512-8 that transfers must be for adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth.4 78 Could she agree to
make a similar promise with respect to community income produced by
property not involved in the transfer? How would you value her promise?
E. Conclusion
In light of the constitutional grant of authority to spouses to partition
community property once it comes into being, one can only speculate
about what policy considerations would warrant a court to invalidate a
marital agreement in which the parties anticipatorily partition their com-
munity property by declaring that neither spouse shall have any interest in
that property that would be the other spouse's sole management commu-
nity property if the marital agreement were not in force. Perhaps the
courts perceive that a more informed decision to partition or not partition
can be made by the spouses after the property is in existence and its value
can be ascertained.
Nonetheless, it seems that the justices of the Texas Supreme Court must
be curious about the justification for the rule of implied exclusion in Ar-
nold v. Leonard. The court held in Williams that a spouse can waive a
specific prohibition in the Texas Constitution; it has been said in Gorman v.
Gause that a prenuptial contract to transfer community property to the
other spouse is valid; yet in Williams, on the authority of Gorman, and in
476. 157 Tex. 240, 246, 301 S.W.2d 621, 625 (1957).
477. It has been suggested that as the result of the repeal of art. 4610, Weidner should be
read as allowing prospective spouses "to execute an enforceable postnuptial agreement di-
recting distribution of their property even though the agreement is not embodied in a will."
Note, supra note 447, at 877-78. It was even suggested that such contracts should be given in
the event of divorce. Id at 880. The difficulty with that proposition is that antenuptial
agreements are sometimes declared inoperative in the case of divorce of the parties even if
the agreement expressly contemplates divorce. See Berall, Estate Planning for the Second
Spouse, in I NOTRE DAME EST. PLAN. INST. 343, 359 (R. Campfield ed. 1977).
478. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
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Arnold v. Leonard it held that the constitution prohibits any expansion of
the definition of separate property even though the constitution says no
such thing. Thus the court must find itself in the anomalous position of
saying a spouse can waive an express constitutional prohibition-the
homestead right-but cannot alter a judicially implied constitutional pro-
hibition.
The time has come to re-examine the validity of Arnold v. Leonard.
There may in fact be some policy reason for sustaining that decision, but
so long as contracts to partition or transfer later are sustained, such policy
justification for the rule of Arnold v. Leonard is difficult to identify. In the
meantime, however, Texas spouses who wish to make interspousal trans-
fers will be frustrated by Castleberry until the Fifth Circuit reverses the
Tax Court or Texas changes its law and allows self-executing agreements
to partititon community property. Fortunately, it appears that the income
produced by property transferred in trust can be earmarked as separate
property to avoid Wyly.
XII. DISCLAIMERS
Even if spouses may not anticipatorily agree between themselves that
property that is ordinarily community shall be separate, is it possible for
one spouse to disclaim or refuse to accept any community interest he ob-
tains by operation of law? While federal taxing legislation expressly con-
templates disclaimer,479 federal tax law follows state property law
determinations, and state law would seem to bar an effective disclaimer.48°
XIII. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court decisions in Castleberry and its progeny have raised a
number of important issues relative to the orderly administration of the tax
laws. An initial question is whether a transferor can be deemed to have
retained an interest in transferred property for purposes of section 2036(a)
479. I.R.C. § 2518.
480. See Williams v. Williams, 569 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1978), discussed at notes 448-57
supra and accompanying text. Except where the legislature has acted to change the common
law, renunciation, disclaimer, or refusal to accept property acquired by operation of law,
such as inherited property, is not permitted. See, e.g., Coomes v. Finegan, 233 Iowa 448, 7
N.W.2d 729 (1943). See generally Howe, Renunciation by the Heir, Devisee or Legatee, 42
Ky. L.J. 605 (1954); Newman, Substantive and Tax Aspects of Disclaimers and Renunciations,
7 INST. EST. PLAN. §§ 73.500-.504.1 (1973); Newman & Kalter, The Needfor Disclaimer
Legislation-An Analysis of the Background and Current Law, 28 TAX LAW. 571 (1975);
Newman & Kalter, Disclaimers of Future Interests: Continuing Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 827 (1974). TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37A (Vernon Supp.
1978-79) expressly permits disclaimer of property to be received "under any will of or by
inheritance from a decedent." While community property comes into being by operation of
law, it is not acquired by will or inheritance. Accordingly, it is doubtful whether disclaimer
of a community interest would be permitted even though partition of community property is
permitted, TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15, after the community property comes into being. Dis-
claimers, not being expressly sanctioned by the legislature would be barred by the common
law rule. In addition, the policy of Texas is to prohibit anticipatory alterations in the char-




when his only interest in the transferred property is that given him by op-
eration of state property law. In 1977 the Louisiana district court in Estate
of Deobald v. United States held that for purposes of invoking section
2036(a)(1), the retained interest must be retained by prearrangement, be it
express or implied. Similarly, in 1966, the Tax Court in Estate ofAllen D.
Gutchess held that retention by operation of law is not retention under the
transfer as required by section 2036(a)(1). While the Commissioner acqui-
esced in Gutchess in 1967, his nonacquiescence in Estate of Robert W Weir
in 1966 suggested that he saw a difference between the case where a tax-
payer in a separate property jurisdiction conveyed his residence to his
spouse and continued to occupy it until his death and the case where a
Texas taxpayer does the very same thing. The Commissioner appears not
to have explained the difference. In Castleberry, for example, the Tax
Court distinguished its prior decision in Gutchess on the grounds that Mrs.
Gutchess could freely exclude Mr. Gutchess from the premises he trans-
ferred to her while Mrs. Castleberry could not defeat Mr. Castleberry's
right under Texas law to one-half the income produced by the property he
transferred to her. The Tax Court failed to appreciate that while Mrs. Cas-
tleberry could not deprive her husband of his community one-half interest
in the income produced by the transferred property, she could deprive him
of any future income by dissipating the transferred property, by divorcing
him, by departing to another jurisdiction, or by dying with a will in favor
of someone other than Mr. Castleberry. It appears from the opinion in
Gutchess that Mrs. Gutchess would have to do even more. She could ex-
clude Mr. Gutchess from the premises he transferred to her only by ob-
taining a court order. Like Mrs. Castleberry, Mrs. Gutchess could not
recover the enjoyment her husband experienced by having remained upon
her premises after the transfer.
While not meaning to belabor the comparison of Castleberry and
Gutchess, it is important to note that the Tax Court chose not to directly
confront the obvious inconsistency between its holding in Gutchess that
retention by operation of law was not contemplated by section 2036(a) and
its holding in Castleberry. In choosing to distinguish the cases on the
grounds noted above, the Tax Court instead suggested a fundamental
weakness in its conclusion. The question is how could Mr. Castleberry
have retained an interest in the transferred property if his spouse could
deprive him of that interest by death, departure, dissipation, or divorce. In
such an event all he would have would be the income produced by the
transferred property prior to occurrence of the terminating event. Reten-
tion by definition would seem to contemplate more. It would seem to con-
template a legally enforceable right, or at the very minimum, some
prearrangement with the donee whereby the donee agreed to cause, or, in
fact, caused, the transferred property to produce income or other benefit
for the donor.
It is unfortunate, too, that the Tax Court in Castleberry confused the
transferred property, which was the donee's separate property, with the
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income produced by that property. It was the income produced that was
community property and not subject to the donee spouse's death, dissipa-
tion, divorce, or departure. Had the Tax Court been able to keep this dis-
tinction in mind, it would, perhaps, have reached a different result.
Thus, retention by operation of law is the first issue in Castleberry.
There would seem to be no reason why section 2036(a) would not reach an
interest retained by operation of law. But the important question is
whether an interest could be retained at all if the underlying property in
which the interest is allegedly retained is subject to the donee's unfettered
dominion and control.
A further question raised by Castleberry is what kind of interest is
reached by section 2036(a). Does section 2036(a) reach any interest in
transferred property or must the interest represent a substantial present
economic benefit as suggested by the United States Supreme Court in
United States v. Byrum. Without considering the standard set down by the
Supreme Court, the court in Castleberry said that section 2036(a) reached
any interest which was not illusory. The illusory standard and the substan-
tial present economic benefit standard are radically different. For exam-
ple, the community income produced by the property Mr. Castleberry
transferred to his wife as her separate property is subject to his spouse's
sole management. The only restriction on her management of this com-
munity income produced by her separate property is that she cannot dis-
pose of it in such a way as to constitute a fraud on the community. The
Texas cases are such that there is little that the managing spouse cannot
do. The cases are few that find the managing spouse has defrauded the
community by her conduct. Accordingly, if the standard is one of illusori-
ness, then, Mr. Castleberry may have the kind of interest that section
2036(a) would reach. But if the Supreme Court's standard of substantial
present economic benefit is to prevail, then it is doubtful that his interest
has the requisite quality. Thus, despite the fact that Mr. Castleberry's
community one-half of the income produced by the transferred property
will be included in his estate for federal estate tax purposes and will be
subject to disposition by him in his will, the transferred property will not
be included in his estate.
The Wyy, case raises an issue beyond those raised in Castleberry. That
issue is whether trust income is community or separate property in Texas.
Careful examination of the cases that have considered this question leads
inexorably to the conclusion that trust income is separate property. At the
very least, there seems to be some unanimity that a settlor of a trust can
earmark the trust income as separate property.
Assuming, however, that a court concludes that trust income is commu-
nity, Wyly should be reversed for the same reasons Castleberry should be
reversed. Mrs. Wyly's claim is not as strong as Mrs. Castleberry's, but
Mrs. Wyly had the right to withdraw $5,000 of trust corpus annually. This
draw down power is a general power of appointment, and for purposes of
federal estate and gift taxation, a general power is tantamount to owner-
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ship. Thus, Mrs. Wyly and Mrs. Castleberry are in relatively the same
position. Both of them can defeat their respective spouse's right to any
income produced by the transferred property by merely divorcing their
respective spouses, leaving Texas, by dissipating the transferred property,
or by dying prior to their respective spouses.
For the taxpayer contemplating a transfer to his spouse, in most in-
stances there will be little incentive to do so. But if that incentive exists in
a particular case, the donor can avoid the application of Castleberry and
Wyly by making the transfer in trust and earmarking the income as his
spouse's separate property. The same result can probably be obtained if
all trust distributions are discretionary with the trustee.
This suggestion indicates the harshness of the rules of Castleberry and
Wyly. Is it possible that Congress contemplated penalizing Texas taxpay-
ers who make gifts to their spouses? Highly unlikely. That is not to say,
however, that section 2036(a) should not apply when one Texas spouse
transfers property to his spouse with the intention of enjoying one-half the
community income produced by that property as a result of a prearrange-
ment or agreement with his spouse. This latter situation is different from
both Castleberry and Wyly.
The harshness of the results in Castleberry and Wyy are exacerbated
because there is little Texas taxpayers can do short of divorce to insulate
interspousal transfers from the reach of the rules announced in these cases.
For example, while Texas taxpayers can make such transfers in trust, they
cannot enter into self-executing prenuptial agreements that provide that
income produced by each spouse's separate property shall constitute that
spouse's separate property. While there seems no good reason for such a
rule, the Texas Supreme Court in 1978 reaffirmed its belief that the Texas
Constitution bars such agreements.
If Castleberry and Wy y are sustained on appeal, Texas must consider
changing its constitution 481  or seeking congressional relief. In the
meantime, if Castleberry and Wyly are sustained:
(1) One-half of all transfers of separate property made in fee simple
to a spouse during the donor spouse's lifetime will be included in
the donor's estate.
(2) One-fourth of all transfers of community property made in fee
simple to a spouse during the donor spouse's lifetime will be in-
cluded in the donor's gross estate.
481. See, e.g., Tex. H.J.R. 54 (1979).
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